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Preface
These four papers consider food policy issues in three countries,
Zambia, Bangladesh, and India, from the viewpoints of short-term adjustment to
the energy crisis and the longer-term impact of food policy on poverty,
malnutrition, and food security. The first paper presents an overview of
these issues drawing upon the three country case studies.
As a general conclusion, the papers suggest that external economic
pressures during the 1970s aggravated agricultural production and food supply
problems, but in none of the case study countries were such external pressures
the cause for a serious food supply problem. International measures, such as
the IMF's cereal financing facility or international grain price stabilization
measures and food aid could ameliorate the problems of food insecurity. Less
easy to generate is the efficacy of public intervention in food systems, which
is widespread among low-income countries. Such interventions are frequently
of benefit only to urban groups (but often including the poorest among them);
they can undermine producers' incentives and pose major problems of food
supply management, especially the use of stocks and imports. At the same
time, there is scope for manipulating the supply and price of basic food
staples to produce cheap calories for the poor.
The paper on Zambia describes the dimensions of poverty and food
insecurity and distinguishes the groups affected: urban dwellers, subsistence
farmers, emergent farmers, and commercial farmers. Although in general public
intervention through subsidies and parastatal marketing has not favored
producers, there is a case for subsidizing and fortifying roller meal (the
cheaper maize product) and for better nutrition education. For rural groups,
production-oriented measures appear most appropriate -- agricultural research,
better infrastructure and services, higher prices, and "micro capital" for the
poorest.
Bangladesh's complex and vulnerable food system is examined through
the analysis of its three crises of the 1970s: the Sylhet floods of 1977, the
drought of 1978/79, and the Bangladesh famine of 1973-75. Some clear
implications for policy emerge: the need for better monitoring and
information systems, more flexible and longer-term commitments of food aid,
and higher levels of domestic food stocks at or near distribution points. The
food distribution system, which employs rationing, appears to have more
benefits than costs, but its benefits are skewed towards groups whose need is
not the greatest. Systems employing more open market sales would be a lower-
cost method of stabilization, but there are reasons for proceeding cautiously
in raising food prices: the disproportionate effect on low-income groups and
possibly disproportionate benefits to larger producers.
In aggregate, India's food security at the outset of the 1980s
appears healthy, even in the face of external shocks; foodgrain output has
outpaced population growth, reflecting technical improvements, greater
resources and incentives devoted to food production, and high levels of
public-sector foodgrain stocks during 1975/76-1978/79. But serious risks
still affect the 15 percent or so of India's population at or below the margin
of caloric adequacy. (This relatively low estimate of the undernourished is
elaborated in the paper.) These groups are concentrated in districts and
- vii -
states where relatively little progress has been made in raising yields or
double-cropping; the variability of crop output remains high; "poor people's
crops remain the most vulnerable to input fluctuations. But the
"international" causes of food insecurity -- scarcer energy, global food
supply fluctuation -- will probably continue to have relatively small effects
on total domestic food supply.
Robert Liebenthal
World Development Report
Core Group
Development Policy Staff
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the author and should
not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to any
individual acting on their behalf.
Part 1
Food Policy Issues in Low-Income Countries: An Overview
Prepared by: Edward J. Clay
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
Brighton BN1 9RE, England
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper and the other supporting background country case studies
focus simultaneously on two sets of issues that have an important place in
World Development Report 1981. First, there are the problems of a short-term
adjustment to a second international energy crisis and the recession in the
world economy that impinge upon agriculture and food consumption in low income
countries. Second, there is the longer-term question of agriculture and rural
development that has significant effects on poverty, malnutrition, and food
insecurity in low-income countries.
A recurrent theme in the analysis of the agricultural production
problem is the importance, but frequent lack of, adequate material incentives
for producers in developing countries (e.g. Schultz, 1978). This lack of
incentives is seen to be in large measure the consequence of the complex of
interventions in food markets by governments preoccupied with short-term
problems of providing cheap (relative to world prices) and secure supplies of
basic food staples, particularly for urban consumers.
The problem of incentives is therefore a problem of public policy.
However, the central aspect of this problem is the extent to which there is
genuine tension in public policy and inevitable trade-offs between containing
short-term problems of food insecurity and the provision of incentives for
the longer-term solution of these problems. There is near-unanimity on the
point that sustained production and productivity increases require time to
bring about. The area of dispute is in the character and significance of the
problems of food insecurity and the other pressures that shape food policies in
low-income countries. This is the concern of this paper and the accompanying
country case studies, which focus largely on the consumption side issues
within the food systems of low-income countries and the associated public
policy problems at national and international levels.
In considering these issues, we have chosen to focus on a small
number of case study countries that have experienced serious food system
problems during the 1970s and also have significantly different economic
structures. These differences include resources, demographic and socio-
political characteristics, and size. The countries chosen for study are
Zambia, Bangladesh, and India (Parts 2, 3, and 4 of this volume). In
addition we have drawn upon the experiences of Indonesia and Sri Lanka,
as documented in recent studies of their food systems.l/ Our starting
point was to indicate the dimensions of the problems of poverty, malnutri-
tion, and food insecurity in each of the case study countries. These
terms are frequently used very loosely, and we have endeavored to use
specific terms in talking about malnutrition and food insecurity
at national, regional, or individual levels. Within this context, we
looked at three sets of issues:
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(1) The problem of adjustments to instability in domestic
production and the extent to which problems of mal-
nutrition and food insecurity are essentially issues
within the national economy resulting from the structure
of that economy and fluctuations in food supply.
(2) The role of external economic pressures from the inter-
national economy, in particular adjustments to events
such as the substantial rises in oil prices and problems
of foodgrain supply.
(3) The role of public policy, both domestic and inter-
national, in either worsening or ameliorating the problems
of malnutrition and food insecurity.
In undertaking this structured review of problems on a case-study
basis, the question most in mind was the extent to which there are common
themes and problems that transcend wide differences in the economic structures
of low-income countries. Are all problems of food insecurity country- and
region-specific, reflecting different structural problems? To what extent
are the issues problems of policy? If they are, what are the problems to be
tackled? To what extent do policy prescriptions need to be modified for
different contexts and different periods? For example, Schultz (1978) and
others have suggested that the problems of poor food sector performance have
been severely aggravated by public interventions. In general, the change
required to put the agricultural economies of low-income countries on a better
footing is to roll back the frontiers of the state and leave a wider area of
activity in food production and agricultural distribution to market forces. If
problems are country and region specific rather than general in character, does
this have implications for the appropriate forms of assistance the international
community should provide for lQw-income countries and the appropriate forms of
international food security? For example, international food security buffer
stocks represent an attempt to improve simultaneously the international environ-
ment of all low-income countries, whereas a food-financing facility is more
obviously a mechanism that can be tailored to a variety of circumstances, (see
Goreux, 1981).
1/ In particular we drew extensively on the work of Timmer (1980) and others
on the rice economies of South East Asia. The Food and Nutrition Policy
Planning Division of the Ministry of Plan Implementation (1980) surveyed
nutritional status and the impact of a range of nutrition interventions
including food stamps immediately after the sweeping food policy reforms
in Sri Lanka. A Harvard Group (Levinson, 1980; Timmer, 1980a) has also
reviewed the provisional evidence on the income and nutritional effects of
these reforms. Another important source of material has been the studies
of public food systems undertaken by the Economic and Policy Division,
Agriculture and Rural Development Department (AGREP) of the World Bank
during 1970/80 (Scandizzo, 1970, 1980, 1980a).
II. SOME COMMON THEMES OF FOOD INSECURITY AND POVERTY
The country case studies, though few in number, indicate some
plausible generalizations about the nature of malnutrition and food
insecurity problems in low-income countries and provide some common themes
for policy analysis. Food insecurity is a problem most often conceptualized
as a macro phenomenon -- deviations from trends in aggregate consumption.
However, as a human problem it is primarily one of the welfare vuluierability
of distinct categories of people within the population. The case studies
show the importance of clearly recognizing the distinct poverty problems and
sources of vulnerability of these groups.
First, it is important to differentiate between the problems of
the urban poor and the rural poor. The majority of urban households in
low-income countries spend a high proportion of income on basic foods. The
effects of fluctuations in food prices on income are therefore significant
and present severe difficulties in obtaining food for those on fixed incomes.,/
The problems are most acute for the poor: low wages, irregular employment,
unemployment, and disabilities make them especially vulnerable. Their
access to capital markets is more restricted, and the cost of credit is
higher. The poorest urban dwellers are also likely to be the most directly
affected by crisis in the countryside, which produces an influx of migrants
who will compete for unskilled and casual employment. When compensating
measures are absent, higher food prices have direct and adverse effects on
the welfare of the urban poor.
The major sources of rural proverty, malnutrition, and food
insecurity lie in the structure of domestic agricultural production.
Characteristically, poverty and malnutrition have a well-defined regional,
seasonal, demographic, and social structural character. However, there
is a considerable difference between the structure of asset-holding and
production in South Asian peasant economies and the less densely settled
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
In terms of their access to and control over productive assets
the poor are differentiated in three broad categories: the rural landless,
near-subsistence households, and poor farmers producing marketable surpluses.
In rural South Asia the poorest and most vulnerable groups are the
landless and the marginal agricultural producers. These broad categories
include groups that are subject to different pressures on food consumption
and have varying capacities to adjust to short-term difficulties. The main
group among the landless we will categorize as "village labor": households
1/ For example, over one-third of the expenditure of more than 75 per cent
of urban households in Bangladesh was accounted for by rice and wheat in
1973/74.
whose primary source of income is work on the holdings of other rural
households. These earnings are supplemented by a range of ancillary
activities such as porterage, food processing, and petty trading, as
well as their own cultivation. Fluctuations in production also directly
affect the level of agricultural and related employment. When a crop is
lost or yields are severely damaged due to drought or flood, there is
less work in inter-cultivation, harvesting and post-harvest operations,
also probably putting downward pressure on real wage rates at a time of
rising food prices.
Established seasonal migration of labor and traditional forms of
payment in kind for operations such as harvesting have been important mecha-
nisms for coping with the problems of periodic underemployment and food
insecurity among agricultural laborers. However, these traditional payment
systems are being displaced in many regions by market-determined wages (Asian
Development Bank, 1977), sometimes facilitated by the increasing flow of
migrant labor (Clay, 1976). Such institutional changes, by forcing agricul-
tural labor to bear a greater share of the adjustment costs of upward food
price fluctuations, increase the food insecurity of this most vulnerable
group within rural society.
The landless group is roughly coterminous with those identified
as landless, i.e. without agricultural land, and near landless, i.e., with
holdings too small to provide more than a fraction of household food. In
Bangladesh a number of surveys show that over 30 percent of rural households
are without agricultural land, and in some districts of north-east India the
proportion is over 40 percent. In Bangladesh a further 20 percent of
households have occupancy rights to less than 0.2 ha (0.5 acres). Existing
patterns of tenancy do not have a significant redistributive effect in favor
of these groups. The typical tenant is a peasant, with his own draft animals
and equipment, holding in excess of 0.4 ha, who rents additional land.l/
The share-cropper is more likely to belong to the third category (poor
farmers producing marketable surpluses) and share rentals to represent a
significant proportion of the marketed output of, for example, jute.
Plantation workers are a numerically significant subgroup among
the landless in some regions of Bangladesh, India, and particularly,
Sri Lanka (Isenman, 1980a). They are paid in cash and depend largely upon
marketed food supplies. Their employment is seasonal and also affected, as
are wage rates, by the profitability of export crop production. Their real
incomes are therefore more sensitive than those of village labor to movements
in domestic food prices and the state of the world economy.
1/ There is now considerable empirical evidence in the form of Ph.D theses
to substantiate these generalizations, which find an early statement in
Bell's (1977) review of evidence on the productivity effects of share-
cropping in N.E. Bihar.
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The circumstances in which plantation labor was permanently
recruited also created a spatially and culturally isolated workforce. The
factors have in turn resulted in poor, nutritionally-vulnerable populations
by inhibiting or precluding seasonal and longer-term migration to find
supplementary employment or alternative livelihoods. Plantation labor in
South Asia constitutes a special problem group, whose circumstances are
reflected, for example, by their explicit inclusion in public ration distri-
bution in Bangladesh.
The wholly landless are nutritionally more vulnerable than those
with homestead plots and access to grazing for animals. The next most
vulnerable category are marginal farming households. They differ from the
near-landless by obtaining the greater part o' their income from their own
cultivation. Their holdings, whether or not supplemented by produce from
rented land, yield incomes that are barely adequate to provide for family
subsistence. Households are locked into patterns of seasonal food deficits
and indebtedness that amplify fluctuations in food prices through "forced"
post-harvest sales and pre-harvest purchases. Long-term debt is also slowly
forcing marginal producers to dispose of assets. Periods of crisis, such as
the 1973/74 famine in Bangladesh, precipitate this process of pauperization.
In the short term, possession of saleable assets provides a line of credit
that makes the marginal farmer less vulnerable than the landless. But in the
long term the dynamic instability of this group threatens to aggravate
problems of proverty and food insecurity by swelling the ranks of the landless,
and interventions to improve the position of the marginal and small farmers
have been an important feature of agricultural policy during the past decade.
The high levels of landlessness, secular patterns of computation
of wage payments and the seasonal food deficits of marginal producers all
contribute to make the rural poor an important segment of the market for
food staples (Clay, 1980; Part 3 of this volume). In the still predominantly
rural economies of Bangladesh and the more backward states of India, the poor
constitute an important segment of the market for food staples. For example,
in Bangladesh rural consumers probably represent two-thirds of the market for
food grains (Clay, 1980).
In contrast, almost all rural people in Africa are engaged in
subsistence production. The market impinges upon them to the extent
that they are surplus producers of agricultural commodities (see Chambers
and Singer, 1980; Part 2 of this volume).1 / These differences of
1/ Nomadic pastoralists are an important group in many African societies.
Their distinctive food security problems are centered on the difficulties
and long time periods required to rebuild herds and flocks after these
have been decimated by drought or disease. The problems of pastoralists,
which are outside the scope of this review, have become the focus of
important international activities such as those of the International
Livestock Center for Africa and the International Laboratory for Research
of Animal Diseases.
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economic structure have significantly different implications in terms of the
trade-offs involved in price policy. In Africa the short-term distributional
conflict involved in price policy is essentially between rural producers and
urban consumers. Chambers and Singer see the conflict of interests involved in
price policy in Zambia as rural-urban, complicated by discrimination between
commodities. In densely-settled countries with large numbers of rural consumers
the trade-offs are more complex and also involve the welfare of the rural poor.
In the case of Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1979; Pitt, 1980; Part 3 of this volume)
Indonesia (Timmer, 1980) and Sri Lanka (Timmer, 1980a) there is a potential
short-term conflict of interest between surplus and potential surplus agri-
cultural producers and the rural poor. The problem is well summarized by Timmer
(1980a, p.7): "This skewing effect of high food price policy is not unique to
Sri Lanka, it is quite characteristic of any market-oriented society at low
levels of per capita income. In such societies low food prices have a strong
equalizing effect on the distribution of calories, while high food prices cause
an inevitable skewing in the absence of alternative policy initiatives or
program interventions."
There is also a problem of effective demand for food staples in
the market-oriented economies of South Asia. As the experience of India
during the late 1970s has shown, increasing aggregate food supply does not
necessarily reduce malnutrition, which is concentrated in marginal groups and
marginal regions within society. Short-term problems of excess supply can
build up, as for example in Bangladesh in 1975/76 and again in 1980/81, while
the under-employed rural poor lack the purchasing power to raise their con-
sumption to nutritionally satisfactory levels.
It is important to recognize the significance of this tension, the
potential in food policy, and the potential trade-offs implied by "cheap"
food or incentive price policies. The price of cheap calories today is probably
some combination of food import dependence and low rates of agricultural growth.
The costs of an incentive price policy are immediate pressures on the real
incomes and nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups, both urban and
rural, if there are no effective compensatory interventions.
In Zambia and probably many other African economies still only
partially integrated into wider markets, the problem is subtly different.
Increasing the supply of commodities for which a substantial demand exists,
e.g. maize, will have a significant impact on the incomes of maize-surplus
producing households in the major maize-growing regions. Areas of subsis-
tence production, where marketed crops are insignificant, would be little
influenced by the growth of marketed output.
In each of the case study countries poverty and malnutrition
are shown to have clearly defined seasonal and regional dimensions. However,
the nature of these problems of seasonality and regional imbalance are country-
specific, reflecting variations in environmental conditions and the demographic
and economic structure of the society. For example in Zambia (Chambers and
Singer, Part 2 of this volume) the problem of seasonality is closely linked to
the pattern of rainfed cultivation under a unimodal tropical rainfall regime.
However, in Bangladesh the problem of seasonality reflects both the pattern of
rainfall and geohydrology resulting in a more complex region-specific seasonal
incidence of nutritional stress (Clay, 1978).
-9-
Seasonal stress on rural households also reflects the demographic
and social structure of different rural societies. In Zambia the more vulner-
able are typically households headed by females. The problem of individual food
insecurity strongly reflects patterns of rural/urban migration. In Bangladesh,
the problem of interseasonal smoothing of consumption is particularly a problem
for the landless and near-landless, due to seasonal underemployment and their
lack of assets. Again, however, female-headed households are the most vulnerable
groups among the poor (Cain, 1979).
The regional dimension of poverty and malnutrition, which are
again country-specific, reflect classic problems of location and remoteness
from the metropolis; environmental and technological factors limit agricultural
productivity growth and market demand for agricultural commodities. For example,
in thinly peopled Zambia, it is in the remoter rural regions, where marketed
production of maize, the major staple, is least important and a high proportion
of households are within the subsistence sector, that poverty and malnutrition
are most severe.
In India and Bangladesh, where there are problems of regional
backwardness and remoteness, malnutrition and poverty are most acute in regions
where the pressure of population on the land is extremely severe. And with
traditional agricultural technologies, there are major problems in increasing
productivity. For example the semi-arid coarse grain staple regions of India
are areas of high food insecurity. The rice-growing region of eastern India is
another poverty zone. Increasing the productivity of the main monsoon rice
crop and the deep-water rices raises technical problems that were not solved by
the development of the first generations of high-yielding semi-dwarf rices.
The discussion of price policy is broadened by recognition of the seasonal and
regional patterns of involvement of poor rural households as buyers and sellers
in agricultural markets. Interventions that reduce the range of interharvest
fluctuations in agricultural prices are likely to benefit the rural poor.
Similarly, the improved articulation of marketing systems and reductions in
transport costs from interior areas to major marketing centers would benefit
producers and consumers disadvantaged by location. Measures that narrow the
intertemporal and spatial range of price outcomes are likely to have strong
anti-poverty implications.
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III. DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOOD INSECURITY
The regional, social, and seasonal profile of malnutrition and
food insecurity may vary between countries. However, in each of the case
study countries the major cause of short-term food insecurity is fluctuation
in regional or national agricultural production. In Zambia, subject to severe
adjustment problems resulting from a 40 percent fall in the purchasing power
of its major export, copper, and the effects of war in neighboring Zimbabwe,
it was the disastrous fall in maize production over the last two years that
led to a "food-system crisis," i.e., a situation in which the food supply of
insignificant sections of the population was threatened, typically provoking
emergency response by government.
A second aspect of food insecurity is the rapidity with which
food system crises develop. In part this is because of the high degree of
individual food insecurity and vulnerability of disaster-prone regions. The
risk of considerable crop damage until the harvest is completed also makes it
difficult, even with a reliable crop forecasting system in place, to anticipate
the magnitude of a shortfall in production. 1/ However, as the Bangladesh
case study indicates, the rapidity with which a crisis can develop is a
reflection on the weakness of the monitoring and food system management in
low-income countries.
The circumstances that may precipitate food crises are varied.
Drought or untimely rainfall are the most widespread causes of serious short-
falls in production where rainfed cultivation predominates. 2 / In largely
deltaic and floodplain regions such as Bangladesh a food crisis can also be
precipitated by abnormal flooding, as in 1973/74 and 1976/77. 3/ Other sources
of falls in production are cyclones and political instability. Another potential
1/ The problems the authorities as well as international agencies such as
the International Wheat Council seem to have faced in estimating the
1980 wheat crop in the USSR is a reminder of the universality of these
problems.
2/ Irrigated cultivation can also be affected by drought, low water tables
and the volume of natural or artificially created reservoirs of surface
water. Thus, irrigated dry season rice cultivation in Bangladesh is
estimated to have fallen by 14 percent in 1979.
3/ The cropping patterns of floodplains are adapted to seasonal flooding.
Disasters result from abnormal flood conditions in terms of the timing and
duration of the floods as well as maximum water levels.
but difficult-to-predict source of instability is genetic vulnerability. The
risks of significant crop losses, including total crop failure, from disease or
pest attack, have been increased by the extensive cultivation of varietal types
with a narrow genetic base. 1/
Finally, one must recognize the role of domestic food policy. In
every case study country, there is massive public intervention in the opera-
tion of domestic food systems. This can both considerably aggravate or
ameliorate the effects of fluctuations in domestic production that are prim-
arily a consequence of year-to-year variations in environmental conditions.
1/ Recent examples of the problem created by genetic vulnerability are the
brown plant hopper infestation of rice in Bali and Java in the mid-1970s,
associated with the widespread adoption of non-resistant semi-dwarf
varieties. In 1978 the Pakistan wheat crop was severely reduced by
widespread rust attacks. In 1980 both the sugar and tobacco crops in Cuba
were devasted by fungus attack. The number and scale of the recent
production problems created by genetic vulnerability are an example of
food insecurity problems that raise issues of science and production policy
rather than food system management (See Biggs and Clay 1981).
- 12 -
IV. ADJUSTMENT TO EXTERNAL ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND THE
DOMESTIC FOOD SYSTEM
The rapid rise in energy prices, as well as problems of supply of
fossil energy based products, created serious economic adjustment problems for
low-income countries in the early 1970s. A second energy crisis is once again
placing these economies under severe pressure. During the early 1970s sharp
upward price movements were coupled with the reduction in availability of
concessional food aid supplies, placing further pressures on low-income food-
importing economies (World Food Council, 1979).
As the evidence from case study countries indicates, these external
pressures unquestionably aggravated agricultural production and food supply
problems in many low-income countries. For example, the coincidence of a
domestic food production crisis in Bangladesh with a tight international cereal
market compounded problems of food import supply by intensifying severe short-
term balance-of-payments problems (see Part 3). However, in none of the case
study countries were external economic pressures the cause of a serious food
supply problem. External pressures such as those on the Zambian economy during
the past five years resulted in adjustment problems that weakened the capacity
of the agricultural production and food supply systems to cope with problems
that resulted from shortfalls in domestic supply.l/ External economic presures
can also contribute indirectly to domestic food system problems when the
adjustment process is characterized by shortages and inflation. In these
circumstances, food system management becomes an important instrument of policy
seeking to assure economic and political stability. For example, in Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Zambia, public food system management is used to cushion the real
incomes of urban consumers and groups essential to the functioning of the state
against effects of price inflation.
Even if the external environment is not the major factor contri-
buting to instability in domestic food supply, the case studies confirm that
international measures could ameliorate the problems of food insecurity. For
example, the availability of a food financing facility or measures to stabilize
international grain prices would improve the environment of domestic policy.
The capacity and willingness of governments to use import policy as a way of
containing the effects of fluctuations in food production will be influenced by
what they can take for granted in the external environment. Again, food aid,
when programmed on a longer-term basis, could make an important contribution to
limiting the damaging effects of instability in domestic food supplies. However,
the use of food aid in domestic food system management raises complex problems
of planning and logistics for which there are no simple prescriptions. 2/
1/ For example, Chambers and Singer document in Part 2 how adjustment pressures
led to the rundown in agricultural extension and other services provided to
agriculture.
2/ See Siamwalla and Valdes, 1980, for a comprehensive review of the problems of
food insecurity defined as deviations in trends in domestic food consumption
and international measures that could provide greater food security.
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V. FOOD POLICY ISSUES
There is massive intervention by governments in the food systems
of all the case study countries. Problems of food insecurity at regional
and national levels make government intervention necessary and inevitable.
But the characteristic forms of intervention raise many policy issues. First,
a virtually universal objective of public intervention would appear to be to
provide food security and to stabilize real incomes of urban consumers. These
interventions, apart from questions of operational efficiency or leakages, are
therefore only partially targeted at one of our four poor and nutritionally
vulnerable categories, the urban poor.
In some Asian countries, governments have attempted to extend a
food insecurity and welfare safety net to wider segments of the population.
For example, the ration system in Sri Lanka was, until recent reform,
extended to provide guaranteed and subsidized food supplies to rural consumers.
A framework for the supply of food to rural consumers, at least in periods of
emergencies, also exists in Bangladesh and most Indian states. In view of
the severity of individual food insecurity and lack of effective demand for
food on the part of poor rural consumers, there is a clear rationale for
such systems of distribution and subsidization of consumption. This is
particularly so in view of the limitations of production measures as a way
of dealing with both structural problems of poverty and malnutrition and
short-term problems of food insecurity. Recent studies of the operation of
such distribution systems have shown that significant nutritional effects
can be achieved. 1/ Scandizzo (1979, 1980a) and others have found distri-
bution programs to have positive cost ratios. These results are important
in providing a much-needed balance to discussion of public rations system
programs otherwise severely criticized for weakening incentives to agricultural
producers. Public food system interventions nevertheless raise many questions.
First, there is a tension between guaranteeing consumption and
sustaining real income levels and the disincentives to domestic agricultural
production resulting from low food prices and a ration system sustained by
imported concessional supplies of food. Second, the costs of public distri-
bution are a direct function of the size of the target group covered. The
burden of a general ration system on a low-income country such as Sri Lanka
may in the end be difficult to sustain. Again, the scale of subsidized
public ration operations in Bangladesh would create major financial problems,
if it were to be based largely on domestic food supplies and large-scale
concessional food imports were to be phased down. Such experiences point
to the need for more narrowly targeted and cost-effective distribution
measures.
1/ See Gavan (1979) and George (1979) on distribution systems in Sri Lanka
and Kerala.
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Close analysis of public food systems indicates other problems
besides cost-effectiveness. In virtually all countries, public food inter-
ventions are used first and foremost as a way of providing food security
and a cushion against inflation to urban consumers. In Zambia the zone of
distribution of imported and price-controlled domestic food staples is
coterminous with the areas of urban consumption. However, because access to
limited supplies of pr4ce-controlled staples is restricted in practice to
certain favored categories of urban residents, the urban poor are often those
least likely to acquire food at controlled prices. Experiences in the case
study countries and elsewhere, for example in Sri Lanka, indicate that this is a
difficult policy area. There is an encouraging growth in recognition of the
problems and in attempts to make public intervention more effective in cost and
distribution.
In each of the case study countries the consumption character-
istics of basic food staples are seen as providing some area of operational
flexibility. For example, in Bangladesh as well as Sri Lanka, where rice
is the major staple, wheat is an inferior good (Part 3 of this volume; Timmer,
1980a). In Zambia, roller meal is noted as the important staple of the urban
poor, whereas cassava and millet are important for consumers in relatively
poorer rural regions. Supply manipulation and differential price policies for
major food staples therefore offer some opportunity for a cheap calories policy
for the poor. There are implications for agricultural science and production
policies in raising productivity of previously neglected staples of poorer
consumers in poor regions (Lipton, Part 4 of this volume; Chambers and Singer,
Part 2 of this volume).
The implementation of policies discriminating among commodities
should, however, be recognized as raising complex problems for some countries.
In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, because wheat is largely imported, price discrim-
ination would be relatively easy to implement. However, as wheat production
becomes more significant in Bangladesh, so the potential costs in terms of
disincentives to increased agricultural production grow. In many African
countries the imported commodities, especially rice and wheat, which are
directly available to government to use in food operations, are superior goods
especially significant in consumption of high-income urban households. In India
there are widely different regional patterns of food staple production. Price
discrimination between commodities has regional as well as income group impli-
cations, with possible trade-offs between poor consumers of coarse grains and
producers in regions where these crops predominate.
Another way of increasing the effectiveness of direct distribution
programs is to restrict the target group through the choice of intervention.
For example, the experimental food stamp program in Sri Lanka is an attempt to
limit food subsidies to a narrower, nutritionally vulnerable group of low-income
households, while food prices can be raised for other parts of the population to
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provide increased incentives for domestic producers. 1/ The increased priority
accorded to food-for-work programs in Bangladesh also attempts to target income-
generating employment and food on poor rural consumers. Problems over eligi-
bility criteria, for example in the case of a food stamp program, or leakages
from direct distribution activities such as food-for-work are indications of the
considerable problems for the organization and implementation of what are
potentially more cost-effective forms of intervention.
There are equally difficult policy choices in macro food system
management, which are illustrated in the recent experiences of the case study
countries. The build-up of domestic food security stocks offers a way of
combining consumption stabilization with price support for domestic producers.
Experience in India shows how domestic stockpiles can play such a dual role
effectively, but at a high cost. Other countries have relied upon imports to
stabilize food supplies. Recent experiences in the case study countries illu-
strate the complexities of the choices involved, which must take account of the
external environment as well as domestic situation. Food supply management,
when faced with difficult to anticipate and substantial fluctuations in domestic
production, would be made easier by levels of domestic stocks that could sustain
supply for more than three to four months. In Bangladesh the lags between the
onset of domestic supply difficulties, recognition and response, and the
scheduling and deliveries of imports, involve difficult problems of macro system
control. Nevertheless, the recent experience of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
and Sri Lanka is that there has been considerable learning about the management
of domestic food systems. Both Bangladesh and India were able to contain the
effects of the 1979 drought. Sri Lanka is seeking to find an alternative to the
increasingly burdensome general rationing policy of previous decades that will
also provide greater incentives to domestic food production.
Food insecurity results in pressures that divert attention from
longer-term priorities of agricultural development. Experiences in the case
study countries indicate some of the ways in which assistance from the inter-
national community can contribute to more effective food system managment as
well as attacking the problems of instability in domestic production that
contribute so much to the problem of food insecurity. The poorly developed
1/ This bold experiment provides valuable insights into the complex issues
raised by a shift from general food subsidies to a more narrowly targetted
system (Food and Nutritional Policy Planning Division, 1980). For example,
the introduction of eligibility criteria based on money income and money
income equivalent raises problems of comparability between households
receiving cash incomes, such as plantation workers, and cultivating households.
There are severe problems of verification where what is at stake is entitle-
ment to an income supplement. Another problem is that imputation of money
values to incomes in kind from a range of sources -- paddy production,
vegetable gardens, coconut trees, etc., is likely to be downward biased.
The criteria of Rs.300 a year household income resulted in the inclusion of
half of the population but the near exclusion of plantation workers, a
relatively vulnerable group within the rural population as evidenced by the
high incidence of child malnutrition, morbidity, and mortality.
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distribution and storage systems of many low-income countries hamper effective
food system management. Improvement in food production monitoring is another
requirement of better food system management.
There is still considerable room for improvement in the coordination
and logistics of food aid. However, the 1980 Food Aid Convention and the
proposed food financing facility represent significant steps toward more effective
international food security measures for low-income, food-importing countries.
Much of the contribution that the international community can make,
however, is indirectly through supporting investments in agriculture, particularly
irrigation, that would increase productivity and stabilize production. Coarse
grains and root crops, for long relatively neglected by agricultural science, as
well as the problems of rice cultivation in rainfed and deep water environments,
are priority areas for agricultural research.
Until recently, little work was done on the problems of public ration
and direct distribution systems. Yet the few studies already undertaken have
begun to modify the views of analysts and policymakers on the role and conse-
quences of such interventions. The tentative nature of many of the conclusions
reached in these case studies is also an indication that work needs to go farther
on many of these issues raised by poverty, malnutrition, food insecurity, and
the public response to these problems.
- 17 -
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Overview
Despite per capita incomes of $480 (1978) and for most of the 1970s
a fair degree of self-sufficiency in the main staple, maize, the levels of
living of most Zambians have deteriorated over the past decade; and malnutrition,
especially among children, has increased. Poverty and malnutrition have
regional and demographic, seasonal, and rural-urban dimensions. Deterioration
is shown in the declining per capita GDP (down 46 percent in real terms from
1974 to 1979), among the causes of which were the Zimbabwe war, unstable and
generally low copper prices, heavy subsidies, inefficient parastatals, foreign
exchange shortages, and biases of marketing, prices, and services against
those who are poorest in the rural areas. A large area and thin population
create chronic problems of transport, distribution, and access to public
services.
National food security gives cause for concern after two years of
poor maize production and the prospect of a third poor year. It is unlikely to
be solved by large projects but rather from price incentives and efficient
services to farmers, especially emergent farmers (small farmers with marketable
surplus). Improvement in the international environment would help but is
entirely speculative. National food security, in terms of self-sufficiency,
should not be confused with household food security. It is relevant for urban
and some rural households. But for the majority of 3 million of the poorer
rural households it is largely or entirely irrelevant. For them, food security
can best be achieved by enabling them to grow more, eat more, and sell more at
better prices, building up from the resources they already have where they
are. This would support changes already occurring in agricultural research
(with attention to farming systems and to cassava, millets, and sorghum).
Other changes needed include higher prices for produce such as cassava, millets,
sorghum, fish, charcoal, and honey; technology to reduce drudgery and improve
productivity for the poorer and weaker (especially female-headed) households;
and the extention of services to remoter areas.
A long-term strategy for national and household food security should
balance rural and urban livelihoods, resources, and interests. Zambia has
extensive uncultivated but reasonably fertile land, acute urban unemployment,
and a rural labor shortage that limits agricultural production. A long-term
strategy to develop and encourage productive and remunerative livelihoods in
rural areas should try to improve off-season incomes and the articulation of
rural producers interests. This could lead to greater food production, less
acute urban unemployment by stemming the drift to the towns, and less poverty
and malnutrition.
For donors, the major implication of this analysis is the need for a
more precise approach to the resources and problems of those who are poorer,
weaker, more remote, and less visible. A corollary is the need for structural
adjustment and program lending and, above all, for helping with operating
expenses of programs such as rural health services, agricultural extension,
collection of farmers production, and distribution of fertilizer and other
prerequisites. On a macro view, the stabilization and raising of copper prices
and compensatory financing of copper export deficits are needed to provide
the overall stability required for food security and other basic needs.
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I. DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY
Poverty in Zambia, as elsewhere, has many dimensions. To analyze
the links among poverty, malnutrition, and food supply, five dimensions are
particularly relevant: regional and demographic; farming systems; seasonal;
biases against poor rural producers; and trends in livelihoods over the
longer run.
A. Regional and Demographic
The population of Zambia is estimated to have been 5.6 million in
mid-1979 (Table 2.1). Of this total, 2.1 million, or 3 out of 8, were in
the large urban centers of the line of rail provinces and the copperbelt, 1.5
million, or 2 out of 8, were in the more favored rural areas, and a further 3
out of 8, almost exactly the same number as in the large urban centers, were
in the less favorable rural areas. The more favored rural areas -- central
and southern provinces and parts of the eastern provinces -- have better
communications, are more prosperous, and produce the bulk of marketed production
for the market. In contrast, the less favored areas -- Western, Northeastern,
Luapula, Copperbelt, and Northern Provinces, and other parts of the Eastern
provinces -- are remote and have poorer communications, very few farmers who
produce consistently for the market, and the greatest concentration of very
poor people.
In the urban areas, the concentrations of poverty are often in
squatter areas, especially in Lusaka.
Table 2.1
The Population of Zambia - 1979 Mid-year Estimates
(Thousands)
Rural & Small Urban
Province Total Large Less More
Urban a/ Favored Favored
Areas Areas
Central, including
Lusaka Province 1208 738 - 470
Copperbelt 1367 1280 87 b/ -
Eastern 650 - 196 c/ 454 d/
Luapula 358 - 358 -
Northern 638 - 638
Northwestern 292 - 292 -
Southern 602 80 - 522
Western 534 - 534 -
Totals 5469 2098 2105 1466
Percentages of
total populations 100 37 37 26
Source: CSO 1978, pages 2 and 3
Notes: a/ The Copperbelt except for Ndola Rural Kobwe, Lusaka.
b/ Ndola Rural
c/ Chadia, Choma, and Lundazi Districts
d/ Chipata, Katete, and Petuake Districts
- 24 -
Other demographic features directly linked with poverty and
malnutrition are very high birth rates, heavy and continuing (although at
a somewhat reduced scale) rural-urban migration, and (partly as a result
of this) a high proportion of separated or disrupted families and female-
headed households.
Recent estimates suggest that about 25 percent of urban households
and about 80 percent of rural households are below a basic minimum needs level
of food and income. 1/ The 100,000 urban households below the line represent
some 400,000 people, and the 600,000 rural households below the line represent
some 3 million people. Of this 3 million, the bulk are in the peripheral areas
and are the great majority of rural dwellers.
The less favored and more remote rural areas differ in their demo-
graphic composition from those that are more favored. Outmigration, especially
of males, has been marked and sustained from Western, Northwestern, Luapula,
and Northern Provinces in particular. In those provinces, female-headed
households are a high proportion of the total. In Luapula, for instance,
these constitute a third of all households. Marter and Honeybone's 1975
survey of 683 rural households in seven provinces confirmed that the less
favored areas had higher proportions of small and physically weak households
than the more favored areas. 2/ Their survey also found that the less favored
areas had a higher ratio of dependents, both children and old people, to
active adults (1.5 against 1.2), usually about half the average farm size, and
very much smaller per caput marketed crop incomes (K5.8 against K34.0). 3/
Weakness, small households, lack of tools and equipment, small areas cultivated,
and low incomes were closely associated.
B. Farming Systems
The same regional division into more favored and less favored areas
is reflected in the distribution of types of farming households. These are
loosely described as subsistence, emergent, and commercial, and their
characteristics are sketched in Table 2.3.
There is a marked concentration of almost all the commercial farmers
and a substantial majority -- probably at least 90 percent of the emergent
farmers -- in the more favored areas. Althouth there are no reliable figures
for this, one indication is that in 1977-78 no less than 88 percent of all
agricultural loans were issued to farmers in the more favored line of rail
provinces (not including Eastern Province). In contrast, the majority of
subsistence farming households were in the less favored areas. This dis-
tribution is also reflected in cropping patterns: most of the marketed maize
is produced along the line of-rail provinces, whereas the main subsistence
staple elsewhere is sometimes maize, but often cassava, millet, or sorghum.
1/ ILO/JASPA (Jobs and skills program for Africa) Basic Needs Mission, 1980,
personal communications.
2/ A slight difference between Marter and Honeybone's definition of more
favored and less favored areas, and that used above (Table 2.3 and elsewhere)
is unlikely to affect these generalizations.
3/ Marter and Honeybone, op. cit., pages 53, 63 and 68.
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Table 2.2
Regional Distribution of Rural Household Size and Household Composition
Number of adults More favored Less favored
in household Central, Southern, Northern, Luapula,
Eastern Western, Copperbelt
1 7 19
2 30 49
3 24 16
4 15 7
5+ 24 9
Total 100 100
Table 2.2(a)
Rural Household Composition (average number of
household members in each category)
Rural Household More favored Less favored
Composition Central, Southern, Northern, Luapula,
Eastern Western, Copperbelt
Children under 8 years 1.6) 1.3)
3.1 2.3
Children 8-14 years 1.5) 1.0)
Male adults 15-55 years 1.4) 0.8)
3.0 1.9
Female adults 15-55 1.6 1.1
Men and Women over 55 0.4 0.6
Average Household size 6.4 4.8
Source: Marter and Honeybone 1976, pages 54 and 53.
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Table 2.3:
Broad Characteristics of Main Types of Zambian Farms
SUBSISTENCE EMERGENT COMMERCIAL
Main Starch Staple Cassava, Millet, Sorghum, * Fertilizer, seed, Fertilizer, Seed
Maize : Pesticide Pesticide, Herbicide,
Veterninary Products,
Drugs
Main source of cash Occasional food surplus : Deliberate production : Deliberate produc-
sale. Fishing, beer, of cash crop surplus : tion of cash crop
charcoal, etc. : for sale : surplus for sale
Production of new
cash crops (cotton, : None : Some : Some
sunflower, soyabean,
tobacco)
Power Source Hand : Hand and oxen, and a : Tractor ownership,
few tractor hire or : Possibly some oxen
ownership
Labor Source : Family, communal and some Family, communal, Permanent and
casual : casual, and occasion- : Casual
ally permanent
Size of Farm : Up to 5 ha. but usually : 2-4 ha. : 50 ha. and over
less than 2 ho.
Number of Households 610,000 90,000 : 1,500 - 2,000
Percentage of total
households : 87 : 13 : 0.2 - 0.3
Notes:
The figures in this table are very approximate. Successive surveys have used
different categories. The estimates of numbers of households by type of farm
are derived from attempts to reconcile data from the Census of Agriculture
1970-71 (First Report), CSO, May 1974; Agricultural and Pastoral Producing
1971-72 (Non-Commercial Sector) CSO, November 1976; Marter and Honeybone 1976;
and population data from CBO 1980. The resulting estimates of 610,000 subsis-
tence households and 90,000 emergent farming households only give rough orders
of magniture. The rounding is to the nearest 20,000. The characteristics of
the types of farming households are adapted from a table provided by the
Planning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, with additions.
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The pattern is thus of the more favored central and more accessible
areas having a population of about 1.5 million, with generally larger and
stronger families, lower outmigration, larger farms, higher per caput incomes,
and more production, especially of maize, for the market; and of the contrasting
less favored or peripheral areas, with a population of about 2.1 million, with
higher outmigration, smaller and weaker families, many of them with only female
adults, smaller farms, much lower per caput incomes, and much less production
for the market. There are many poor households in the more favored areas, but
they form a higher proportion of the population in the less favored areas.
The more favored areas also enjoy superior access to public services
of all kinds and better distribution of goods and marketing facilities.
C. Seasonal
Rural Zambians suffer the effects of unimodal tropical seasonality.
For most small farmers, only one crop is possible during the rains. Irrigation
is insignificant, except in small local pockets. All indications are that rural
deprivation has the marked seasonal character noted elsewhere in Africa, mirroring
south of the equator problems that exist north of the equator in a similar band
of unimodal rainfall. During the rains, and especially during the periQd
January to March, many adverse factors coincide and interact: shortages of
food, less variety of food, less nutritious food, difficulties in transporting
food, harder work, less time available for child care, higher exposure to
infections (especially malaria and diarrheas), and difficulties of travel and
access to health facilities.
Problems that accompany the rains are especially acute for weak house-
holds and for the many women who have to manage households on their own. As
housewife, mother, cook, gatherer of firewood, fetcher of water, farmer, food
processor, and marketer, a woman heading a rural household faces extreme
difficulty at this time. In the nothern half of the country, where heavier
rain and leached acidic soils give cassava some advantage, the weak households
grow cassava disproportionately, not least because the labor requirements are
more evenly spaced than for maize. 1/ As the food of last resort, especially
during the food-short season of the rains, cassava is critical for perhaps
2 million rural Zambians. But during the rains, the time-consuming work
involved in cassava processing competes for labor needed for new cultivation,
and drying cassava becomes difficult. The combination of heavy seasonal demands
for labor, food shortages, and sickness, not least among children, makes this
the time of year when poverty and deprivation are most acute.
1/ Marter (1978, p. 27) gives the relative labor requirements of maize and
cassava cultivation as follows (hours per hectare):
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Total
Maize 67 121 198 158 8 - - - - - - - 552
Cassava 5 7 47 81 97 98 43 24 16 12 10 8 448
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It is, however, also the time of year when rural deprivation is least
observed by urban-based professionals and officials. Travel in rural Zambia
during the rains is difficult except on all-weather roads, which do not reach
many of the poorest. The worst rural deprivation therefore goes largely
unseen. When the rains are over, travel is easier, the harvest is in, con-
ditions are healthier, and deprivation is less pronounced.
D. Biases against Rural Producers, Especially the Poor
A fourth dimension of poverty is the biases against the poorer rural
producers. At one level, these can be seen as urban-rural biases; at another,
they are biases in favor of those rural producers who are better off against
those who are poor.
First, the urban-rural bias is reflected in changes in terms of trade
and in unequal income distribution (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4
Indices of Real Wages, Barter, and Income Terms of Trade (1965-77)
Real wage, Price index, Price index, Barter
Zambian low income agricultural terms of
production trade
1965 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1966 102.1 110.2 106.4 96.0
1967 135.1 115.6 114.9 99.4
1968 130.6 128.2 90.4 70.5
1969 135.0 131.3 64.4 49.0
1970* 161.7 135.4 54.2 40.0
1971 171.4 139.1 64.5 46.4
1972 167.1 145.9 72.9 50.0
1973 175.9 155.4 72.0 46.3
1974 160.4 168.2 70.0 41.6
1975 147.8 185.1 60.5 32.7
1976 161.7 219.9 81.2 36.9
1977 142.9 263.5 95.6 36.3
1978 306.7 101.0 32.9
1979 336.5 119.6 35.5
* Change in base year of price index and of a different national account
system.
Source: Working Paper of the ILO/JASPA Basic Needs Mission, 1980.
The rural-urban barter terms of trade shifted against rural producers
(Table 2.5) from a base of 100 in 1965 to 35.5 in 1979. In 1979, a rural producer
had to. market three times as much as in 1965 in order to buy the same urban goods.
Part of this shift results from subsidies, especially on maize meal. Maize is
purchased at a fixed uniform price and resold, mainly to urban consumers, at a
subsidized price. There is a larger fertilizer subsidy; but, because of a
controlled producer price, this has been in effect a consumer, not a producer,
subsidy.
Table 2.5
Changes in Some Rural Producer Prices (1971-80)
Changes
1971 .1972 1973 : 1974 1975 : 1976 1977 1978 : 1979 : 1980 : :1971-1980
Maize a) 4.00 4.30 4.30 : 4.30 : 5.00 6.30 6.30 6.80 9.00 11.70 192
Sorghum b) 4.70 : 4.70 : 4.70 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 : 6.00 : 6.00 6.00 28
Dried Fish c) 31: 31: 31: 40 40: 40: 40 : 50 50 50: 61
Charcoal d) : 1.75 : 1.75 : 1.75 : 1.75 : 1.75 : 1.75 : 1.75 : 2.50 : 2.50 : 2.50 : : 43
Low Income : : : : : :
Urban price : 100 : 1.04.9: 111.7 : 120.9 : 133.1 : 158.1 : 189.4 : 220.5 : 241.9 : n.a
Index e) : : : :
Note: If account is taken of changes in the fertilizer subsidy, this will probably
reduce the comparative increase in the maize price
a/ Dodge 1979, table 3. Prices are for a 90 kg. bag.
b/ Ministry of Agriculture Farm Survey 1980, vol. 4. The price is for a grade A 2001b/9Okg bag.
c/ Statutory Instruments 380 of 1967, 156 of 1974, and 38 of 1989. Prices are ngwee per kg
(1971) - 14 Ngwee per lb).
d/ Relevant Statutory Instruments. The price is in Kwacha per 2001b/9Okg grain bag measure.
e/ Calculated from data prepared for the ILO/JASPA basic needs mission to Zambia 1980.
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E. Changing Livelihoods: Trends over the Longer Run
Rural and urban poverty are subject to long-term trends. Urban
real incomes are reduced by stagnation or fall in formal sector employment,
reductions in formal sector real wages, continued migration to the cities,
and consequent overcrowding of the informal urban sector. In the absence
of any real expansion of earning potential, there is evidence that the urban
informal sector is saturated. Declining urban opportunities may be a major
factor in the slowing of the growth of population in the urban areas from 66.4
percent in 1963-69 to 39.5 percent in 1969-74 and 37.1 percent in 1974-79, and
a corresponding speeding up in the rate of increase in the rural population.
In the more favored rural areas, several studies (Mutemba 1979,
Siegel 1979, Pletcher 1980) have shown a growth of agriculture for the
market but at the same time households with weaker labor dropping out of
modern sector agriculture. In the less favored areas, with more permanent
out-migration, especially of males, agriculture has stagnated or declined.
The removal of male labor has undermined traditional farming systems in
which labor peaks were evened out by a division of labor between men and
women. The citemene system of shifting cultivation based on a fire climax
required that men lop the trees; with fewer men it has declined, and other
cultivation practices that are more labor-demanding have partly taken its
place. Land under non-staple crops has declined, with less variety of
garden types and crop mixes and greater reliance on cassava and other
starchy crops such as sweet potatoes. The greater reliance on fewer crops
has simplified the diet but sacrificed nutritional balance.
These processes, especially in the less favored and labor-scarce
areas, have created a large, depressed, scattered, and largely unseen popu-
lation of small, weak, and very poor households. Although hard evidence is
lacking, there are strong suggestions that remittances from urban areas have
declined and are not a significant source of rural income. Those who depend
largely on subsistence cultivation number about 3 million people, over half
the total population of Zambia. Most are trapped at subsistence or below
subsistence levels. Some have taken part in a gradual shift of population
over the past two decades towards roads, river, and service centers. One
effect has been a decline in shifting cultivation and an increase in con-
tinuous cropping of the same land, leading to declining fertility and yields.
Subsistence households have been almost completely left out of agricultural
development programs, which are designed for, and only feasible for, stronger
and better-off households that can, for example, cultivate with oxen. The
neglect of marketing for traditional crops (cassava, sorghum, millets) and the
lower prices offered where they are accepted, make it even more difficult for
this very large depressed population to improve its lot and to obtain a cash
income, even though, in earlier, less-depressed times, many of them became
accustomed to making cash purchases for basis goods. Many of these -- soap,
salt, sugar, blankets, needles, paraffin -- are now both very expensive and
very difficult to obtain, since urban areas take priority for limited supplies.
Over the past decade most rural shops outside district headquarters have gone
out of business. Households that in the past might have relied on the market
to even out seasonal shortages have been driven back to the more precarious
existence of subsistence farmers.
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II. MALNUTRITION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The inevitable consequence of the conditions and trends described
above has been widespread malnutrition and disease interacting in a vicious
circle. Hospital admissions due to malnutrition/anemia show a rising trend,
both in urban and rural hospitals and clinics, although, in view of the close
interaction of malnutrition and ill-health, data are less than conclusive.
There are also some countervailing improvements, such as the conquest of
smallpox and the improved provision of under-five clinics and other mother and
child health services that have led to a creditable reduction of mortality and
increase in life expectation, more or less in line with world trends.
The Nutrition Survey undertaken in 1970-72 with the assistance
of the FAO in remoter rural areas showed a particularly heavy incidence of
malnutrition and ill-health among children, especially in poorer regions
relying on cassava as a staple (and often also a weaning food). In the
absence of reliable longitudinal data it is difficult to establish trends over
time, but a new survey conducted in 1979 by the WHO-supported Tropical Health
Institute of Ndola seemed to show retardation of growth and (less clearly)
weight of children since 1970-72. Malaria continues to be endemic and with
worm parasites, measles, and iron deficiency, forms a formidable quadruple
threat to health and child development. In the north, lack of Vitamin A
combined with measles can lead to irreversible blindness among children and
adults alike. Vaccination of children and the efficient running of rural
clinics generally are threatened by lack of drugs and dependable cold chain
and storage facilities, as well as lack of transport and access for the remoter
-- and usually poorest -- households.
Data for urban malnutrition are scare, but with recent declines in
real wages there are signs that, even in such relatively privileged areas as
the mining towns in the Copperbelt, malnutrition among children is a problem.
In purely monetary terms, the costs of providing drugs, cold chain,
vitamin tablets etc. is often quite small, and the resulting benefit/cost
ratio of improvements would be extremely high. For example, the total cost
to protect a child threatened by blindness due to Vitamin A deficiency/
measles interaction is of the order of 5 US cents per child. However, there
are logistic, transport, administrative, and education difficulties in pro-
viding such protection to children in remote areas and very poor households.
The popular staple food of poorer urban families (roller meal) is
nutritionally superior to the more refined product (breakfast meal) preferred
by better-off groups. Yet the price margin between the two has narrowed in
recent years, and there is a strong case for discontinuing the subsidy on
breakfast meal, while maintaining it, at least for the time being, on roller
meal. In the poor rural households the main staple is cassava, which is
nutritionally inferior and particularly unsuitable for children, unless
supplemented by meat, fish, vegetables, fruit or at least cereals. For
poorer households, beans would be the most economical required supplement.
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Lack of household food security and adequate nutrition stems primarily
from the poverty and weakness of households. If they were less poor, rural
households would have the resources to cultivate larger areas and to increase
yields or to purchase food. Urban households would be able to purchase food,
since it is always available at a price. But for the urban poor and for
those of the rural poor who depend partly on purchased food, national food
security and the assurance of adquate supplies of staples, especially maize
meal at moderate prices, are vital.
Since it is a product of poverty, malnutrition is directly related
to income distribution as well as trends in average income. As far as trends
in overall incomes are concerned, the general picture was that, up to 1976 or
1977, average urban incomes were reasonably well maintained -- at the cost of
widening the rural/urban income gap -- but in the last two or three years
average urban incomes, and especially real wages, have been declining quite
sharply, by perhaps 20 percent per caput. In the informal sector, which
largely determines living standards in the squatter settlements, the decline
in incomes has been much more continuous since the early 1970s. What happened
was that the larger numbers crowding into the urban areas exerted increasing
pressures on the jobs in the informal sector, given the stagnation or decline
of the modern sector. Thus a given volume of jobs had to be shared out among
increasing numbers of people, leading to falling real income.
This simultaneously had its effect on income distribution. Not only
has the rural/urban gap within the urban sector increased, but the modern/informal
gap within the urban sector has also increased, and larger portions of the urban
population were in the low-income informal sector.
Data on income distribution are neither very up-to-date nor particularly
reliable, but Table 2.6 gives a fairly clear picture of urban income distribution
in 1976. It shows a very high degree of inequality of income distribution for
the urban population as a whole (a Gini-coefficient of 0.50), which is almost
certainly higher than the inequality of income distribution in the rural
sector. The fact that the Gini-coefficient for urban population as a whole is
higher than the separate coefficients for squatters, low-income or high-income
groups separately, is due to the particularly sharp inequalities between these
groups. The higher-income group (typically more skilled workers in the formal
sector, as well as civil servants and other white-collar workers) had median
incomes some 6 to 7 times higher than the squatters or lower-income groups.
Incomes among squatters (typically informal sector workers) in turn were
distinctly lower than those of low-income earners outside the squatter areas
(typically unskilled workers in the modern sector). However, the real difference
was not between these two categories but between either of them and the higher-
income group.
- 33 -
Table 2.6
Income Equality According to the 1976 Household Budget Survey,
Urban Areas Only
Percentage of total income
Squatter Low-cost High-cost All urban
% of Population cum. cum. cum. cum.
0-20 4.6 4.6 7.4 7.4 8.8 8.8 4.6 4.6
20-40 11.8 16.4 9.8 17.2 12.0 20.8 8.0 12.6
40-60 14.4 30.8 14.8 32.0 16.3 37.1 12.1 24.7
60-80 22.3 53.1 21.5 53.4 23.6 60.9 19.4 44.1
:30-90 18.0 71.1 15.3 68.7 16.9 77.8 18.9 63.0
90-95 11.3 82.4 12.0 80.7 22.2 100.0 13.0 76.0
'35-100 17.6 100.0 19.3 100.0 24.0 100.0
Gini-ratio 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.50
Average yearly
income per person 238.18 270.04 1,432.51 353.85
Median yearly
income per person 179.90 213.40 1,212.32 287.89
Average household size 5.47 6.41 4.87 5.95
Source: UNDP/ILO: Second Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and
Prices in Zambia (1978) Vol III, Table D4 (Mission estimates)
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III. FOOD PRODUCTION
There are no statistics that cover 'all food production in Zambia.
The Ministry of Agriculture compiles an annual forecast for the current
crop, covering maize, seed maize, sunflower, shelled groundnuts, soya beans,
paddy rice, wheat, sorghum, mixed beans, seed cotton, and tobacco. Conspic-
uously absent are the two main subsistence staples apart from maize and
sorghum, mainly cassava and the millets (finger millet and bulrush millet).
Yet both are very widely grown, especially in the peripheral areas. Cassava
is grown by some 2 million Zambians, 1/ for some of whom it is the main
staple, and for most of whom it is the fall-back food of last resort. Millet
is somewhat less significant, but it provides the main source of cash income
for many rural women through brewing. Statistics and policies are dominated
by maize (See Table 2.7), because it is the basic staple for the urban areas
and for the more favored rural areas and is also grown in some less favored
areas.
The attention paid to maize is partly justified by the sheer scale'
of maize production and by its growing predominance. As a percentage of total
marketed production of crops, its value rose from 61 percent in 1964/65 to
1968/69, to 67 percent in 1969/70 to 1972/73 and to 76 percent in 1973/74 to
1976/77. 2/ Contrary to common impressions, Zambia appears to have been
largely self-sufficient in maize from 1972 to 1978. Production was adequate
for or exceeded domestic demand for human consumption. At the end of 1979
the domestic requirement of maize was estimated to'be 648,000 metric tons. 3/
During the period 1971-79 the annual percentage growth in marketed maize meal
was 5.5 percent, 4/ which suggests that self-sufficiency was achieved from
1972 through 1978, a conclusion supported by recorded exports totalling
276,000 metri-c tons over the 7-year period, 61,000 metric tons in 1978 and by
the small percentage of foreign exchange spent on imported cereals and cereal
preparations, which include wheat and which only once in 1973-78 (in 1975)
rose above 3 percent of all imports (see Table 2.8).
1/ This estimate is very approximate. It is based on Schultz 1974; the
Agricultural Census of Zambia 1970/71; Marter and Honeybone 1976;
population estimates adjusted to 1980; and advice from the Planning
Unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development.
2/ Dodge 1979, page 8.
3/ Evans and Jiggins do not make it clear to which year this refers.
Since their paper was written well into the 1979/80 crop year, it is
assumed here that it refers to 1980.
4/ UNDP/FAO 1974, and Planning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Devlopment.
Table 2.7
Selected Statistics for Maize
(All units thousands of metric tons of maize - except where otherwise stated)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
A Annual Comsumption
Requirements from (424) (448) (472) (498) (526) (552) (582) (614) (648)
Marketed Maize a/
B Marketed Production b/ 617 460 495 559 746 693 583 338 360
C Implied Surplus (B-A) 193 12 23 61 220 141 1 -276 -288
D Recorded Exports c/ 2 50 111 17- 9 26 61 NIL n.a.
E Imports of Cereals d/
and Cereal Prepara- 70,000
tions K. '000 n.a. 6,011 10,931 18,388 10,902 13,363 14,672 -80,000 n.a.
F E as percentage of
total imports n.a. 1.7 2.2 3.1 2,3 2.5 3.0 n.a. n.a.
n.a. Not available
a/ 648,000 tons of maize is the estimated requirement in Evans and Jiggins 1979. Since 1972 consumption
of maize meal has risen at 5.5% p.a. Annual requirements for years before the 1980 have been estimated by
reducing this figure annually by 5.5%.
b/ Table 1 in Evans and Jiggins 1979, citing CSO and MAWD for 1972-1977.
c/ CSO 1980, p.2 2 (December 1979 n.a. and assumed to be nil)
d/ CSO 1980, p.21.
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Food Imports, 1973-78
(K. '000)
1973 1974 : 1975 : 1976 1977 1978*:
A. Meat and Meat Preparations 5,244 : 5,854 2,729 : 1,135 81 439
B. Dairy Products and Eggs 3,555 10.750 4,781 5,347 4,619 3,701
C. Fish and Fish Preparations : 1,536 : 2,828 : 1,887 : 922 : 1,161 : 1,009
D. Cereals and Cereal Preparations : 6,011 : 10,931 : 18,388 : 10,902 : 13,363 14,672
E. Fruit and Vegetables : 1,472 : 2,938 : 2,036 : 939 : 1,428 773
F. Sugar, Sugar Preparations, and : 1,519 : 1,352 : 589 : 308 : 689 : 141
Honey
G. Coffee, Cocoa, Spices, Tea, : 1,555 : 1,947 : 1,423 : 1,212 : 1,332 :. 1,086
and Manufactures : : : . :
R. Animal Foods (not unmilled : 1,439 : 3,506 : 1,334 : 1,710 : 3,091 : 7,497
cereals) : .: : :
I. Miscellaneous Food Preparations : 2,191 : 2,991 : 2,107 : 1,500 : 2,278 1,758
J. TOTAL FOOD IMPORTS (A-1) 24, 522 : 42,927 : 35,274 : 23,975 : 28,042 : 31,076
K. GRAND TOTAL ALL IMPORTS : 346,867 : 506,636 : 597,611 : 468,748 : 529,970 493,887
L. FOOD IMPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF : 7.1 : 8.5 : 5.9 5.1 : 5.3 6.3
ALL IMPORTS (J/K x 100) : : : : .
* Provisional Source: CSO 1980, page 21
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In 1979 and 1980, however, marketed production of maize dropped
sharply to 338,000 and 360,Q00 metric tons (provisional figure) respectively,
compared with an ave-rage of 593,000 for the previous seven years. The question
is whether this drop is an aberration or whether it represents a long-term or
more deeply-rooted-shift. -An aberration is more plausible for 1979 than for
1980. In 1979 there was bad weather; the credit squeeze resulting from
policies agreed with the.IMF in 1978 meant that many farmers had no credit
for the 1978/79 crop season,,.and the war in the south disrupted the supply of
iinputs and spare parts and raised costs. A long-term trend might be indicated
by the shift of commercial farmers out of maize, running down their machinery
and not making new purchases, and moving into livestock, which they regard as
more profitable and less risky. Even, however, if there is a longer-term
t:rend here, commercial farmers produced only some 40 percent of marketed maize
in the two recent years for which figures are available.
The major factors in the low marketed production of 1980 were almost
certainly to do with.prices, institutions, and effects of Zambia's prolonged
economic crisis..
Throughout the 1970s Zambia followed a policy of negative protection
for maize producers, paying them a controlled price well below borders prices.
However, the producer price for maize was raised from K6.80 a bag in 1978 to
K9.00 in 1979 and K11.70.in-1980. A further rise to K13.50 is promised for
1981. This has, however, coincided with other changes. First, costs of
production, especially for commercial farmers who use more fertilizer and
energy-intensive cultivation, have risen sharply. At the same time, attractive
prices for cotton and oilseeds have induced widespread substitutions of those
crops for maize by both commercial and emergent farmers. Meanwhile, however,
Zimbabwe to the south, after a disastrous maize crop in 1979, raised producer
prices by a quarter, and a large surplus for export was predicted for 1980. It
might appear, therefore, that by raising producer prices further, perhaps to
Lmport parity prices, a large recovery in Zambia's production could be induced,
especially since the domestic (white) variety is preferred to imported yellow
maize.
Although there is every indication that Zambia's farmers, both
commercial and emergent, are price responsive, there are two intractable
problems that impede a dramatic recovery. The first is institutional. All
maize is supposed to be marketed through the inefficient parastatal Namboard,
which is reportedly slow to collect crops and slow to pay farmers for them.
There are many cases of farmers not receiving payment for their previous crop
until after preparations should have begun for the next one. Few conditions
could be more designed to discourage subsistence farmers from emerging, or
emerging farmers from becoming fully commercial. Those who do are attracted
to crops for which payment is more prompt, as for example cotton paid for by
the parastatal Lintco.
The second set of problems stems from Zambia's prolonged and deep
economic crisis, due to low copper exports and other adverse external circum-
stances. This has prevented imports of agriculture inputs and incentive
goods, has contributed to transport difficulties due to lack of vehicles,
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spare parts, and gasoline, and has led to cuts in allocations vital for the
operation of essential public services. It has also led to grey and black
markets in a number of scarce commodities, and price controls have favored the
urban over the rural areas, especially over the remoter rural areas.
The adverse conditions for commercial and emergent farmers have been
many. The Ministry of Agriculture's extension service has been virtually
grounded and severely demoralized. The Lima program to encourage the growing
of maize has had some successes, but has also been promoted in areas where
growing maize makes neither agronomic nor economic sense. Maintaining the
program has been extremely difficult, with many government vehicles either
dilapidated, commandeered for the Zimbabwe war (in 1979) or for the Party
elections (during the run up to the 1980/81 crop season), or in long queues
for repair by the Mechanical Services Branch. Harsh cutbacks on government
recurrent expenditure have sharply reduced activities such as farmer training
(over 1,000 courses held in 1970/71 declined to only 365 in 1977/78 and probably
even fewer since). The amount of gasoline that could be purchased by the
Ministry of Agriculture in 1980 was only one-fifth of the amount that could be
purchased in 1973. The effects of reduced contact between agricultural staff
and farmers, deteriorating roads, lack of spare parts (for ox-drawn as well as
tractor equipment), uncertain supplies of inputs, and rapid inflation have
created a high-costs and risky environment that discourages bold expansion of
production by either emergent or commercial farmers.
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IV. NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY: SOLVING THE PRODUCTION PROBLEM
The Government's current food production strategy is heavily oriented
towards maize, with some attention to wheat. The maize strategy has the
following components:
(1) Transferring the responsibilities of Namboard to
Regional Cooperative Unions. The objective is to
decentralize and to increase efficiency. In the
short term at least, the effect of this move, if it
occurs, is widely expected to be a further decline in
services for emergent farmers.
(2) Raising the producer price. This has been set at
K13.50 for 1981, but the incentive effect will depend
on the extent to which the fertilizer subsidy is
maintained in the face of pressures (e.g., from the
IMF for it to be abolished), and on other cost
components of production.
(3) A foreign exchange incentive to commercial farmers.
Commercial farmers who market significant quantities
of maize are to receive 50 ngwee a bag in foreign
exchange.
(4) Operation Food Production, a program announced in 1980,
to create two large-scale state farms, each of 20,000
ha., in each of Zambia's nine provinces. The farms
are to be managed by technical assistance personnel
and will, it is hoped, solve the food production
problem.
There are many reasons why Operation Food Production could be a
disaster. Costs would be very high, including clearing access roads; housing,
electricity, and water for expatriates and Zambians; and the high input costs
envisaged. With different countries adopting different projects, many varie-
ties of tractors can be anticipated, with consequent problems of spare parts
and servicing. Most of the few countries that have shown any interest have
little expertise in tropical agriculture. Past experience with state farms
has not been encouraging. The last major project of this sort in Zambia --
the Rural Reconstruction Centers -- was an economic and social failure. One
estimate of the current costs of production of a bag of maize from a RRC is
US$1125 approximately (Garner 1980) (18,900 bags from 3,000 ha at a cost of
US$21 million, approximately). Above all, Operation Food Production, to the
extent that it materializes, would divert scarce resources, including admini-
strative capacity and foreign exchange, from more productive endeavors.
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An alternative approach, in our view more likely to succeed, would
aim for a long-term shift to less import-intensive production through
encouraging emergent farmers and ox-cultivation. Emergent farmers already
grow some 60 percent of the marketed maize crop. For this strategy to succeed,
would require:
(1) careful assessment of incentive prices, including
prices relative to alternative crops;
(2) concentrating maize production and resources for it
in areas where maize grows best (mainly in the southern
half of the country) and where ox-cultivation is possible,
outside the areas infected with tsetse;
(3) providing an efficient marketing system, inputs, and
credit;
(4) revitalizing agricultural extension and providing it with
adequate recurrent resources.
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V. HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY: SOLVING THE CONSUMPTION PROBLEM
It is misleading, however, to view the problems of poverty and mal-
nutrition in Zambia in terms of maize and wheat production. If maize or wheat
are short, they will be imported. The costs will be born by the economy as a
whole, but it is unlikely, short of war, a major international food crisis, or
gross mismanagement, that there will be a serious absolute shortage of maize
in Zambia. Maize production is thus part of the problem of the Zambian
economy and effects the poor and malnourished only indirectly.
Malnutrition and deprivation are much more the result of poverty
and consumption. For all Zambians to be able to eat adequately requires that
they have adequate flows and stocks of food and income around the year.
A. The Urban Poor
For the urban poor and the small minority of the rural poor who
depend on purchases of meal, the need is for a favorable relationship between
income and costs of food. An argument can be made here for maintaining a
subsidy on roller meal, on grounds both of income distribution and nutritional
superiority. Improved income opportunities in the urban informal sector and
more jobs in the formal sector though increasing existing capacity are vital,
but depend partly on an improvement in external circumstances. For pronounced
shortages of iron and riboflavin, food fortificants could be a cost-effective
nutritional improvement. There is also much need for nutrition education,
especially in relation to urban food plots ("gardens"), breastfeeding, weaning
foods, and the disadvantages of breakfast meal.
B. The Rural Poor
Higher incomes for the small minority of rural households that
regularly produce maize for the market can only indirectly, and to a slight
extent, improve the livelihoods of the great majority who are subsistence
cultivators. It is with these 3 million or so Zambians, and especially the
1 million or so who are in female-headed or otherwise physically weak house-
holds, that the problems of consumption mainly lie. For most of that 3
million, maize meal is irrelevant. It is either not for sale, or not on sale
when needed, or they lack the money to buy it. Other measures are required to
see that they have enough to eat.
Four complementary measures are suggested. All address the problems
of poverty. The first three are designed to increase the production of
incomes of poor households, starting with the resources they have where they
are.
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1. Agricultural Research
(a) Zambia is pioneering an agricultural research program
with Agricultural Research Planning Teams (ARPT). The
approach, entailing the analysis of farming systems,
promises to bring agricultural research close to
subsistence farmers and to identify research priorities
that fit their resources, needs, and opportunities.
(b) Crops such as cassava, the millets, and sorghum have
been neglected in the past; and there is still only one
agronomist working on cassava research. The importance
of root crops for the poor (Goering 1979) applies
strongly in Zambia (Marter 1978) where cassava and to a
lesser extent seed potatoes are grown, especially by
the poorest familes in areas that are agronomically
suitable. There is an opportunity for research on
cassava and other crops of the poor to include the
labor requirements of processing. In the case of
cassava, varieties may be bred that are less labor-
demanding in peeling.
(c) Another priority is research to identify cropping systems
that can maintain fertility with continuous cultivation
on some of of the less fertile soils, especially on the
leached acidic soils of the higher rainfall areas.
(d) With livestock, research on the diseases and productivity
of smallstock (hens, sheep, goats, pigs, etc.) should
specially benefit large numbers of poorer rural households.
2. Marketing and Higher Prices for What Poor People Produce
Higher and more reliable incomes for poor rural people are best
assured by marketing what they produce and paying them more for it. Prices
offered for cassava, sorghum, and the millets appear designed to discourage
marketing; open market prices, though low, are usually higher. Similarly, the
price offered for honey, produced by some of the poorest people (especially
in the Northwestern Province) is very low, leaving excessive "profit" margins
for the Forestry Department. Again, controlled market prices for fish and
charcoal have both risen much more slowly than inflation.
The opportunity here is to increase the incomes of the poorer pro-
ducers in two ways: with staple crops (cassava, millets, sorghum, and honey)
by assuring a market and providing a higher floor price; and with fish and
charcoal, either by deregulating prices or by sharply raising producer prices.
3. Micro-Capital for the Poorest
The opportunity here is to reduce the drudgery and increase the labor
productivty of poor households. Since many of the poorest households have
high dependency ratios, and often only one, female, adult, the benefits both
to production and to better care of children should be high. Suggestions
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include improved tools and instruments for cultivation, food proccessing
(especially), and cooking; new crop varieties and crop mixes that are less
labor-demanding, higher-yielding, more disease resistant, less risk-prone,
better in storage, easier to process, and more nutritious; smallstock and
simple equipment for improving wells and reducing the labor requirement for
water drawing and carrying.
4. Infrastructure and Services
Better production and consumption by subsistence households also
depends on support from infrastructure and services. Better and more roads
improve access and may reduce adverse terms of trade. Health services can
reduce losses from sickness during the seasons of cultivation, quite apart
from other benefits. Rural water in small-scale accessible sources can reduce
drudgery and release labor for other purposes.
Pursued together, these four measures could transform the food
security for many rural people. Their effect should be to increase food
production by the poor and to enable them to earn modest incomes. There is
danger, however, in analyzing the rural and urban sectors independently, of
zero sum policies. Relative urban prosperity can mean rural impoverishment,
as it has in the past; but the reverse could also occur with sharp rises in
urban prices. A national strategy has to balance the interests and potential
of each sector and create favorable interactions between them.
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VI. A LONG-TERM URBAN-RURAL STRATEGY
Any long-term strategy to enable Zambians to gain adequate liveli-
hoods must consider where employment takes place and at what cost. There is
no prospect that formal sector employment can absorb more than a negligible
proportion of new entrants to the labor force. Employment in mining and
manufacturing in 1979 at 105,000 was virtually identical with 1972 (104,000).
Meanwhile, the urban population had increased by 45 percent. Urban informal
sector employment is saturated. This has been reflected in the decline in
rural-urban migration. Given the deprivation that results from lack of male
and adult labor in rural areas (especially the misery of so many female-headed
households and the children of those households) and the wastefulness of
unemployed urban labor, measures to reduce further rural-urban migration
deserve to be examined. Evidence from several areas suggests the male out-
migration is least in those rural areas where incomes are highest and where
there are opportunities for income (from fishing, charcoal-burning, etc.)
in the slack season. A long-term strategy might seek through local-level
planning to improve year-round flows of food and income to rural people,
assuring them of more stable and more substantial livelihoods. The long-term
effect would then be to increase the productivity of Zambia's people and to
reduce the pressure on the towns. Food production, national food security,
and household food security should all benefit.
An essential complement to these measures is organization by the
rural poor themselves. The distribution of resources in Zambia is determined
partly by the strength of the elite (urban and rural) and partly by urban
interests, well-organized and articulated through bodies such as the Zambia
Confederation of Trade Unions. If resources are to be redistributed and rural
producer prices raised, then the interests of the rural poor have to be
better represented. Those who grow and sell maize can argue for higher prices
through bodies such as the Commercial Farmers Bureau. There is no equivalent
body for the growers of cassava, sorghum or millet, and the interests of
bee-keepers, charcoal-burners, and fishermen are but weakly represented.
- 45 -
VII. CONCLUSIONS FOR DONORS
In selecting measures to support, the World Bank, the EEC, and
other bodies as well have their attention directed to obvious and easy
activities that directly concern national food security and self-sufficiency.
These are important, but they will not affect significantly the food
security of the mass of poor rural households. To do that requires a quite
different set of more finely pointed actions to enable the rural poor,
especially those who are more remote and weaker, to secure adequate liveli-
hoods. Problems of malnutrition are, of course, not merely problems of
food production and incomes; and education and services must complement
other measures. But without production and incomes, the poorer rural
families will remain vulnerable; malnutrition and deprivation will persist
and even deepen. The great pitfall is that the visible and measurable
problems of the urban population and of food production for the market will
be solved while the invisible problems of the poor rural majority go
untouched.
Even for the urban population, better income and employment
opportunities for the poorer sections are more fundamental to food security
than merely the supply of additional food. And both urban and rural sectors
would gain from a further reduction of urban drift numbers that exceed the
income-earning opportunities in the towns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses largely on the consumption side of the Bangladesh
food system and the food policy issues that have emerged from Bangladesh's
difficult experiences since independence in 1971. The production side of the
food system is not considered here in detail. A separate study of food security
policy in Bangladesh and other countries is forthcoming from the World Bank's
Agriculture and Rural Development Department.
The issues of slow growth, low productivity, the limited impact of
modern rice varieties, and underutilization of irrigation, as well as the
evidence on unequal development and increasing poverty and landlessness in
the countryside, have been frequently reviewed. 1/ Many have given prominence
to structural factors -- a social organization of production that constrains
the realization of the still vast untapped productive potential of this fertile
delta country. There are also technical problems in increasing the productivity
of many of the cropping systems of this complex region. There are no high-
yielding varieties of deep-water rice. The earlier semi-dwarfs were force-
fully rejected by farmers as unsuited to main monsoon season cultivation.
Others emphasize negative and short-sighted government policies that have
failed to provide economic incentives to agriculture. The context for the
policy failures implied in such analyses -- the inability and unwillingness
of the state to tackle structural problems or "get the prices right" -- include
social and political pressures, the complex of interests of urban consumers
and bureaucratic and military groups that weak governments pamper with con-
cessionally supplied food imports rather than take the tough-minded decisions
that would lead to food self-sufficiency. There are also the periodic natural
calamities that devastate crops and spread human misery. The objective of this
paper is to explore these issues of food insecurity, poverty, and public policy
a little more deeply in the light of the experience of the seven years from the
famine of 1974 to the record harvest of November-December 1980.
The record clearly underscores the tension between longer-term
agricultural development and short-term problems of food policy that have
preoccupied the government and the donor community, whose assistance, amounting
to approximately $1.5 billion a year, underwrites the Bangladesh economy.
Beginning with a review of the salient dimensions of the now well-documented
problems of mass poverty, this paper seeks, if tentatively, to develop a fresh
theme. Striking, repeated characteristics can be identified in the behavior of
the food system. Stochastic shocks of flood or an unfavorable mansoon have
established the rhythm of a veritable food system cycle. However, the amplitude
of these fluctuations is as much the consequence of the processes of macro
control that involve the interaction of donors and government. In stressing,
with an earlier historian of the food problem in Bangladesh (A.H. Khan, 1973),
this man-made aspect of the problem, my hope is that something can be learned
from a dispassionate review of the record about ways of improving macro food
1/ For example Ahmed, 1977; Alamgir, 1978; Stepanek, 1979; World Bank, 1979.
- 51 -
system management. The paper ends by considering some of the points in the
system where there are possibilities for small but difficult-to-achieve
improvements in short-term food policy. 1/
1/ Khan (op. cit. p. 2) summarized his personal experiences of the period
1942 - 1971: "Nature was not the chief culprit. Extensive crop failure
was very rare. Contrary to recent newspaper stereotypes, flood or cyclones,
though frequent, were mostly limited in extent. Nature no doubt was some-
times over-exuberant, but usually generous." He drew from these experiences
the still relevant lesson that there are no "magical cures" and warned
against those proposing "a one-day hike to the mountain top".
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II. SOURCES OF FOOD INSECURITY
Food security is most often considered as a problem at the national
or international level. Food security discussions are then first of all con-
cerned with minimizing instability in aggregate food supplies (fluctuations
around the trend in consumption). 1/ Second, there is the related question
of minimizing the costs of stabilizing supply to low-income countries with
food insecurity problems. Third, there is the question of measures to limit
fluctuations in prices and production at an international level.
However, stabilization of supply and the containment of price fluctu-
ations are not the objectives of economic policies, but are ways to achieve
implicit, but often unclearly specified, social welfare goals through limiting
the human costs of quantity and price stability. There is the further objective
of avoiding the socio-political disruption and negative impact on longer-term
economic development of the emergency measures that governments feel compelled
to take in response to periodic food crises. Finally, stabilization measures
have a directional, positive impact on production by reducing the uncertainties
of the economic environment within which the producer makes his decisions. 2/
Food insecurity manifests itself in the short term as the increased
incidence of distress and higher levels of malnutrition and mortality, par-
ticularly among the economically most vulnerable sections of society. Food
intake falls to levels at which people are unable effectively to continue
productive activity. Such periods of stress also have adverse long-term
consequences. Damage is done to the physical growth of children. The distress
selling of assets and disruption of family units increases the numbers of
destitute and vulnerable people who are even more at risk in any subsequent
disaster or crisis and also represent a long-term poverty problem.
In a largely rural society such as Bangladesh (with approximately
10 percent of population classified as urban) food insecurity is an aspect
of the wider structural problems of poverty and mass malnutrition that make
the majority of the population vulnerable to any instability in their economic
environment, whether from environmental factors or from economic fluctuation
generated within or outside the economy. It is the structure of its economy
1/ For example, World Food Council, 1979; Siamwalla, 1980; Reutlinger, 1978.
2/ Levels of return of 80-100 percent on direct costs are commonly mentioned
as necessary to provide sufficient incentive to encourage more intensive
use of productivity-augmenting inputs -- higher fertilizer use, High Yield
Variety (HYV) seeds, etc. Such high levels of return must in part reflect
the considerable uncertainties surrounding production, including output
prices that have experienced severe short-term fluctuations. Stabilization
measures that limit these fluctuations are likely to result in a "rightwards
shift" in the supply function.
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and society that makes Bangladesh so vulnerable to variations in production
that are small compared with fluctuations in most developed countries
(Siamwalla, 1980).
For example, the largest recorded fall over a period of 12 months
in aggregate production of food grains since independence in 1971 was approxi-
mately 8 percent over the period up to the main monsoon crop (aman) of 1979/80,
largely the result of a severe drought following the record production year of
1977/78. 1/ However, with population growing at approximately 3 percent a year,
the implied shortfall in production against the minimum rate of growth in food
requirements is 11 percent. Shortfalls in production of this level, or even
less in the famine year of 1973/74 (see Table 3.1), precipitate a serious food
crisis in Bangladesh because of the low level of carryover of stocks, the highly
unequal impact of shortfalls in supply, and the vulnerability of large sections
of the population living close to, or even at, nutritional levels below those
necessary for normal bodily function, resistance to disease, and growth in the
child population.
An analysis of the problems of food insecurity in Bangledesh and
possible policy responses at national and international levels must begin
with an understanding of the poverty and malnutrition that make a substantial
proportion of the population vulnerable to fluctuations in food supply. There
is another important political dimension to the problem of food insecurity in a
low-income country. The high proportion of income spent, even by relatively
well-off groups, on basic foodstuffs and the high income elasticities of
demand for food make the supply of food to the small urban population and
industrial and tertiary sectors an issue of primary political significance. 2/
This is an aspect of the food security problem -- sharing supply and limiting
real income effects of changes in food price levels -- that confronts the
government of a low-income country. An analysis of possible policy responses
to food insecurity will have to accommodate this consideration.
1/ It is conventional to estimate production in Bangladesh for an agricultural
year, July-June, beginning with the early monsoon rice crop (aus) harvested
in July and August. In the absence of reliable estimates of production on
a monthly basis or of private levels of stocks, a better method would be a
seasonally adjusted estimate. Year-on-year comparisons beginning with the
main aman crop are probably a better measure of fluctuations in supply since
there is least carryover of stocks beyond the beginning of the main aman
harvest.
2/ The public ration system is intended to cover the resident population of
six major urban centers as well as all public sector employees, whatever
their location.
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Table 3.1
Bangladesh: Aggregate Foodgrain (Rlce and Wheat) Requirements, Supply 1972/73-1979/80
(Million long tons)
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 19791,80 1980/71
Foodgrain
requirements a/ 11.7 12.0 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.8 14.3 14.7
Production
(net) b/ 9.0 10.6 10.1 11.5 10.6 11.8 11.7 12.0 13.6
Procurement c/ - 0.07 0.13 0.42 0.31 0.55 0.36 0.35 1.1
Imports 2.8 1.6 2.5 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.2 2.7 1.1
Distribution d/ 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.6
Availability e/ 11.6 12.3 11.7 12.8 11.8 13.1 13.2 13.8 14.1
Availability f/ -0.7 +2.5 -4.8 -0.8 -8.6 -0.9 -2.6 - -0.6
Gap (%)
Distribution as
% availability 22.5 14.0 15.0 13.1 12.5 14.1 13.6 17.4 11.3
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Food, World Food Programme.
Notes: (p), provisional.
a/ Assume 15.5 oz. per person per day of rice or wheat equivalent for population
on January 1 of each year.
b/ Gross production of rice and wheat less 10% for losses and seed.
c/ Domestic purchase by government.
d/ Distribution by public ration system including food-for-work and relief.
e/ Net production less procurement plus public distribution.
f/ Food requirements minus food availability as percent of requirements.
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III. POVERTY AND MALNUTRITION IN RURAL BANGLADESH
Bangladesh is a largely rural society with one of the highest densi-
tites of rural people in relation to its agricultural land resource in the
world. Rural population to agricultural land will have risen to approximately
10 persons per hectare by 1990 (World Bank, 1980, Table 4.1.). Agricultural
yields are comparatively low -- less than 1.5 tons(t)/ha in rice and wheat
production in 1977/78, or a gross output of less than 200 kg per person. The
Bangladesh Government's own definition of minimum food requirements (15.5 oz.
a person a day) implied an average food production deficit or "availability
gap" of 15 percent over the period 1972/73 - 1980/81.
Imports of food publicly distributed have augmented supply by
between 10 and 20 percent over the past decade. Public distribution, including
domestically procured food, has accounted for between 10 and 23 percent of
estimated availability. But imports and public distribution have only partially
counteracted the effects of fluctuation in supply resulting from variations in
domestic production (Table 3.1). 1/ This is considered in more detail below
(see Section VI). Apart from fluctuations in supply, official estimates of
foodgrain availability also suggest that supply measured against average
requirements has been substantially inadequate in at least three of the past
eight years. The consequence has been severe levels of malnutrition for
low-income households in both town and countryside 2/.
The highly skewed pattern of expenditure on food in rural areas
reflects the structure of both asset and income distribution. High population
densities are also associated with a highly unequal distribution of agricultural
land. Approximately 30 percent of the rural population is landless, and another
20 percent of householders own less than half an acre (0.2 ha) of cultivable
land (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1977). The landless and near landless
are obliged to find their livelihood, or to supplement their incomes, from
agricultural wage labor and non-agricultural activities such as cottage industry,
petty trading and porterage. 3/ At current levels of land productivity, many
1/ Variations around the trend of domestic production averaged 11 percent over the
period 1965-76, whereas variations in "availability," including publicly dis-
tributed imports, have averaged 7 percent around the trend (Ahmed, 1979, p. 17).
2/ The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1978) surveys of consumer expenditure
provide evidence on low levels of food intake by low-income urban and rural
households. The Institute of Nutrition and Food Science (1977) survey of
rural Bangladesh provides more detailed, cross-section evidence on food
intake and the incidence of malnutrition (Table 3.2). The work of the
International Center for Diarrheal Diseases (ICDD), in its laboratory area
in Matlab Thana, Comilla District, provides comparative evidence on the impact
of the war of independence, 1971, and environmental stress (the floods of
1974) on levels of nutrition-related morbidity and mortality (Chen, 1981).
:3/ See Clay, 1977, and Ministry of Agriculture, 1978, for estimates of rural
employment.
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households with up to a hectare of land will also find it difficult to do more
than meet minimum nutritional requirements from cultivation alone. 1/
Table 3.2
Bangladesh: Regional and Seasonal Dimensions of Dietary-Energy Gap, 1975/76
[Mean calories/person (percent of calorie standard)] a/
Period Location b/
Chittagong Dacca Rangpur
May-July 1975 2766 1584 1757
(130) (75) (83)
Aug.-Sept. 1975 2664 2012 2014
(126) (95) (95)
Oct.-Nov. 1975 2586 1766 1731
(122) (83) (82)
Feb.-April 1976 2754 1060 2129
(130) (95) (100)
Source: Nutrition Survey of Bangladesh, 1975/76.
Notes: a/ Daily calorie standard of 2122 calories per person.
b/ Purposive survey including 140 households in 3 locations.
Aggregate labor requirements of agricultural and other major sources
of earned income in the countryside result in significant levels of under-
employment, estimated as up to 40 percent of available labor time (Ministry of
Agriculture, 1978). This, taken in combination with the seasonality of employ-
ment, particularly for hired labor, and the low wage rates, results in poverty
that is massive in dimension by any definition. Focusing on malnutrition as a
direct and quantifiable consequence of rural poverty, it emerges that the
1/ Average land productivity is currently less than 1.5 t/ha. Where seasonal
flooding or lack of irrigation preclude multiple cropping, net production,
allowing for seed, would on many land types range between 1 and 2 t/ha.
See Banladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI) crop-cut reports for estimates
of yield. Labor requirements of rice cultivation make it difficult for a
family having less than the equivalent of two full male field workers to
retain more than a ton of food grains. [See U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), Dacca and Ministry of Agriculture, Agro-Economic
Research Farm Management Studies for estimates of labor requirement.]
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proportion of the population suffering from serious shortfalls in calorie intake
is approximately equivalent to the proportion of landless and near landless in
the rural population. 1/
In addition, almost 50 percent of the population had deficient or low
levels of riboflavin and vitamin A; and anemia was widespread (70 percent of the
total population and 82 percent of children had less than the minimum acceptable
level of hemoglobin in blood). Variations in nutritional status within families
and between socio-economic groups defined by landholding size confirmed that
certain segments of the population are most likely to suffer from malnutrition
and to be more vulnerable to variations in food supply. 2/
The present intra-family distribution of food implies that malnutrition
is most acute for small children and lactating and pregnant women and least severe
for adult males (Chen, 1981; Institute of Nutrition and Food Science, 1977).
Poverty and malnutrition and associated problems of disease and mortality have a
powerful seasonal dimension. The labor requirements of agriculture have seasonal
peaks, with a major period of inactivity at the end of the monsoon season before
the main crop. 3/ The disproportionate significance of the main aman harvest
presents a major problem for marginal cultivating households as well as the
landless dependent on wage employment. The pattern of debt forces many house-
holds in physical food surplus to sell a part of their output immediately after
harvest when prices are usually lowest (Table 3.3). They are then obliged to
enter into further debt or to try to finance food purchases by agricultural work
in the period of least activity and relatively high food prices before the next
main harvest. Table 3.2 suggests the extent to which the seasonality of agri-
cultural activity shapes the pattern of nutrition. The same is true for disease
and mortality 4/ (Chaudhury, 1978). A seasonal pattern of the run down of food
stocks and movement into deficit of many cultivating households, combined with
unemployment and lack of purchasing power on the part of the landless, is an
important dimension of the food insecurity problem in Bangladesh. In years of
relatively tighter food supply or natural disaster, the-potential exists for
near-total social disintegration. Large numbers of cultivating households may
be forced to sell off their assets to sustain consumption. This exacerbates the
long-run structural problem of poverty by increasing the pool of landless and
destitute.
1/ The 1975/76 Rural Nutrition Survey found that 46 percent of households studied
had a significantly inadequate calorie intake (Institute of Nutrition and
Food Science, 1977). See also Lipton (Part 4 of this volume) for critical
discussion of estimates of calorie malnutrition with reference to India.
2/ The average intake of all families having less than 3 acres of land was found
to be deficient in calories, calcium, vitamin A, riboflavin and vitamin C.
3/ There are marked regional variations in the pattern of employment in
agriculture, but everywhere there is little activity in the pre-harvest
period 6-10 weeks in September to November (Clay, 1978).
4/ It should be noted that the amplitude of seasonal fluctuations in average
calorie consumption is considerably greater than the variations in aggregate
consumption around trend levels.
- 58 -
Table 3.3
Bangladesh: National Monthly Average Wholesale Price of Coarse Rice, 1972-80
(Actual and Seasonally Adjusted)
Takas per Maund
Month 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
January 40 69 88 212 113 101 133 139 194
February 42 75 97 239 113 111 133 145 196
March 51 82 114 261 107 118 143 159 197
April 54 91 131 235 104 130 147 176 204
May 63 91 130 202 105 129 137 183 190
June 62 87 134 193 101 139 131 217 178
July 61 85 138 197 105 150 130 233 166
August 72 83 170 160 104 142 129 225 161
September 73 86 209 153 106 145 139 220 162
October 71 90 256 130 110 145 139 204 162
November 67 85 213 105 107 129 137 194 160
December 63 82 186 106 98 125 132 182 156
Annual
Average 60 84 156 183 106 130 136 190 177
Seasonally Adjusted Index (1976 100) b/
Month 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
January 71 89 216 115 103 136 142 198
February 75 97 240 103 114 137 153 189
March 79 110 251 103 114 137 153 189
April 85 122 219 97 121 137 1o4 190
May 83 117 182 95 116 124 166 172
June 79 121 174 92 12C 119 196 lCO
July 54 75 123 175 95 134 116 207 148
August 65 76 154 145 95 129 117 205 147
September 65 77 186 136 94 129 124 196 144
October 65 82 233 118 100 132 126 185 147
November 63 80 201 99 101 122 130 183 151
December 66 85 194 110 102 130 138 190 162
Annual
Average 57 79 147 173 100 123 128 179 167
Source: Directorate of Agricultural Marketing.
Notes: a. Combined unweighted average of all varieties of coarse rice.
b. Seasonal adjustments based on monthly average prices as a percentage of
12 month moving average price July 1958 - June 1970. This index is
to be regarded as illustrative of seasonally adjusted price movements.
Closer analysis would show significant changes over time in the
pattern contribution of different rice crops to production and
marketed output. For example, the increasing significance of boro
(Spring-harvest) rice and the later planting and harvesting dates
of high-yielding varieties of boro.
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Food insecurity also has a regional dimension, with what are, by
Bangladesh standards, abnormally high levels of malnutrition and human distress.
Pressure of population has resulted in the settlement of lands that are marginal,
not only in terms of productive potential 1/, but also because of high risk of
natural disaster leading to partial or total loss of crop as well as of any
capital investment in land improvement and equipment.
Kurigram subdivision, the area worst affected in 1974 famine, 2/
exemplifies this. It is a region of 970 square miles with an estimated
population of 1.29 million in 1974 and a ratio of seven persons/hectare of
cultivated land. Geographically the area consists of flood plains of the
Brahmaputra and Tista river system. Flood damage to crops and erosion are
annual phenomenia. The floods erode previously settled land and deposition
creats new chars (sand banks and Riverine Islands), which are rapidly taken into
cultivation, often by families dispossessed by earlier erosion. Rice yields
average one t/ha, only two-thirds of average national productivity; and gross
output per person is below the official minimum requirement of 15.5 oz. a day.
per person. Low productivity combined with a high risk of large-scale crop
failure, which can be caused by either drought or severe flooding, makes
Kurigram one of the areas most prone to disaster and subsequent famine.
The mapping of areas liable to famine (Currie, 1978) shows that the
worst effects of drought and flood are highly regionalized. An important aspect
of short-term food insecurity is the problem of intracountry distribution and
effective targeting of supplies on severely-affected areas. This factor is
elaborated below (Section III). Quite different are the problems of food
shortage and famine that occur during countrywide shortfalls in food supplies
(see below Section IV and Section V).
The high level of marketed food is another, and perhapss surprising,
characteristic of this still largely rural economy. The expanding urban popu-
lation has increased the market demand for food, but urban demand accounted for
no more than 11 percent of expenditure of foodgrains in 1973-74. tMarket demand
is also increasing in rural areas because of the growing proportion of landless
and near landless in the population. The as yet unquantified scale of post-
harvest sales and pre-harvest purchases by households that in terms of gross
output are net surplus producers also increases the marketed share of foodgrain
1/ Seen as the level of land productivity with existing technology in favorable
environmental conditions.
2/ Akbar, 1975, provides a detailed account of the famine and its impact in
Kurigram. See also Stepanek, 1979, p. 63-6.
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consumption. Taken together, these factors suggest that market purchases,
including the public ration sales, account for between 40 and 50 percent of
total expenditure on foodgrains. 1/ With public distribution accounting for
approximately 15 percent, this in turn implies an open marketed share of
domestic foodgrain expenditure in the range of 25 to 35 percent. 2/ Rural and
urban low-income households also constitute the greater part of the market for
foodgrains.
Public food distribution, established in the wake of the 1943 famine,
has become an integral and major component of the Bangladesh food system. Public
supply through rationing focuses primarily on the population of the major urban
centers, public sector employees, and industrial workers. There is a limited
distribution of food grains through "modified rationing" to rural areas as
well as relief activities including food-for-work programs. Approximately
two-thirds of food distributed through the public system is allocated to the
above-mentioned priority groups (Table 3.4). The poorest consumers, excluding
low-paid public sector employees, are therefore left to depend on the residual
commercial market for food grains and will bear the brunt of adjustments to
fluctuations in domestic supply. Without exploring the operations of the
public sector in detail, it should be noted that, to the extent to which it
increases domestic supply through importation of food grains, the public
sector dampens the effects of fluctuations in domestic production. 3/
1/ Urban expenditure on food accounted for 11 percent of aggregate foodgrain
expenditure in 1973-74 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1978). The poorest
53 percent of rural consumers accounted for 41 percent of rural cereal
consumption. Taking account of factors such as rural wages being largely
monetized and the real value of wage being sensitive to food price movements
as well as the purchases of those in seasonal deficit, it is probable that
market purchases of food in rural areas are not significantly different from
this 41 percent of expenditure by poorest consumers. Ahmed (1979) estimates
market demand for food as 24.5 percent of gross rice production, also using
the 1973/74 household expenditure data. However, subsequent evidence on land
distribution indicating that the poorest 50 percent of rural households are
largely dependent on market supplies would suggest a higher figure.
2/ The publicly distributed share of availability has only exceeded 15 percent
in 1972/73 (22 percent) and in 1978/79 (17 percent). But periods of food
crisis, when public distribution is more important, are also times when more
people are forced into the market by their household food deficits.
3/ Ironically, the higher the level of leakages from the public system, the more
significant are the effects on the open market. The existence of a sizeable
market for food grains in the countryside also provides part of the economic
explanation for the high level of leakages of inferior grains, notably
wheat, from public distribution activities, including food-for-work. See
Ahmed, 1979, for a fuller description of public distribution.
Table 3.4
Public Foodgrain Distribution by Category of Beneficiary Group, 1968/69 - 1979/80 (percent of total)
Statutory Other Priority All Priority Modified Relief Food for Total
Rationing Groups b/ Groups Rationing c/ d/ Work e/ Percent Thousand tons
(Urban) a/ (1) + (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1968/69 21.5 13.6 (35.1) 58.2 6.7 - 100.0 1,038
1969/70 17.9 12.6 (30.6) 68.3 1.1 - 100.0 1,354
1970/71 15.9 7.4 (23.3) 59.0 17.7 - 100.0 1,318
1971/72 16.2 9.3 (25.5) 50.2 24.3 - 100.0 1,734
1972/73 17.8 13.5 (31.3) 60.8 7.9 - 100.0 2,618
1973/74 29.1 22.9 (52.0) 45.0 3.0 - 100.0 1,728
1974/75 26.7 31.4 (58.1) 32.8 9.1 - 100.0 1,764
1975/76 21.4 35.5 (56.9) 29.5 6.6 6.9 100.0 1,676
1976/77 25.6 41.3 (66.9) 19.6 2.2 11.3 100.0 1,473
1977/78 24.4 40.8 (65.2) 19.4 1.6 13.8 100.0 1,847
1978/79 23.2 44.9 (68.2) 17.3 2.5 12.0 100.0 1,796
1979/80 20.5 42.8 (63.3) 16.0 2.1 18.3 100.0 2,402
Source: Ministry of Food.
Notes: a/ Ration card holders in six urban centers: Dacca, Narayanganj, Chittagong, Khulna,
Raishahi, Rangamati.
b/ Government, police, armed forces, mills and the large-scale industrial enterprise
employees, student hostels, etc.
c/ Distributed by Union Councils at half statutory level.
W/ Disaster relief (Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation).
e/ Food-for-work programs (Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation).
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Some of the trade-offs and tensions in food policy in Bangladesh
are now apparent. First, attempts to provide incentives for producers
through higher relative prices of food grains are potentially highly
regressive in their short-run implications. The income and nutritional
impact of increases in relative food grain prices will be most severe for'
poor consumers in both the towns and the countryside. 1/ Second, public
sector distribution would have less political but greater real income and
nutritional effect, to the extent to which it delivered food to the poorest
consumers. Third, in the short-run, reliance on imports, especially food
aid, provides the lowest cost way of augmenting domestic food supplies and
building up food security stocks. But a high level of food imports in
relation to market demand for food restricts the possibilities for encouraging
the expansion of domestic production. A high and relatively stable level of
imports could force back upon domestic producers the adjustment costs of
fluctuations in production beyond their control.
The way the government has responded to the fluctuations in
domestic supply illustrates the complex and difficult trade-offs that exist
in food policy. There have been three domestic food crises in Bangladesh
since independence. These were the famine of 1974, the Sylhet flood disaster
and public food system crisis of 1977, and the drought of 1979. The problems
of food policy emerge more clearly when these events are considered not
chronologically but in terms of the relative scale of the food crisis. The
1977 crisis was largely a regional phenomenon. The 1979 drought was more
widespread, with its effects felt nationally. The 1973/74 crisis was compli-
cated and intensified by unfavorable changes in the external environment and
consequent adjustment pressures on the Bangladesh economy.
1/ Pitt (1980, p. 41), who has quantified the impact of a shift to free trade
prices, finds that "the greatest absolute losses (of calories) are incurred
by middle expenditure groups and the greater proportionate losses are
incurred by low expenditure groups." See also Ahmed, 1979, for an elabor-
ation of this argument. The low employment elasticities of output in
agriculture (see Clay, 1977) suggest that additional employment associated
with increased output would do little in the short run to ameliorate the
impact of higher food prices on real incomes of the rural landless.
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IV. SYLHET FLOODS, 1977
The precursor to this disaster was the build-up of import levels in
early 1975 and subsequent bumper harvests. This led to a 60 percent fall in
wholesale rice prices by November and December, 1975, from a peak in March the
same year (Table 3.3). For the producer, there was a 53 percent fall in aman
harvest period prices between 1974/75 and 1975/76 (Table 3.5). Such was the
buildup of stocks with two further good harvests (boro and aus) and high import
levels that there was a further softening of prices in spite of a poorer aman
harvest in late 1976. With harvest prices then at disincentive levels there was
a reduction in plantings for the following boro (winter) season. This was most
clearly reflected in a lower level of hiring out of pump sets for irrigation.
There was also a cutback in the level of food aid shipments. 1/ There was a
short and sharp turnaround in the supply position in the following months.
In April 1977 the boro and aus crops were devastated by early
floods in Sylhet (the most northeastern district of Bangladesh). 2/ The
major sufferers in this disaster were, as always, the landless and marginal
farmers who are affected directly through a reduction in employment and
increases in food prices. However, the price increases were ameliorated by the
integration of regional markets within Bangladesh and by large-scale relief
measures. 3/ The immediate problem after such a disaster is the lack of
effective demand on the part of vulnerable groups rather than a problem of
food supply. Relief and rehabilitation measures included for the first time a
significant level of employment-creating, food-for-work activities during the
summer and monsoon to tide the most seriously affected over the period up to
the main rice harvest beginning in November (Brundin, 1978).
In spite of the high level of crop losses, grower prices in the region
rose only 44 percent on a annual basis for boro rice and 38 percent higher for
aus, against respective national movements in prices of 23 and 38 percent (Table
3.5). The integration of regional markets significantly dampened the effects of
production shortfalls on prices, containing the scale of windfall losses and
gains of a highly regionalized crisis. There were also rehabilitation measures
1/ The cutbacks in food imports were a reflection of the concern among donors
at the disincentive effects of the build-up of large food stocks during
1975/76 and low levels of procurement prices.
2/ Boro production fell 88 percent between 1976 and 1977 and aus production
by 75 percent. Floods are a perennial hazard in Sylhet district, a largely
monocrop region in which the spread of modern rice varieties during the
dry season has been inhibited by the early incidence of floods. Many pro-
ducers engage in multi-year storage of rice.
3/ Retail coarse rice prices rose by 50 percent between March and April 1977
but fell again by 11 percent in May in Sylhet District. Nationally prices
rose by 11 percent and then fell by 1.4 percent during the same months.
Table 3.5
Primary Market Harvest Period and Official Procurement Prices for Paddy
Rice, Sylhet District and Bangladesh, 1974/75 - 1978/79
(Takas/maund) a/
Season b/ 1974/75 c/ 1975/76 c/ 1976/77 c/ 1977/78 c/ 1978/79 c/
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
Aus 86 102 np 79 82 74 53 55 70 72 76 70 75 74 80
Aman 148 137 74 165 67 74 64 66 74 81 83 80 81 88 80
Boro (local) 83 109 74 45 56 74 65 69 70 70 73 80 90 104 86
Boro (Irrigated) 96 116 74 52 57 74 70 72 70 75 74 80 105 114 86
Source: Ministry of Agricultures and Forests, Directorate of Marketing.
Notes: np. no procurement;
A. Sylhet District;
B. Bangladesh;
C. Procurement, IRRI, International Rice Research Institute.
a/ Unweighted average of daily prices at selected interior hats" (primary markets)
during harvest and immediate pool harvest period.
b/ Aus: July - September; Aman: December - February; Boro (local): April-May.
c/ Procurement prices exclude the transport premium of Taka 3 (November 15, 1976-
February 18, 1977 and Taka 4 (February 19, 1977 - November 14, 1979).
- 65 -
for producers including, for example, the distribution of wheat seed for the
1977/78 winter season. However, as with the relief of food-for-work measures,
there is some uncertainty about the extent to which the most seriously affected
and vulnerable groups were the direct beneficiaries of these interventions. 1/
The potential scale (involving hundreds of thousands or millions of
people) and the frequency of such disasters (occurring almost every other year)
underscore the need for large-scale relief and rehabilitation measures at a
regional and even national level. The problems are those of finding efficient,
decentralized forms of organization that can respond quickly and effectively to
problems that are large in scale but regional in character. 2/
The Sylhet crisis took place at a time of reduced national production
accounted for both by producer decisions and natural disaster. This quickly
resulted in pressures on prices and the public distribution system as the gap
widened between open market and ration system prices. The government responded
by increasing the scale of commercial food imports. The level of food aid
commitments was also increased in light of the developing crisis. These
decisions proved to be badly timed, given the limited public storage capacity.
The build-up of imports coincided with a sequence of favorable harvests, which
resulted in record production levels in 1977/78. Food prices stabilized,
public distribution and public stocks of imported food grains rose, and the
government was left with little capacity to use domestic procurement as a way
of providing floor prices for producers. Problems of macro control arise in
Bangladesh when production is subject to fluctuations that are large and rapid
in relation to the lags in import operations. As subsequent events in 1978/79
were to demonstrate, these problems are compounded by the decision process
involved in determining the levels of food imports, particularly the levels of
food aid.
1/ During a field trip in January 1978 the author observed that the location
and size of wheat plots suggested that little of the seed in fact reached
those who were most in need of rehabilitation. The Bangladesh Agriculture
Research Council (BARC) has undertaken a subsequent study that suggests
that 75 percent of wheat supplied for food-for-work projects in part of
Sylhet District failed to reach the intended beneficiaries.
2/ The problems of decentralized administration are best documented for the
pre-independence period by Sobhan (1968).
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V. THE DROUGHT OF 1978/79
The drought of 1978/79 1/ was the most severe in living memory and
resulted in the first food crisis of national dimensions since the famine of
1974. It provided a measure of the improved capacity of Bangladesh to cope
with instability in domestic production. In retrospect it will be seen to
highlight some of the problems that result from Bangladesh's continued high
level of dependence on concessional food imports and its failure to build up
adequate emergency food stocks.
The food situation had considerably improved by early 1978. There
had been both record harvests and the highest levels ever of procurement from
domestic sources during 1977/78. High levels of commercial and concessional
imports programmed in the wake of the 1976/77 food crisis also contributed to
the build-up of public stocks. These were thought likely to reach 1 million
metric tons by late 1978. However, the early withdrawal of the southeast
monsoon in October 1978 was to change abruptly the domestic food situation.
Unfortunately, it was to be some time before there was a reappraisal of the
situation by the government and members of the Aid-to-Bangladesh Consortium,
who were still thinking in terms of the more optimistic appraisals of the food
situation made earlier in the year. 2/
The first indication of the severity of the drought was the modest
fall in open market rice prices from pre-harvest October peak levels during
November and December 1978. 3/ The aman harvest only disguised an upward
movement in prices on a seasonally adjusted basis. As the gap between open
market prices and public system procurement and ration prices widened, the
procurement program faltered and off-take from the ration system rose in early
1979 to monthly levels unprecedented since 1972/73 (Table 3.6).
1/ This account of the drought of 1979 and its impact and the policy response
to food crisis is based on H. Brammer, 1979 (a valuable account of the agri-
cultural aspects of the drought), and interviews by the author in Bangladesh
during August September 1979.
2/ At the June 1978 Aid-to-Bangladesh Consortium meeting, aid commitments of
1.6 million metric tons (mmt) for 1978/9 were made in the context of
expected domestic procurement of 500,000 mt and the continuous build-up of
stocks towards the storage capacity limit of around 1 mit.
3/ There is no official, seasonally adjusted index of rice prices for Bangladesh
despite the considerable seasonal fluctuations in prices. A relatively
simple seasonally adjusted series suggests that prices began to harden from
October and November 1978 (Second half of Table 3.3). This upward tendency
is confirmed by another approximate measure of seasonal movements in prices
-- the percentage fall in prices from the pre-aman harvest high of September-
October. This was less in November and December 1978 than in any year since
the famine year of 1973/74. The behavior of the rice market in late 1978
provided warning signals of what was to follow.
Table 3.6
Monthly Off-take of Cereals from Government Stocks, 1972-81
1972-76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
Average monthly
off-take
July 166 114 160 118 200 105
August 178 97 168 118 225 105
Septemher 188 104 186 145 248 132
October 193 143 202 160 277 143
November 151 112 151 121 223 123
December 116 68 115 114 168 89
January 131 106 143 154 174 108
February 138 147 155 166 182 140
March 143 148 166 179 194
April 146 156 149 163 200
May 147 136 127 167 162
June 147 141 127 190 150
Source: World Food Program.
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The drought continued to affect agricultural production in subsequent
seasons. The largely irrigated boro crop (estimated as 14 percent down from 1978)
was affected by the low levels of open waters that provide the major source of
water in this season for a crop irrigated by traditional and mechanized lift
technology. The subsequent aus rice (estimated as 20 percent below 1978 level
of production) and jute crops were also severely affected by lack of soil
moisture at planting times. The effects of the drought were most severe in
relatively well-drained high areas and on heavy soils. It was broken only by
rains late in the aus season. Even the following aman crop was partially
affected by late plantings.
The crisis was nationwide in its effects because of the integration
of food markets. The cutback in production affected both producers and, probably
more severely, those most dependent on agricultural wage employment. The land-
less were doubly hit by high prices and curtailed employment, especially due to
reduced aus and jute plantings. 1/ Some of the most severely affected areas were
the more remote rural regions of the north and west, including the ever vulnerable
Kurigram, where near famine conditions prevailed for a period. Elsewhere the
main effects were felt through rising food prices (Cain, 1979).
The close monitoring of the effects of the drought on agricultural
production by Brammer (1979) and others showed how producers are able to
respond flexibly to such a crisis. Some crops, including the increasingly
important rain-fed winter wheat, were little affected. Subsequently, there was
a considerable increase in the planting of many minor millets where inadequate
soil moisture prevented plantings of rain-fed rice. Clearly, agricultural
research, extension, and rehabilitation measures involving the supply of
drought-resistant varieties could considerably help producers to cope with the
effects of drought and possibly also flood. However, this would imply a flex-
ibility of response and a knowledge of local conditions that would probably
require the build-up of a considerable decentralized capacity to monitor
disasters and support agricultural rehabilitation. As with previous disasters,
the full extent of the human and economic costs of this drought will remain a
matter of speculation.
This drought tested both the capacity of the government in a period of
relative stability to cope with the problems of a food crisis and rehabilitation
and the effectiveness of the support the international community can provide to
Bangladesh in a period of crisis. Things began badly. Only the rice market
and a few agricultural specialists appear to have recognized the seriousness of
the drought as early as October and November 1978. Official estimates of pro-
duction for the 1978 aman season suggested a fall of only 1.3 percent from the
record harvest of the previous year. But this appears quite unrealistic in the
light of the developments in the rice market. A government preoccupied with
elections suddenly became aware of the magnitude of the crisis as the sustained
1/ The time of aus and jute planting and subsequent intercultural operations are
in a normal year the periods of most intense activity and relatively full
employment (Clay, 1977, 1978). There is a serious lack of reliable quantitative
information on the nutritional and wider economic impact of the drought.
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and unseasonally high level of off-take from the ration system in early 1979
threatened to exhaust public food stocks. This international community seems
to have been even slower to recognize the extent of the abrupt turnaround.
The food situation was in fact aggravated by the curtailment of U.S. food aid
shipments. U.S. officials felt that the Bangladesh Government was failing in
its commitment under the new PL480 Title III agreement to set sufficiently
high prices to sustain domestic production through procurement. The apparent
lack of evidence on the effects of drought on production and the low levels of
procurement in December-January 1979 appeared to support their view. 1/ As a
consequence food aid shipments during the period July 1978 through June 1979
were below the level committed in 1978.
Once the extent of the crisis was recognized, the government
responded by rapidly increasing the level of commercial and concessional
food imports from all possible sources. Successful in scheduling an increase
in food imports over a 12-month period to 2.6 mit, the government was equally
effective in organizing rapid unloading and distribution of imported food to
inland storage and centers of consumption. Thus it was able to halt the price
rise at mid-1979 levels and maintain the high flow of foodgrains through its
public distribution system (Table 3.6).
However, to achieve this the handling and distribution of
foodgrain had to be given priority over all other bulk goods in transshipment
and within internal transport systems. If, for example, fertilizer stock
levels had not been already high, then these emergency measures could have had
an adverse effect on domestic production in subsequent seasons, thereby
aggravating the domestic supply situation. Again, if there had been sub-
stantial stocks of food held in major consumption centers, the scale and
urgency of such emergency measures would not have been so great.
Public and nongovernmental agency relief activities in most affected
areas are thought also to have been successful in limiting the human costs of
the severe drought. However, the worst effects appear to have been felt in
remoter rural regions, and the limited capacity to monitor such events makes
it difficult to be certain how severe the problems of intensified malnutrition
and distress were, or how effective relief activities were in combating these
consequences of the drought.
1/ This incident is a classic example of the problems that are raised by an
attempt to give a longer-term "development focus" to food aid policy,
i.e., to make aid conditional on performance criteria with respect to
agricultural or rural development policies. The operation of such a
policy, which involves if necessary the unilateral curtailment of aid,
presupposes a monitoring and interpretation capacity within the aid agency
that was lacking in 1978/79. When public statistics are unreliable and
there is a rapid turnover of aid staff, it is difficult for an aid agency
to develop and sustain such a capacity.
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The crisis continued into 1980 after a second, disappointing aman
crop. Higher levels of commercial as well as concessional imports were used
to sustain public distribution at a level that contained the upward pressures
on food prices. Bangladesh then moved into a relatively more favorable
period. There was a succession of four record harvests, beginning with the
wheat and boro crops of 1979/80. Food stocks also rose to a record level.
Imports scheduled during the food crisis continued to arrive, resulting in
port congestion in late 1980. Large-scale procurement measures were initiated
to hold up prices for producers. At this writing Bangladesh has again swung
~rapidly from food crisis towards the problems of short-term over-supply.
However, food stocks are still less than recently experienced year-on-year
changes in the level of production, and food imports have also been cut back.
The situation, could again deteriorate rapidly.l/
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the drought of
1979/80. First, Bangladesh can cope with a rapid deterioration in the domestic
food supply through an emergency program to step up the level of imports and
ensure the rapid distribution of these augmented supplies within the public
distribution system. However, such emergency measures have substantial
balance-of-payments costs and, as discussed above, involve serious risks of
disrupting economic activity. The scale of purchases in 1979 had immediate
as well as continuing implications for the balance of payments. 2/ Giving
priority to commercial imports of food crowds out other imports, in the
absence of an international facility to meet the balance-of-payments costs
of emergency measures. 3/
Such a crisis comes very quickly. A second lesson of the events of
1978/79 is that, in the absence of adequate monitoring and statistics, delays
in recognizing the problem both by government and by donors may intensify
the crisis. Practically, the monitoring of production still raises consid-
erable problems, and there will inevitably be time lags in recognizing and
responding to such problems. Clearly much higher levels of domestic stocks
would allow governments to absorb the first effects of such a crisis without
running stocks down to dangerously low levels and being forced into costly
emergency measures.
1/ There already seems to have been some hardening of rice prices on a
seasonally adjusted basis by the end of 1980 (second half of Table 3.3).
But this firming of prices is at least partially explained by the record
level of domestic procurement in 1980/81 (Table 3.1).
2/ During 1979/80 foodgrain imports increased to nearly US$700 million
(Table 3.7). Commercial purchases of approximately 1 mmt entailed a
foreign exchange outlay of $110 million (f.o.b) and purchases on deferred
terms. In addition there were the increasing freight costs of commercial
and food aid shipments to be financed.
3/ Imports were projected to increase by 26 percent during 1978/79. In fact
imports rose in value terms by only 9 percent, excluding petroleum products,
representing a decline in real terms. In 1979/80 the value of imports rose
by more than 50 percent, with food imports accounting for 54 percent of this
increase (Table 3.7) and petroleum products for 27 percent. Imports of other
categories, apart from largely aid-financed capital goods, again fell in
real terms.
TABLE 3.7
Bangladesh: Food Imports, Food Aid, and Merchandise Exports since 1973/74.
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1980/81
1. Value of food imports
(c.i.f. in US$ million) 321 344 582 408 169 284 251 691
2. Food aid disbursements
(US$ million) 183 229 382 314 121 178 179 375
3. Merchandise exports
(US$ million) 347 373 359 389 455 496 614 719
4. Food aid as % of
food imports a/ 57 67 66 77 72 63 71 54
5. Non-aid food imports
as % of merchandise 40 28 56 24 11 21 12 44
exports b/
Sources: Ministry of Finance, External Resources Division, Planning Commission;
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
Notes: a/ (4) = [(2)/(1)] x 100.
b/ (5) = [((1) - (2))/(3)] x 100.
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Third, there is a clear need for measures to reduce the vulner-
ability of Bangladeshi agriculture to the effects of drought as well as flood.
The flexible response of producers to the drought, documented by Brammer (1979),
through switching to more drought-resistant crops, indicates one way in which
disaster preparedness and rehabilitation measures could help contain the effects
of a drought or flood. The rapidly expanding wheat crop was virtually unaffected
by the drought. Crop diversification, supported by research and extension
efforts, can contribute to reducing the vulnerability of Bangladeshi agriculture
to environmental disaster. Extending the area under irrigation can also reduce
the vulnerability of agriculture to unfavorable environmental conditions.
Finally, this crisis brought sharply into focus some of the
problems in multi-party decision-making on the flow of concessional food
imports. Government action, as in previous crises, reflected the political
reality that the urban population and the bureaucratic-military complex that
sustains the state will have first claim on food supplies distributed through
the public system. 1/ This is a fact of life in Bangladesh and elsewhere.
However, where these demands can be met by rapidly increasing the level of food
imports, or by using domestic buffer stocks if available, such action is positive
if far from ideal in taking pressure off the rest of the food system. What is
more worrying is the outcome of complex decisions by the government and donors
over the level of food impo-rts over the period from the lead into the 1976/77
crisis until the present day. These decisions threaten to amplify the effects
of fluctuations in food supply resulting from the instability of domestic
production.
Government decisions are strongly influenced by short-term pressures
-- to maintain supplies to priority groups and as far as possible to build up
stock levels to minimize future risks to these supplies. Financial consider-
ations of minimizing the costs of imports as well as taking advantage of the
revenue-raising opportunities of concessional imports to sustain a public ration
system also contribute to a desire to maintain high levels of concessional food
imports. Donors take a longer view of the potential dangers of high import
levels to domestic agricultural development and doubtless also wish to limit
commitments to supply concessional food. They therefore consider the evolving
food supply situation in making food aid commitments. On the whole this multi-
party decision process has not been very effective and is possibly destablizing
in its impact on Bangladesh because of the lags between decisions and their
effect on the level of food imports. As "good" years have followed "bad" for
agricultural production, the lagged response in the planning of food imports and
aid commitments has meant that food imports have had a limited effect in smoothing
out fluctuations in the supply of food grains (Table 3.1). 2/
1/ The share of priority urban and other groups increased during 1978/79 to
68 percent of total public foodgrain distribution (Table 3.4).
2/ Ahmed (1979) finds average fluctuation around local level production of
11 percent and 7 percent in consumption availability. This implies a much
higher level of fluctuation in consumption than occurs in better managed
systems of developed countries where much of the adjustment in grain con-
sumption occurs in the livestock sector.
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VI. THE BANGLADESH FAMINE
The events of 1973-75 have to a considerable degree shaped views
on domestic food policy both in Bangladesh and internationally. 1/ An extra-
ordinary combination of circumstances produced the most disastrous conditions
since the Bengal Famine of 1943. Postwar disorder still affected the transport
and distribution system. A government still trying to gain social control as
well as one inexperienced in internal economic management and external economic
and political relations proved poorly equipped to cope with the crisis.
Bangladesh was in the midst of domestic hyper-inflation. The rapidly deter-
iorating external economic environment was a result of rising oil prices and
worsening terms of trade for jute and jute goods, Bangladesh's major exports.
Finally, a sequence of relatively poor harvests culminating in disastrous floods
in some lower-lying regions led to near famine conditions.
Looked at after the food production crisis of 1978/79 that could
have resulted once more in famine conditions, the aspect of the earlier
crisis that remains of most interest is how an unfavorable external economic
and political environment can be seen to have exacerbated the crisis. Only
by good fortune did the emergency program of food imports in 1979 occur when
grain markets were relatively soft, thus enabling Bangladesh successfully and
rapidly to acquire imports on a range of favorable terms from many sources. 2/
During 1978/79 India was also able to prevent a serious food supply situation
by drawing down on its massive domestic reserves. In 1973/74, Bangladesh
lacked any such reserves. The concessional supply of imported food was also
curtailed as commercial sales led to a sharp reduction in the availability of
food aid from North America. The priority assigned to sustaining ration system
supplies forced the Bangladesh Government into making commercial food imports
equivalent in value to 56 percent of the value of merchandise exports in
1974/75. 3/ Balance-of-payment pressures at the height of the crisis began to
constrain the supply of other imports essential for post-war reconstruction. 4/
1/ See, for example, McHenry, 1977; Alamgir, 1978; Sobhan, 1979.
2/ In addition to imports from the major developed-country grain exporters,
Bangladesh obtained grain on a variety of terms from Burma, China, India,
Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand in 1979 and 1980.
3/ Due to uncertainties of definition the estimates in Table 3.7 should be
regarded only as approximations. The presentation of imports on an annual
basis in fact underestimates the severity of the balance-of-payments
pressures felt in the middle of 1974. It was only later in the year that
sizable food aid shipments began to make an appreciable impact on the food
situation.
4/ Post-war reconstruction involved initially an attempt to move back towards
pre-war levels of capacity utilization. Balance-of-payments constraints on
the inputs of raw materials therefore disrupted production, whereas shortages
of a wide range of basic consumer goods intensified the inflationary
pressures of 1973/75.
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The government also sought to augment public system food supplies
by forced procurement at below open market prices from agricultural producers
and the grain trade. Whatever the short-term rationale for such measures, I/
disruption of private trade only intensified the pressures on consumers outside
the public distribution system. With supplies at a low ebb in mid-1974 distri-
bution also contracted in a highly regressive way through the limitation of
rural (modified) rationing and food-for-work activity (Table 3.4). The system
proved least effective in moving supplies to the remoter rural regions where
famine conditions prevailed. 2/ Thus in this severest of crisis, exacerbated by
problems of external supply, it was the remote and poor who bore the brunt of
the adjustment process.
Food production was further hit in 1974 by the breakdown of the
plant that was the major domestic soure of nitrogenous fertilizer (World Bank,
1979, Tables 3.1, 8.1). 3/ Fertilizer distribution fell by 100,000 tons
(26 percent) between 1973/74 and 1974/75. Both problems of foreign exchange
and difficulties of arranging supply in the short term in a tight market
prevented Bangladesh from making good this shortfall, which probably reduced
cereal production by 350,000 - 500,000 tons. Again, the response of the
government was to use rationing and administrative allocation to ensure supply
to priority groups. Where the effect of re-trading on prices and supply was
documented, it appears that administrative allocation was again highly
regressive in its impact (Von Martius, 1975). 4/ The fertilizer shortages of
1974/75 illustrate a problematic aspect of the increased use of modern inputs.
The disruption of domestic production or supply difficulties with imports
introduces a new source of food insecurity.
1/ Nurul Islam provides some clue to the framework of ideas within which the
forced procurement was organized: "To the extent that the Government was
able to procure food from the surplus farmers, it would be possible to reduce
their consumption and import less. It was also thought that the purchases
of food in the domestic market might reduce the stocks of food available to
farmers and traders for speculative operations in times of shortage...."
Compulsory procurement was favored because "there was a possibility that
voluntary purchase, even if the purchase price was not unfavorable compared
to the ruling market price, might not secure enough foodgrains for the
Government if farmers or traders decided to hold on to their stocks in
anticipation of further shortages" (Islam, 1977, p. 115).
2/ Akbar (1975) reports how in Rangpur the famine problem was recognized too
late and, with restrictions in the supply through modified rationing, relief
began only after there were widespread famine deaths, large-scale sale of
land and assets by marginal farmers, and mass migration of the destitute
towards the towns. See also Stepanek, 1979, pp. 63-66.
3/ This might appear to be a chance event, a further piece of bad luck. But
when an economic system is under intense pressure and there are maintenance
and spare parts problems, it is probably more likely that such a breakdown
will occur.
4/ During the 1978/79 drought the government again introduced anti-hoarding
regulations, restricting the level of stocks maintained by the private
grain sector. If such regulations were effective, the carryover of stocks
would have been reduced, tightening the food situation in subsequent months.
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VI. FOOD POLICY: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
In each of the food crises, we have seen how crop failure can bring
whole regions to the edge of disaster and have a severe impact on food
consumption throughout Bangladesh. The scale and rapidity of such fluct-
uations in production and localized devastation have inevitably given over-
whelming importance to government intervention. Yet in each crisis a number of
factors have impeded effective action by government. Political and social
pressures on the government have been reflected in an ordering of priorities
that does not give primary concern to maintaining the food supply for the more
vulnerable 30 to 50 percent of the population.
This is a difficult problem area because government has, at least ir the
short term, limited freedom of maneuver. There is a long history of food
insecurity, and recent experiences of hyper-inflation and savage cuts in real
incomes have affected almost all strata of society. At low levels of real
incomes the nature of the Engel Curve relationships for food consumption gives
importance to ensuring supplies of basic foodstuffs in urban areas and for those
on whom the functioning of government depends. 1/ The record of the past decade
nevertheless provides some indication of where specific changes would make policy
more cost effective, as well as tilting the balance of benefits towards the
poorer consumer.
First, our review of each crisis has demonstrated the importance of
reliable monitoring and information systems in bringing detailed and credible
information before the government. Otherwise, a disastrous situation builds up.
The government is subsequently forced to respond by emergency measures that are
inherently disruptive of the longer-term development of the economy. This
destabilizing pattern of reactive intervention as well as supportive action by
the international community is reflected in the behavior of the food sector
since Bangladesh's independence. The domestic supply situation has swung from
dearth to short periods of over-supply and reduced incentives to producers, as
in 1975/76 and again in 1980/81. These fluctuations have been aggravated by the
lags in the flow of imports as well as slippage on food aid commitments. 2/
Second, because food import policy is obviously an important measure of
macroeconomic control as well as a critical element in food consumption policy,
it is questionable whether an annual pattern of commitments is optimal. Food
aid agreements should be made on a basis comparable to longer-term commercial
contracts, which allow flexibility to the importer within a pre-agreed total.
Otherwise, an import-financing facility such as that proposed at the 1980
International Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meeting would seem to be a more
flexible form of support to macro food policy in a country such as Bangladesh
with a serious problem of short-term food insecurity.
1/ It is worth remembering that in richer societies similar priority is often
given to maintaining real incomes and indexation of the pensions of public
employees.
2/ Some of these lags reflect the cumbersome procedures of aid donors. For
example, EEC (European Economic Community) Food Aid involves sanction by
both Commission and the Council of Ministers.
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Third, a much higher level of domestic stocks and stockholding capacity
of foodgrain as well as agricultural inputs is called for. A high proportion
of stocks should be held at points from which final distribution can be readily
undertaken. This would provide a breathing space for coping with a rapid
deterioration in the production situation as well as the disruption of input
supplies. A higher level of domestic stocks would also imply the need for
considerable infrastructural development. The poorly developed system for
channelling domestic food surpluses into the public distribution network limits
the possibilities for using domestic procurement as a method of price stabili-
zatian. A system is needed that can hold considerably more than the build-up of
stocks from a single good harvest combined with the spillover of high import
levels in the wake of a food crisis as in 1977 and again in 1980. This has
been accorded priority by the government and forms part of the program of
development assistance by the World Bank and other donor agencies. 1/
Fourth, an aggressive food import policy has been shown capable of
containing the economic and human costs of shortfalls in domestic food supply.
However, the record of the past three crises leaves room for concern. Food
aid supplies have not, as already mentioned above, had obvious stabilizing
effects on the food situation. Balance-of-payments support such as that also
discussed could play a valuable role in allowing Bangladesh to use imports for
stabilization purposes. For when, as in 1973/74, a domestic food crisis
coincides with a tight world food market, Bangladesh could still encounter
serious problems in scheduling and financing supplies.
Studies of the economic benefits and costs of public distribution activities
such as the Bangladesh ration system 2/ have shown that large-scale operations
have positive cost-benefit ratios. Studies of large-scale food aid to support
such activities have similarly shown that benefits in terms of increased food
supply as well as balance-of-payments and budgetary support have been large
compared with the disincentive impact on domestic production. 3/ However,
experience in Bangladesh indicates that there is no reason for complacency
about the effectivenss of such public supply operations. The distribution of
rations appears to be highly skewed towards priority groups who do not comprise
the poorest consumers, among whom there is widespread malnutrition. These
priority consumption groups have become increasingly entrenched as the major
beneficiaries of subsidized public distribution (Table 3.4). The broader
1/ Ideally, with production subject to substantial swings and at least half the
population almost immediately vulnerable to the effects of any deterioration
in the food supply situation, a highly flexible system is required that
can handle a large volume of domestic surpluses as well as a rapid build-up
of imports. This rather than a massive stock-building policy as in India
would intuitively seem to be the optimal solution for Bangladesh.
2/ See Scandizzo, 1980, as well as Scandizzo, 1979, 1980a, 1980b.
3/ See, for example, the preliminary findings of Nelson, 1979, and for India,
Blandford, 1977.
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benefits of public system operation have been through the expansion of domestic
food supply. Imports have eased the overall food situation. 1/
There have also been some developments in food production and the food
distribution system that have encouraging distributional and nutritional
implications. The increasing importance of wheat in both domestic production
and food consumption is one such development. Household expenditure surveys
confirm that wheat, the major commodity distributed through the public ration
systems, is an inferior good that is relatively more important in consumption
by the poor (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1978). Augmenting domestic
food supply through concessional imports of wheat has been more equitable in
its consumption distributional impact than imports of rice. 2/ Following the
introduction and diffusion of more productive wheat technology since 1974/75,
domestic wheat production has risen from around 115,000 tons to over 1 million
tons in 1979/80 (Clay, 1978a; 1980). The crop is largely unirrigated. So far
wheat, which was little affected by adverse weather conditions such as the
drought of 1978/79, also promises to have stabilizing effects on domestic food
supply. 3/
1/ Ahmed, 1979, reached the different conclusion that rationing had been quite
successful in providing support for the rural and urban poor. This con-
clusion is, however, directly dependent on assumptions about the operation
of the system that are not supported by the evidence. He assumed that
ration quotas were drawn by all cardholders and that the incidence of false
cards was proportional to the size of various income classes. The validity
of these assumptions for 1973/74 cannot be tested. However, lack of cash
income has been a constraint on the ability of the lowest-income groups to
use a ration or food-entitlement scheme elsewhere, e.g., Sri Lanka (Alailima,
1978). Many low-income families also had difficulty establishing eligibility
because of residence requirements. The large number of bogus ration cards
cancelled in 1975/76 were was believed to be concentrated in the hands of
the politically and economically influential, who were using blocks of
cards to operate, in effect, as wholesale intermediaries. Nor is Ahmed's
assumption that rural rations were distributed to lower-income groups as
intended by the conditions of eligibility supported by survey findings.
Karim (1980) found the percentage of cereal consumption by rural households
drawn from the ration system to be small and independent of economic
status, so that, in absolute terms, consumption of food from the ration
system increased with income levels.
2/ Ironically, given the pattern of demand for wheat, leakages from the public
distribution system augment the open market supply and (all other things
being equal) have, through price effects, had a relatively greater impact
on the incomes of poor consumers. The high level of wheat imports, which
has established a sizeable domestic market, has provided the context for the
rapid expansion of wheat production.
3/ This probably contributed to the 67 percent increase in wheat production in
the following year. In 1978/79 significant levels of wheat were also pro-
cured domestically (50,000 tons) for distribution through the public system.
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The increasing importance of wheat consumption and production is
an example of a fruitful interaction of agricultural science, production,
and food distribution policies. Grown as a rainfed crop in the winter season,
wheat has also led to an increase in agricultural employment and effective
demand for food. 1/
Other encouraging developments in food policy indicate an increasing
awareness of the need to take account of the consumption characteristics of
basic staples. Domestic procurement of rice has traditionally concentrated
on the finer long-grain types, which command higher market prices and are
purchased predominantly by richer consumers. Recent decisions to extend
procurement to the boro and aus crops, predominantly shorter staples with a
high proportion of modern semi-dwarf varieties, not only benefits the producers
but also increases the supply of coarse grains, acceptable to lower-income
consumers, through the public distribution system. However, this encouraging
development is to a considerable degree counterbalanced by an increased share
of rice in actual public ration distribution, an inevitable consequence of
increasing domestic procurement of food grains for the public system.
In 1978 there was an experimental program for the distribution of
sorghum through selected ration shops in urban and rural areas. This provided
an opportunity to test the possibility of targeting part of public food
distribution towards the poorer and malnourished by introducing an even lower
status, but nutritionally valuable, food. Off-take was low in urban areas,
suggesting the predominance of middle-and high-income consumers. However, in
rural areas the off-take of sorghum, particularly among lower-income groups,
was very high. This program confirmed that in Bangladesh as elsewhere
(Timmer 1980, 1980a) the use of such "self-targeting" foods has a considerable
potential for affecting malnutrition and to a lesser extent the distribution
of income. But careful monitoring of this experiment also indicated that
limited coverage and the meagerness and uncertainty of supplies through rural
ration distribution stood in the way of making the programs an effective
instrument for combating malnutrition (Karim, 1980).
1/ Khan, 1980, has criticized the expansion of wheat because of what is seen
as the unfavorable distributional impact on employment. This inference
is derived from a cross-section comparison of the labor requirements of
irrigated winter boro rice with those of wheat. However, studies of
changes in cropping patterns suggest that the dominant substitution has
been of rainfed winter wheat for lower productivity rainfed oil-seed and
pulse crops (Clay, 1980), with positive employment effects. Such sub-
stitution can increase annual labor requirements by up to 30 percent
(Clay, 1978). Where irrigation is necessary for wheat cultivation the
lower water requirements of wheat also allow producers to irrigate up to
three times the area of boro.
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Another attempt to increase the effectiveness of public distribution
on malnutrition and the incomes of the rural poor has been to build up the
scale of food-for-work activities. In principle such developments are highly
desirable. The problem of effective demand for food among the landless and
near-landless, intensified in periods of disaster, gives an added importance
to food-for-work and other wage-earning rural works activity. The food-for-
work programs have built up to a level where around 250-300,000 tons of food
grain is being disbursed annually, which, if fully utilized, would generate
over 100 million person-days of employment in rural areas. Following the
Sylhet floods, attempts have also been made to increase activity in the monsoon
high flood-level period. Experimental programs have also shown that rural
works can provide an important source of income for particularly vulnerable
disadvantaged groups, such as rlral women (Chen and Ghaznavi, 1977). However,
studies and reports suggest that major organizational problems stand in the
way of considerably expanding the level of rural works activities (Brudin,
1978). In particular, there is a need to establish satisfactory decentralized
capacity to handle the supply of foodgrains and organize labor, all as part
of a program of works that takes into account local variations in patterns of
agricultural activity and possibilities for labor-intensive capital formation.
In the absence of such trained, well-motivated organization capacity, the
food-for-work programs are likely to be beset by high levels of leakage
and to prove an inefficient and inegalitarian form of capital formation. 1/
The combination of domestic procurement of foodgrain, imports, and
open market sales to stabilize the domestic food market has been widely
advocated. 2/ This would integrate "the two food worlds in Bangladesh"
(Stepanek, 1979, p. 69) of the protected urban consumer, and the rural poor
and the farmer. Assuming a competitive grain market, open market operations
represent a lower-cost method of stabilization than subsidized ration
distribution (with its income effects on the consumption by ration card
holders). This method of stabilization could also reduce the administrative
costs of intervention. USAID supported an experimental open market operation
in wheat during 1978/79 as part of an innovative Title III Food Aid Agreement.
In practice, wheat was sold to millers at substantially below open market
prices, making the operation in effect an extension of the existing system of
subsidized distribution. The timing of this first experiment in the midst of
a food crisis was unfortunate. Yet this is also part of the problem of
increasing the effectivness of public interventions. 3/
1/ Brundin (1978) in a USAID study suggests 25 percent leakages. Independent
nongovernmental organization estimates cited by Henshaw, 1980, suggest
that leakages can go as high as 75 percent. The Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies and International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) are undertaking a major appraisal, supported by the World Bank and
the World Food Programme, of food-for-work program.
2/ The first fully worked-out proposal was made by Stepanek, 1976. See also
Stepanek, 1979, p. 67-69
3/ As rice represents the bulk of the food graintrade, open market operations
in rice would be more effective. Whereas open market operations in
wheat could play an important role in extending the private market in
this commodity, or, if handled insensitively, could undermine the existing
market for domestic producers.
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Bangladesh has now committed itself to moving more broadly in the
direction of open market operations and limiting the extent of subsidized
ration distribution. An extended period of relative food price stability is
probably required to allow a substantial transfer of food distribtuion to the
private grain trade. Meanwhile the build-up of domestic stocks, guarantees
of large-scale emergency food import finance, or food aid availability would
also be necessary to provide the capacity for large-scale stabilization
operations. This would give credibility to and reduce the risks of such a move
to market distribution. There is a long history of fears about food insecurity,
an inherent distrust of, or at least lack of confidence in, the private grain
trade, and a preference for visible administrative measures in periods of
crisis that stand in the way of a move toward a market-oriented food system.
Such a change also requires the build-up of experience in operating such a
system and establishing a monitoring capability to provide a basis for sophis-
ticated market interventions.
Administrative and logistic capacity in the agricultural and food
sector have come to be extended piecemeal over a range of price controls and
physical procurement operations for rice, wheat, jute, sugar, tobacco, and,
most recently, cotton. In addition to foodgrains, vegetable oil and sugar
are distributed through a fair price public ration system. There have even
been interventions to assure urban supplies and contain retail price levels
of commodities such as onions and tea. However, a review of the effectiveness
of this complex of potentially inconsistent interventions would probably
indicate that scarce administrative resources should be concentrated on inter-
ventions in foodgrain markets. There are strong cross-price relationships
between rice and wheat consumption and other commodities, too, because of
the large income effects of changes in rice prices (Clay, 1980; Pitt, 1980).
Foodgrains also dominate agricultural production, and there are major substi-
tution possibilities with other commodities: rice and jute and wheat with
oil seeds, pulses, and sugarcane. Effective stabilization operations for
foodgrains would limit the destabilizing effects of volatile foodgrain prices
on the production of other commodities.
Finally, it must be recognized that apart from the benefits of price
stabilization, which with inelastic demand schedules probably benefits all
consumers, a market-oriented food system does little to meet the needs of the
poor and malnourished (Stepanek, 1979). Indeed stabilization at relatively
higher prices could even have short-term negative implications for the
nutritional status of the poor rural and urban consumers (Pitt, 1980). The
wholly inadequate nutritional status of these groups needs to be carefully
taken into acount in moving the ground of discussion from stabilization to
providing incentive prices to producers.
There are two equity arguments for proceeding cautiously on the
incentive price issue. As Pitt (1980) has shown, the potential short-term
negative nutritional impact of higher food prices will fall disproportionately
on lower income groups. Comparable analysis based on more sophisticated data
bases in Indonesia (Timmer, 1980) and Sri Lanka (Timmer, 1980a) suggests that
the pattern of income and price elasticities of basic consumption staples for
different income groups implies that relatively higher food prices have a
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negative impact on consumption by the poorest 20 percent of consumers. Second,
higher output prices may disproportionately benefit larger producers who
account for a disproportionate share of marketed output. Nor does the avail-
able evidence support the view that additional employment would increase the
incomes of the rural poor as agricultural laborers sufficiently to compensate
them for their losses as consumers (Ahmed, 1979; Clay, 1978).
There are three other reasons for caution on the price incentive
issue. First, social factors are widely held to constrain the realization of
the productive potential of Bangladeshi agriculture, implying a low aggregate
supply for agriculture in the absence of institutional changes (Ministry of
Agriculture and Forests, 1978). Second, there are problems of adjustment.
Rtising real food prices, which imply reduction in the real incomes of urban
as well as rural consumers in the short term, are all too likely to produce
or add to inflationary pressures that undermine this whole strategy. Third,
there is the questions of effective demand. As the record shows, every time
there is a sequence of good harvests there are temporary problems of oversupply.
Recent experiences in India provide some indication of the short-run problems
to be faced in going for agricultural growth and self-sufficiency in food
without simultaneously finding a way of massively augmenting the purchasing
power of the poor consumer.
To summarize, developments since the economic crisis and famine of
1974 provide grounds for qualified optimism about the food consumption situ-
ation in Bangladesh. The government has demonstrated a capacity to contain
the worst effects of short-term deterioration in the domestic food supply
through emergency import and distribution measures. There is also a growing
recognition of the need to make public interventions more cost-effective and
to find ways of targeting food more successfully towards the poor. This is
reflected in experimental programs and the high priority accorded to rural
work activity in the second Five Year Plan. Success in limiting fluctuations
iLn food supply and sustaining effective demand of low-income groups in
periods of stress prevents the worsening of long-run problems of malnutrition,
poverty, and widespread destitution. Nevertheless, these problems of massive
structural poverty remain. It has yet to be shown whether a short-term food
security net can be put into place to provide an alternative to crisis manage-
ment of the food system and the economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This paper deals with two related problems of adjustment:
fluctuations in food output and availability and their impact on poverty
and undernutrition. (The aggregate performance and prospects of Indian
agriculture, in the context of adjustment to energy prices and world
recession in 1973-90, are dealt with in another paper.) 1/
An observer from the perspective of the early 1970s, but armed
with knowledge of oil price trends in the 1970s, would be amazed at the
relatively healthy appearance of India's overall food position in 1980.
Foodgrain output-per-person, after the rapid progress of the late 1960s,
fell sharply from 1970-71 to 1974-75. 2/ Indeed, there was no uptrend in
food output-per-person between 1956 and 1974; although technical progress
(mainly HYVs) brought a net gain to food output of about 6 percent. Even
by 1971, this was offset by stagnation in pulses and some cereals and by
population growth. By 1974, many saw the green revolution as no more than
a genetically vulnerable, one-time upsurge of rabi wheat output in one or
two states. Stocks in 1972-74 reached dangerously low levels. The quad-
rupling of oil prices in 1973 and the further doubling in 1978-80 impinged
on an agriculture increasingly dependent on energy-based inputs: nitrogenous
fertilizer, diesel oil for pumpsets, and in some areas tractor fuel.
Yet India's foodgrain output in the 1970s, as Table 1 shows,
outpaced population growth (which slowed down slightly). Good weather
conditions during 1975/76-1978/79 permitted India to build up public-sector
stocks to unprecedented levels, 15-20 percent of output, and in some years
to eliminate net grain imports and even to emerge briefly as a net exporter
of 1-2 percent of output. HYVs and (despite the price explosion) nitrogenous
fertilizers appeared to be spreading their yield benefits to more crops,
notably winter rice; more areas, notably coastal Andhra, eastern Uttar
Pradesh, and northern Bihar, and even, to some extent, into monsoon-season
crops. 3/
These improvements seem to be backed by some degree of all-party
commitment to increase the resources and incentives to produce food. In 1980,
as in the 1970s, the Indian farmer could have bought more of his production
and consumption needs, per ton of grain sold, if he could have transacted on
world markets than he could in fact buy on Indian markets; but this relative
disadvantage has not widened much and may even have narrowed slightly. 4/
The proportion of public and private investments, realized as well as planned,
going to the agricultural sector -- with 70 percent of India's workforce, and
with new technologies waiting upon land and water development -- is still only
22-25 percent, but this is more than the 18-20 percent targeted and achieved
in 1956-70. 5/
Are these improvements in agricultural policy getting the necessary
institutional support? Some of the signs are hopeful. National crop research,
which has a strong tradition in India, is increasingly receiving the necessary
regional support. Some steps to improve watershed management are under way in
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the Command Area Development Programs. Extension, especially in Rajasthan, may
be transformed by the "training and visit" system. Much larger proportions of
institutional credit, via nationalized banks, are reaching rural areas, though
not much is getting to small food growers. Special programs for vulnerable food
producers -- the Drought Prone Area Program, the Small Farmers' Development
Association -- can report some successes, and they embody career structures that
encourage some civil servants to direct energies towards poorer farmers. In
Maharashtra and Karnataka especially, right-to-work programs have provided some
basic food security even for some of the rural landless, and neither the actual
distribution of rights in land, nor in some places the process of land reform,
have moved as unfavorably as general reports suggest. 8/
So India's food security -- with well over 10 million metric tons of
public-sector food stocks, a growing proportion of land irrigated, and an
improved policy posture -- looks surprisingly healthy, even in the face of oil
shocks and recession. But aggregate looks may deceive. Unknown proportions
of grain stocks, coop-stored in the open, have been ruined. Gravity-flow
irrigation depends on the monsoon for full functioning, as the 1979 drought
reminded us. Present investment allocations do not suggest irreversible
policy shifts in favor of food production, especially if an attitude of "all's
well in food production" spreads. The near miss of 1972, and before that of
1965-67, shows how swiftly an apparently healthy food position can evaporate.
The really serious risks affect the 15 percent or so of India's population at
or below the margin of caloric adequacy. They have few, if any, food stocks
*or saleable assets or access to loans. In a bad year, they are in most states
at high risk of unemployment. 9/ Lacking much land of their own, they cannot
afford much food grown on other people's land either. Even in "normal" years,
infant and child death rates among these vulnerable groups are alarmingly high
-- each perhaps 80-100 per 1000 -- and, even without overt famine, calorie
shortage is a major factor in the damaging synergism underlying about a third
of these deaths. 10/
Four central issues affecting the nature of individual food insecurity
(which in India means almost entirely, caloric inadequacy) 11/ have determined
the structure of this paper.
First, caloric inadequacy affects many fewer person-days than is
generally believed. The true proportion is 10-15 percent, not 50-60 percent.
(The reasons are too complex for debate here but boil down to the facts that
average dietary energy requirements are below the levels normally set and
non-harmful bodily adjustments mean that below-average intakes tend to
accompany below-average requirements, both within populations over a period and
among person-days for an individual.) 12/ Hence, food insecurity in India is
narrowly focused on small at-risk groups that may face a succession of days of
worsening physical condition.
Second, these groups are concentrated in districts and states where
relatively little progress has been made either in raising output-per-hectare or
in increasing double-cropping. The 289 mainly rural districts of India averaged
2.75 percent annual compound growth in foodgrain output between 1962-65 and 1970-
73, but 72 suffered declining output. 13/ Areas concentrating heavily on sorghum
(of which output fell in 59 out of 93 districts), rice (56 out of 184) and gram
(79 out of 150) 14/ remain at special risk. In such areas, small farmers are
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especially prone to drought and flood and receive relatively little help from
HYVs. Landless laborers get less income from work in the same "bad" seasons
that make food scarce and expensive.
Third, the main causes of insecure access to food are local, not
international. Despite the spread of irrigation and pest control, the
variability of crop output remains high. This variability did not fall signifi-
cantly in the 1970s. And it is most serious for the crops grown and eaten by
the poorest groups. At the policy level the causes lie in the relatively low
priority assigned to water management in marginally irrigated areas, to water
control in rainfed areas, and to non-marketed crops. At the individual level
the descending spiral of food insecurity often begins with illness.
Fourth, "international" causes of food insecurity -- especially
scarcer or more expensive energy, and hence fertilizers -- probably will
continue to have rather small effects on total food supply. However, it will
continue to be the poor whose price elasticity of demand for such inputs is
highest, and "poor people's crops" will continue to be the crops most vulnerable
to input fluctuations. (The proportion of fertilizers going to such crops in a
normal year is surprisingly high.) 15/
Section II of this paper considers how food insecurity affects India's
poorest groups. Section III examines the impact on these groups of sudden
changes in the world economy -- both directly and via alternative Indian policy
adjustments to these changes. Section IV analyzes the impact of internal circum-
stances and changes in the access of at-risk groups to food. Section V reviews
the interaction of internal and external shocks, especially between (a) Government
of India attempts to secure the food position of at-risk groups by internal policy
measures (e.g., irrigation policies), (b) vulnerability to external shocks, and
(c) responses to these shocks.
II. POVERTY AND FOOD INSECURITY IN INDIA
About 40-45 percent of Indians, even if they spend 80 percent of
outlay on food, cannot afford the average Indian dietary energy (in Kilocalories,
kcals) standard; and this proportion showed no clear trend, up or down, between
the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. 16/ However, this standard is set higher
than necesary. 17/ Also, many who can afford less -- less, even, than
an appropriately reduced standard -- also require fewer kcals than that
average. 18/ It is important to distinguish between the 10-15 percent of
Indians who are truly undernourished in caloric terms (and who are hereafter
called "the poorest") and the 30-35 percent immediately above these in the
scale of income-per-consumer unit (who are hereafter called "the poor").
The "10-15 percent poorest" figure accords with clinical evidence 19/
and with the fact that only the poorest decile or two (ranked by income per
person) spends most of any rise in income on simply raising the intake of very
cheap food. The next two or three deciles up the income scale spend much of
any rise on tastier food or on non-food. 20/ For these "poor but not poorest"
really are poor -- often forced, in order to eat enough, to do without other
near-essentials (decent shelter, the diversion of adolescent time from employ-
ment to education, etc.). However, food insecurity imposes immediate severe
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hardship directly only upon the poorest 10-15 percent. Only indirectly --
because an unexpected food shortage 21/ must sometimes be met by the sale of
assets, 22/ leading to increased personal insecurity and to a transition from
"poor" to "poorest" -- does a shortage impose extreme hardship on the remaining
"poor" 25-35 percent of Indians. The analytical and policy issues regarding
"poor" and "poorest" in the face of food insecurity are distinct. They have to
do with identifying and preventing or countering cost-effectively the causes
and/or harmful results: for the poorest, of increased caloric stress and of
bodily adjustments to it; for the poor, of non-bodily adjustments to (i.e., of
avoidance of) increased caloric stress (e.g., via further sacrifice of near-
essential non-foods or via pauperization.) 23/
This paper deals mainly with the first issue, the plight of the
poorest, initially by clarifying two points.
First, it is not quite accurate to write of "10-15 percent of
Indians" too poor to afford necessary dietary energy. Strictly, it is 10-15
percent of "consumer-unit days" in India. This is of, literally, vital
policy importance: (a) because in any year undernutrition of one person for
30 days on end is much more harmful than that of 30 persons for one day each;
and (b) because, if most of the underfed consumer units are among children,
they will comprise not 10-15 percent, but perhaps 20 percent, of persons.
Unfortunately, Indian undernutrition appears to be concentrated on long
periods of child hunger -- involving more health risk than the 10-15 percent
figure, although correct in itself, indicates. This heavy concentration on
infants and small children, especially infected children, arises not because
adequately fed adults heartlessly or ignorantly discriminate against their
offspring, 24/ but because high infant and child death rates (and respon-
sively high birth rates) mean that, among the poorest households (i.e., those
likeliest to be underfed), there is a disproportionately large number of
persons under five. Indeed, given the non-nutritional risks to children (and
to their prospects of earning and remitting enough to support their parents in
old age), parents may choose "many children, all hungry" rather than "few
chidren, none hungry" as a rational strategy to maximize the family's
survival prospects. 25/ Moreover, life-cycle effects probably mean that
families have the least income, per consumer unit, when the mother must look
after several small children, because then only one family member earns
income.
Second, to say that 10-15 percent of Indian consumer-unit days
involve the poorest in being underfed is to say that damaging bodily adjust-
ments ensue. If such adjustments can be identified, the order of priority
for steps to prevent, or cope with, further food shortage will be suggested; 26/
The damaging adjustments are:
- faltering of height/weight ratios (little damage, apparently,
is done by low height/age or weight/age ratios alone) 27/
in persons under 18, and especially in under-fives;
- lethargy or loss of learning capacity;
- unwanted declines in work-seeking or work-performing capacity; 28/
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- persistence of, or higher death rates from (rather than higher
incidence of) 29/, illness, especially among under-fives;
- where observable, dangerously reduced fat/lean ratios 30/;
- where observable, dangerously reduced protective capacity
against illness.31/
Where and when are which Indians most prone to these risks if, for
any reason, calories become scarcer or more expensive? The "where" question
has two parts: urban or rural, and in which areas of India. It is convention-
ally argued that a larger proportion of urban persons are underfed than of rural
persons, and that their deficiency is more serious. The village's lower internal
inequality, higher sense of mutual obligations, and cheaper food are believed to
outweigh higher urban real income-per-person. This belief is out-of-date, in
part irrelevant to policy, and based on misreading of evidence:
(1) The belief is out-of-date because of the substantial collapse
of traditional mutual social security obligations (e.g., within the
jajmani system, which tied craft families to work for farmer-patrons
for standardized payments) in much of rural India in the wake of
commercialization and market integration. 32/ These factors also
probably reduce the (anyway small) 33/ disparity between urban
and rural food prices and other prices.
(2) The alleged urban location of most hungry people after food
insecurity strikes is also partly irrelevant, because hungry people
wander between town and country in search of cheaper food. Such
mobility renders major price gaps between town and country espe-
cially unlikely when food is scarce. Hence the limited relevance
of distinctions between urban and rural location of the victims of
hunger after the event, though locating its causes and cost-effective
treatments remain highly relevant.
(3) The evidence -- namely, the (rather small) discrepancies between
rural and urban intake of kcals per consumer-unit -- is misread by
not setting these discrepancies against the probably much larger
discrepancies in requirements. In 1971-2, 32.6 percent of urban
households, as against 28.8 percent of rural, enjoyed fewer than
2300 kcals per consumer-unit per day. Less relevant was that average
caloric intake per consumer unit was 2539 in urban areas and 2924
in rural. 34/ But these gaps must be set against the greater rural
incidence of (a) parasites and infections; (b) relatively energy-
demanding work, income earning (including walks to, among, and from
plots), and domestic work (especially fetching water); and
(c) pregnancy and lactation. All these substantially raise
requirements of energy per consumer-unit. The sums have not
been done, but there is strong supporting evidence in economic
behavior 35/ that rural dietary requirements exceed urban,
for the underfed, more than do intakes. Rural areas, unlike
towns, also suffer from the perverse coincidence of seasons
of hardest work, scarcest food, and greatest risk of infection. 36/
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Rural India is probably more underfed relative to needs than urban
India. Thus -- as marginal damage increases with caloric deprivation -- rural
India is the priority area for "treatment" to prevent or to cure nutritional
risk. To this pure "welfare" argument must be added two dynamic considera-
tions. First, productive rural outlays not only provide income for the
hungry, but normally increase food output. Second, urban outlays -- by
attracting persons, income, and hence marketable food to the towns -- somewhat
increase food losses in transport and storage.
Although the evidence on the direction of change in Indian poverty
is unclear, the states in which it is most serious are less in doubt.
Agricultural laborers, the most at-risk group, were likeliest to be below a
rigorous poverty line in 1970/71 in Orissa (72 percent of households),
Maharashtra and Karnataka (almost 60 percent), Uttar Pradesh (51 percent),
and Rajasthan (43 percent). 37/ In most years, these show up as the most
serious areas of poverty overall on National Sample Survey data, alongside
West Bengal, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and (implausibly) 38/ Kerala. In these
states, too -- except Uttar Pradesh, where there has been recent improvement in
many areas -- Sen's poverty index is consistently highest. 39/
There are, in brief, two belts of extreme risk and exposure. One is
Northeast India -- West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. This region still depends
mainly on monsoon rice, for which high risks deter farmers from incurring
investment and current costs. HYVs, except in a few northern wheat areas,
have brought no real breakthrough. Moreover, agrarian structures are more
unfavorable and overall income distributions more unequal 40/ than in the rest
of India.
The second very exposed area is the unirrigated semi-arid heart-
land that covers most of Maharashtra, northern Karnataka, and western Madhya
Pradesh. These areas depend mainly on millets, sorghum, and (in Madhya
Pradesh) rainfed wheat. Bajra and wheat HYVs have made somewhat more progress
in areas of moisture stress than rice HYVs, but the risks still deter major
private investments, and tenurial conditions and land concentration are less
unfavorable than in Northeast India.
Such "placing" of povery by states assumes highly imperfect markets.
The relaxation of food zoning may permit poverty to be more evenly shared than
in the past, though transport costs, delays, and bottlenecks will always
keep food markets segmented and imperfect. Intra-rural migration is also an
equalizing factor, although a growing rural work force, mechanization (usually
ill-advised 41/ -- the 1981 decision to favor the use of combine harvesters
involves, where implemented, a reduction of over 90 percent in harvest employ-
ment per acre), and ethnic separatism (from Shiv Senalto Assam) limit its
scope. Shuttle migration between city and country, especially in time of
hunger, renders the urban poorest to some extent an overflow of rural poverty.
Shuttle migration is heavily concentrated, for reasons of language and distance,
in intra-state movements. This fact, together with the operation of state-
specific agricultural policies and to some extent of de facto foodgrain
zoning, still makes it reasonable to expect differences in exposure to food
risk to continue to cause larger differences in the incidence of poverty among
states than within states.
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Both the poverty belts, the Northeast and the West, also have high
weather risk. This leads naturally to the question: When are the poorest
most likely to be pushed below the margin of nutritional danger? For India
as a whole (and for states containing three-quarters of the rural population
in poverty), years of high agricultural output tend to have less poverty. 42/
Probably a regression of the proportion in poverty on annual food output
would yield a stronger relationship, for more states and probably also for
urban poverty. This suggests that both high agricultural growth and "good"
years in a given growth sequence reduce the incidence of poverty -- i.e., of
exposure to food insecurity. Bad water-control possibilities, in Northeast
and West India, at once curtail the economic options for growth (including
research) and raise the downward semi-variance of food output below the low
levels produced by such curtailment.
The seasonal distribution of poverty has been neglected until
recently. Especially in one-crop areas (most of Rajasthan, Maharashtra,
Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka), the second half of the wet season is a time
when many stresses coincide, especially for deficit farmers and landless
laborers. Food stocks run out; prices are high; work requirements are great;
infections are prevalent; and transport of food and medicine is often
difficult. In Bangladesh, the Cholera Research Laboratory has shown that both
child and adult morbidity and mortality are highest at this time, and that
this is related to peaks of undernutrition. 43/ (Implications for agricul-
tural and health policy are considered elsewhere.) 44/ Improved household-
level storage by deficit farm households 45/ and the introduction of crops or
varieties that are robust in face of poor weather but can be harvested at
unusual times may have advantages -- in reducing the seasonal food insecurity
of the most vulnerable -- not captured in conventional benefit/cost analysis,
even with income-distribution weights.
These indications of when and where food security is at risk are
general. They do not, therefore, guide policy responses to particular
events. If a bad monsoon affects a particular time, help is required at that
place and time. "When and where" can, however, indicate to food security
planners:
- the type and location of general measures of relief that need to
be prepared; for example, employment guarantees have been relatively
successful in Maharashtra and Karnataka, partly for administrative
and political reasons, but partly because drought-prone and
single-season agricultures, prevalent in most parts of these
states, render employment protection a relatively effective
safeguard; if so, Madhya Pradesh is a strong candidate for an
employment guarantee scheme;
- the areas and times of year 46/ for which readily available
food reserves and public health initiatives are likely to be
most cost-effective;
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- above all, the priority areas and seasons for investment and
research to prevent or reduce food insecurity in the longer
term: e.g., by producing more low-cost calories such as millets;
by redistributing command over assets that produce relatively
secure calorie sources (such as irrigated land or urban home garden
plots); 47/ or by reducing the variation of output (especially of
cheap calories) and of labor income over time (through better
water control, catch crops, or varieties bred -- even at some cost
in expected yields -- to resist moisture stress and/or photo
periodicity and hence to perform relatively better in less
favorable seasons or years).
Following up Visaria's work, 48/ analysis of data from the annual
rounds of the National Sample Survey suggests characteristics of the poorest,
as distinct from the poor, affecting nutritional risk. 49/ It is too early to
give detailed results. Broadly, however, in the Western "poverty belt" farmers
with below 1 to 2 ha. of land are nearly as likely to be in the lowest quintile
of income-per-consumer-unit as the landless laborers or the poorest urban workers;
in the Northeastern belt even mini-farmers are at considerably less risk than the
landless. Unemployment is a much greater risk to the poorest than was once
believed. Single-member families and families with several small children and
only one working member are especially likely to be in the poorest quintile by
income-per-consumer-unit. (This is consistent with evidence about nutritional
and medical conditions in large, young families.) 50/ More familiarly, the
individuals at greatest nutritional risk are pregnant and lactating women and
children from six months to three years old 51/ (especially if they have many
older siblings) 52/. In particular, diarrhea can worsen undernutrition, which in
turn increases death risk -- but not infection risk -- from diarrhea; hence
protection of drinking water may be a major, albeit tricky and expensive, 53/
weapon against food insecurity, 54/ especially in the infection-prone wet season,
among the under-fives, for Harijans (the hereditary castes of ex-untouchables who
remain the likeliest to have unclean water sources), and in rural areas and urban
slums without standpipes.
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III. ADJUSTMENTS TO WORLD ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS: EFFECTS ON PERSONS AT
GREATEST NUTRITIONAL RISK
The main causes of food insecurity in India are domestic: low
levels and unequal distribution of food output, of land and other assets to
produce it, and of investments to increase and (especially via water control)
to stabilize it. The really grave danger to the Indian poor posed by world
economic fluctuations is the indirect risk that these fluctuations will again
induce the Government of India -- as during the Second and Fifth Plans -- to
shrink expansion to a "core" of investment that severely reduces outlays on
agriculture, especially for increasing or stabilizing food production for
consumption by deficit farmers in drought-prone or monsoon-dependent areas.
To illustrate the relatively lesser direct effects of world economic
fluctuations on the poorest -- via reduction in either food availability or in
poor people's "exchange entitlements" (that give access to food in exchange
for cash or work) -- I shall examine three possible areas of deleterious
adjustment: energy supply to agriculture; fertilizer and its feedstocks; and
food pricing.
There appears to be no good reason why Indian agriculture should
be vulnerable to rises in the relative price of fossil fuels. Third World
agriculture is much less fossil-fuel-intensive, especially in food production,
per unit of value added than (a) Third World non-agriculture, (b) developed
agriculture, (c) non-agriculture as compared with the use ratio between the two
sectors in developed countries. First, agriculture, with some 70 percent of the
work force and producing 40-45 percent of national product, used only 4.6
percent of India's commercial energy in 1970-71 55/ -- mainly for lifting and
draught (indirect use via fertilizer is treated below). Second, agriculture
is especially light in its demands on largely imported types of fossil fuel
(oils and their most immediate substitute, coal); agriculture used about 4.3
percent of India's oil consumption in 1974, and 4.6 percent in 1976. 56/
Third, agriculture accounted for only 9.7 percent of India's growth in commer-
cial energy consumption in 1970-77 (industry 75.4 percent). 57/ Fourth, rapid
growth in agriculture's requirements of energy has taken place largely in the
electricity sector -- from 0.2 billion kilowatt-hours (4.2 percent of Indian
sales, as against 63.7 percent industrial and 12.5 percent domestic) in 1951,
to 10.1 billion kwH (14.6 percent, as against 58.7 percent industrial and 9.8
percent domestic) in 1977-78. 58/ This pattern of growth in demand reflects
the facts that conversion efficiency of engines declines with size much
less rapidly when they run on electricity rather than fossil fuels and that
agriculture (and even irrigation) on balance runs on much smaller engines
than industry in India. The reliance on electricity by agriculture, there-
fore, will intensify with adjustments to energy price increases. Yet the
dependence of much Indian electricity on non-peak uses of hydropower and the
non-substitutability of electricity for imported oil in most transport uses
render this energy source less vulnerable to world disruptions of energy
supplies or prices than other commercial fuel sources.
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The poverty belts should be even less vulnerable. Unlike the
l'unjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh, they are seldom tractorized,
though diesel and electrical pumpsets and major irrigation are important
in the Northeast. Nor do they use much energy via fertilizer.
The poorest people in the less-poor areas, rural and urban, may be
the most vulnerable to sharp price rises or supply failures in oil and
petrochemicals. However, casual empiricism suggests that non-delivery, due
to transport failure (at ports or railway marshalling yards) or to priority
for urban users or for cash crops, is a more important cause of fuel supply
shortfalls to food growers than are fluctuations in world availabilities
or prices. The closer India moves towards self-sufficiency in energy and
the more agricultural energy growth relies on electricity and on non-commercial
energy types, the clearer it will be that food vulnerability is mainly an
internal issue.
That is especially the case for the poorest. Many are purely
manual laborers; in rural areas, their energy is a substitute for fuel-based
mechanical energy (e.g., in animal plowing or rice husking), and demand for it
rises if fossil fuels become scarcer or more expensive. (In urban formal
employment, complementarity prevails, so energy shortages mean lay-offs; I
know of no Indian data on this.) The crops grown by micro-farmers and eaten
by the poorest urban and rural people are especially likely to be coarse
grains and root crops, which probably -- though once again statistics are
lacking -- are even less commercial-energy-intensive than agriculture as a
whole.
One cloud on the horizon, as regards the impact of world energy
problems on the poorest Indians, concerns (a) depletion of some non-
commercial energy sources, especially firewood; 59/ (b) rising kerosene
prices; and hence (c) rising real cost of buying -- or collecting, at even
greater distances -- domestic fuel. If rising costs of feedstock, and hence
of fertilizers, further encourage the diversion of dung from fuel to manure,
the heating and cooking resources of the poorest will become even more vul-
nerable. Research into cereal varieties with high conversion efficiencies of
nitrogen into grain (especially at low root nitrogen uptake) -- perhaps via
nitrogen fixation -- gains aaded urgency.
Although neither average nor extra production in agriculture
have been directly fossil-fuel-intensive, there remain indirect effects of
scarcer, or more expensive, energy on food production. (Unfortunately the
data are lacking to trace such effects systematically through an input-output
table.) One recurring fear has concerned the effect of energy costs of
incentives to use fertilizers on food crops, since fertilizers will "soon
take the biggest share [45-55 percent] of the total commercial energy that
goes into ... agricultural production, ... particularly in developing
countries." 60/ Yet, after doubling in the eight months following the oil
price quadrupling of October 1973, prices of most major fertilizers to
Indian farmers fell back to about 150 percent of pre-October levels and
stayed there until mid-1979. Paddy and wheat prices rose slightly faster
than nitrogen prices and substantially faster than single-superphosphate
prices from 1971/72 to 1978/79. Improved varieties and techniques, moreover,
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raised the average return per rupee of nitrogen from Rs 2.64 in 1971-2 to
Rs 3.24 in 1978-9 in paddy and from Rs 3.78 to Rs 4.29 in wheat despite the
big rise in input levels. Returns per rupee spent on single-superphosphate
fertilizer rose even faster. 61/
Thus fertilizer consumption for food grains -- which rose from
2.2 kg/ha in 1960-1 to 5.7 in 1965-6 and 19.5 in 1972-3 -- fell off only
slightly to 18.4 kg/ha in 1974-5, rose to 29.1 in 1977-8 and probably to
over 33 kg/ha (still very low) by 1970-80. 62/ Sustained growth in fertil-
izer input is the best proxy variable (in explaining food output) for, and
delivers benefits in close conjunction with, other purchased inputs to food
production. 63/ But can the dramatic growth of 1965-80 fertilizer input be
sustained? Nitrogenous fertilizer, in particular, has been rendered, by
past fossil-fuel price rises that have raised the share of feedstock in its
cost especially vulnerable to future rises. Suppose the mid-1973 price of
a bag of urea comprised 85 units of non-feedstock cost and 15 of feedstock
cost. Quadrupling of the latter raises the price to (85 + 60), or by 45
percent, by mid-1973. But now feedstock represents (60/145) or 41.4
percent of total cost. If this element doubled in price in 1979-80, that
represents a price rise for urea from (59.6 + 41.4) units to (59.6 + 81.8)
units, namely by 41.4 percent -- almost as severe as the impact of the
1973-4 quadrupling. Since this new rise in feedstock prices raises the
fossil-fuel (feedstock) component in urea costs to (81.8/(59.6 + 81.8)) or
57 percent, it has left the incentive to use urea even more vulnerable to
future feedstock price rises.
So it cannot be assumed, because past fertilizer consumption
resumed rapid growth after only one year following the 1973-74 rise in
fossil fuel prices, that off-take of this key input for food security will
be equally immune to higher fossil-fuel prices in the 1980s. Moreover,
renewed growth in consumption owed much to government decisions to reduce
domestic protection and to increase fertilizer subsidies 64/ -- a costly
path with limited prospects for extrapolation. 65/ In the future, it would
be wise to assume that:
- feedstock will comprise a growing proportion of
fertilizer costs;
- price-elasticity of demand for fertilizer will rise,
especially for poorer users;
- the government's capacity and wish to insulate fertilizer
users from price rises due to more expensive feedstock
will decline;
- therefore, the price of feedstock is potentially a
growing threat to fertilizer off-take;
- unstable fertilizer prices (due to capacity cycles),
combined with high and rising prices (which depress
the growth of food output most in India's relatively
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well-watered areas, at once the biggest fertilizer
users and the most stable sources of food output)
may still seriously threaten the year-to-year
stability of India's food output.
Nevertheless, there are two factors that give hope. First,
phosphatic (P2 05 equivalent) and potassic (K20 equivalent) fertilizers
represent a rapidly growing share of total fertilizer use; tonnages distri-
buted in 1979-80 were 1,010,000 of P2 05, 592,000 of K20, and 3,500,000 of
nitrogen, as against only 7,000, 7,000, and 56,000, respectively, in 1950-51.
The impact of fossil fuel prices upon production costs is much smaller for P
and K than for N fertilizers -- a kilogram of N nutrient requires (in manu-
facture, packing, transport and application) about 2 kg. of fossil fuel, but of
P only 0.33 kg and of K only 0.21 kg, including mining and concentration. 66/
Hence the faster growth of P and K reduces the energy input risk to overall
fertilizers available for food production. Second, domestic production of
utilized N from fertilizer reached 63.5 percent of use in 1979-80, and of
P205, 75.5 percent; by 1987-8 they are to reach 87.1 percent and 84.4
percent, respectively, on quite modest assumptions about capacity use. This
reduces vulnerability to prices and availability of imported energy, because
within India natural gas from Bombay High and South Bassein has enormous
comparative advantages for fertilizer production (in the strict sense -- i.e.,
if we consider assignment of all commercial fuels among all users), is available
in large quantities, and has been assigned by the Government as the "preferred
feedstock for fertilizer production." 67/
In recent years, and for the 1980s, it is probably not adjustments
to world markets that -- as it were -- stand between fertilizers and the food
security of poor and hungry people. Rather it is the lopsided concentration of
fertilizers on:
- a minority even of the districts with assured irrigation:
of 380 districts (289 substantially foodgrain-dependent) 68/,
55 use nearly 60 percent of fertilizers, and a further 54 use
another 20 percent; 69/ it is the at-risk districts that are
least supported by (and possibly, given research and irriga-
tion biases, least economic for) fertilizer use;
- larger farms (despite lower levels of land productivity, of
labor use per hectare, and of incidence of food crops),
perhaps because of lower distribution costs; 70/
- non-foodgrains and fine grains, as opposed to the coarse
grains and root crops that, especially in desperate times,
provide the food of the poorest. 71/
The bitterest complaints about fertilizers -- from the industry 72/
and farmers alike -- concern, not absolute scarcity or price (as regards
levels, trends, or fluctuations, whether energy-induced or otherwise), but
poor distribution and port clearances, untimely arrivals, lack of timely
supporting credit (especially for small users), and -- for small and hence
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more risk-averse farmers, for Northeastern and semi-arid rainfed crops,
and for many coarse grains -- the absence of varieties offering reliable
and economic returns from fertilizer use. These factors, rather than inter-
national energy fluctuations, threaten the potential contribution of fertilizers
to Indian food security in the 1980s.
How sensitive is India-s food security to sudden fluctuations in
world grain prices, stocks, or availability? Arguably, the "normal" delivered
price of grains relative to other commodities -- the price of marginal food,
which in general should still be seen in India as imported -- should, if
measurable, be treated not only as shadow price but also as appropriate market
price. It reflects, that is, what India would have to pay to import and deliver
food to replace domestic output forgone. But this use of international food
prices, however well justified, proves nothing about the effects of non-Indian
grain, or of its harvests, stocks, markets, or prices, on the Indian economy
-- let alone on the risks of hunger. There are, indeed, four good reasons to
expect such effects to be fairly small in the 1980s:
(1) India is in normal years at or very near foodgrain
self-sufficiency -- zero net imports. Admittedly, this is
at a very low, and for 10-15 percent of consumer units
grossly inadequate, level of kcal intake (dependent for
that 10-15 percent largely on grain consumption). Sustain-
able improvements in this level, however, entail either
rapid real-income growth or asset redistribution. Rapid
growth was shown in the 1960s to produce unmanageable
problems of wage-goods shortages unless matched by
increasing food output. Asset redistribution involves
major land transfers to poor hungry small farmers -- who
are relatively more productive 73/ and foodgrain-intensive
users of land. In both cases, near-self-sufficiency in
foodgrains would survive a rising level of per-capita
grain consumption in India.
(2) Unlike 1965-77 or 1972-74, the early 1980s see India
with relatively large stocks of grain (currently 10-20
million tons) and, despite a worsening in 1980, substantial
foreign-exchange reserves. One very bad year, or two
rather bad years in succession, would eat up the grain
stocks, but the combination with foreign-exchange reserves
(and, recently, increased use of international private
lending) gives the government a new choice between
imports and stock reductions. Thus, in the main monsoon
season of 1979, a scanty Indian monsoon coincided with a
fairly easy world foodgrain position; in November 1980,
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) declared a food
alert following widespread bad harvests, but Indian food
production in the 1980 monsoon season was again above
trend. 74/ Only in the l-in-4 situation of 1973 (both
Indian and non-Indian harvest below trend) is there a
serious risk of aggregate food problems with foreign
causes, and present stock levels in India should suffice
to handle that risk.
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(3) If grain is imported, transport costs from major
exporters, to and within India, are substantial parts of
total delivered costs, especially since the rises in oil
prices of 1973-74 and 1979-80.
(4) Partly for these reasons, Indian price and stock
policy can, to a considerable extent, remain independent
of world fluctuations in grain harvests, stocks, and
producer prices. In view of unpredictable year-to-year
fluctuations in all these, such independence is probably
wise, provided a trend price-relative between foodgrain
and non-food, reflecting roughly the world year-to-year
average price-relative, is sought. (It is not, of
course, easy to establish.)
India therefore seems surprisingly, though by no means completely,
immune to adjustment problems, generated by world fluctuations, for its food
security. Agriculture depends substantially on non-commercial energy; to some
extent on electricity, which is partly hydropower-based; and, if on fertilizers,
on locally available feedstocks (natural gas). If anything, world energy price
rises -- and fluctuations in supply -- increase India's comparative advantage in
foodgrain production, which is relatively economical of commercial energy and
especially of imported oil and its derivatives. Nor is a 95-105 percent self-
sufficient foodgrain economy of 675 million persons obviously over-exposed to
world grain uncertainties.
So all is well? Obviously not. The last paragraph is full of
aggregates. At least 10-15 percent of Indians 75/ are seriously underfed.
They live in poverty belts in Northeast and West India, where risks of downward
fluctuation, both in food production and in the earning power of the poorest,
are very high. The point is not that poor Indians are food-secure. It is that
their food insecurity is not for the most part externally induced and aggregative
-- even in the most general sense, the decelerating demand for Indian exported
manufactures in the wake of the developed world's "slum protection" has had no
identifiable nutritional impact -- but is intranational in origin and related
to timely local availablity of cheap calories and of the resources to obtain
them.
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IV. INTERNAL FOOD INSECURITY IN INDIA
Table 4.1 shows that the instability of foodgrain output has not
declined in India since the 1950s. The time-trend explains a smaller
proportion of the variability of foodgrain output (56 percent) in the 1970s
than in the 1950s (72 percent), though more than in the 1960s (27 percent),
with India's once-in-a-century succession of monsoon disasters in 1965 and
1966. This evidence from regression coefficients is confirmed by the
coefficients of variation. On both, too, there is a clear increase from
the 1950s to the 1970s in variability of foodgrain area, whereas yield
variability is clearly less in the 1970s than in the 1960s, but no less
than in the 1950s. This is surprising. Gross irrigated area expanded from
13.7 percent of gross cropped area in 1951-2 to 28.2 percent by the mid-
1970s, 76/ and is probably 30 percent now. The "New Strategy" for food-
grains after 1965 explicity, and it seems successfully, sought to concen-
trate grain output growth in areas of assured water supply, notably the
Punjab and Haryana. How, then, is the apparent failure of output stabili-
zation explained? What is its incidence among regions and crops? Is it
likely to continue in the 1980s? And what are the likely effects on the
food security of those most at risk?
Section III argued that the international "shocks" of the 1970s did
not significantly retard or destabilize Indian foodgrain output. The rainfall
index, measuring the quality of rainfall as an input to food production, also
showed a lower coefficient of variation from 1970-71 to 1977-78 (namely, 9.7
percent) than during the 1950s (11.7 percent). 77/ We must therefore seek
internal causes of increasing -- or at least non-declining -- instability.
Which ones?
Blaming the HYVs, for instance, via the yield faltering of 8156-based
North Indian wheats in the early 1970s, is implausible. New HYVs in several
crops and regions are steadily coming on stream, are increasingly bred for
low variability (robustness) instead of the maximal yield potential, 78/ and
compensate for not only one another's failures (via the law of large numbers)
but also the clear retardation in many unirrigated non-HYV districts. 79/ The
growing stress of HYV research on robustness, coarse grains, and unirrigated
areas, if encouraged, should continue to operate against instability and
insecurity in foodgrain output.
To a substantial extent, expansion of irrigated area has failed to
stabilize output. One sign is the very slow expansion of cropping intensity:
111.1 in 1950-51, 114.1 in 1955-56, 114.6 in 1966-67, in 120.2 in 1975-76. 80/
Larger top-end farmers use "excess" (but free) water to take
high-value main crops, to drown weeds, etc., thereby denying poorer tail-
enders water for a second (or sometimes even a first) crop. This is due
mainly to poor management and control of irrigation systems above the outlet
-- lack of incentives, lack of agronomic training on crop-water requirements,
low priority for maintenance, and corruption -- and not, as often alleged, to
the farmers' own faults. 81/ Since tail-enders are usually among the poorest
and most labor-intensive farmers, their "water insecurity" directly increases
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Table 4.1
Growth and Fluctuations of Major Indian Food Crops, 1950/51 - 1979/80
I I I I IiI
1 | Trend rate of growth I Average output I Average area | Average yield | Variability (coefficient | R2 of output on time
| | (Percent per year) I (i. metric tons) I (kgs. per ha.) I (kgs. per ha.) of variation about trend) | trend (adj.)
1 |I First 3 Last 3 i First 3 Last 3 First 3 Last 3 |
I Output Area Yield | years years I years years | years years Output Area Yield I Output Area Yield
IFoodgrains I
SOs 4.16 1.93 2.23 1 54.01 72.67 98.79 113.35 546 640 j 7.05 2.29 5.08 j 0.724 .845 .591
60s 1.84 0.52 1.32 1 81.63 96.19 1116.88 121.80 1 698 790 1 8.84 1.75 7.32 0.272 .379 .122
70s1 2.90 0.56 2.34 103.54 123.67 1122.07 126.66 1 848 970 1 6.78 2.07 5.34 j 0.565 .255 .523
Whea t 1
SOs 4.62 4.17 0.04 7.35 9.43 j 10.00 12.58 734 747 8.16 6.13 6.74 0.6422 .765 .107
60s 6.33 2.23 4.10 11.28 18.05 13.36 15.87 844 1136 15.52 6.73 9.84 0.5504 .440 .541
70s 4.44 2.27 2.18 I 25.00 31.91 I 18.94 21.53 I 1320 1480 I 8.40 3.86 5.84 I 0.6010 .667 .414
509 2.59 1.51 1.08 25.55 30.11 30.44 33.13 838 908 7.27 1.04 6.74 .409 .931 .041
60s 1.28 0.80 0.48 34.49 39.15 34.83 36.95 991 1059 10.49 1.64 10.74 ¶ .100 .645 .105
70s 2.11 0.98 1.14 41.50 50.83 37.08 39.66 1108 1281 6.31 2.10 6.50 .436 .674 .059
ISorghum
SOs 4.22 1.01 3.22 6.3 8.7 I 16.3 17.7 384 495 11.85 4.05 9.46 .478 .274 .459
60s 0.70 0.13 0.61 9.2 9.8 118.3 18.6 I 500 530 8.62 1.51 7.74 .061 .054 .070
70s 4.86 -0.63 5.49 7.6 11.2 16.6 16.0 458 697 9.17 3.10 9.09 .670 .186 .760
IMille: I I
SOs 2.40 1.51 0.89 6.07 7.41 16.53 08.23 367 40o 8.68 4.87 7.47 .347 .397 .U12
60s 1.47 0.82 0.65 7.85 8.47 18.51 19.67 405 430 I 10.00 2.41 8.49 .057 .454 .072
70s -0.55 -1.09 0.54 9.56 9.55 19.08 18.05 497 528 16.71 3.91 13.80 .115 .360 .111
MTa1zoe I1 I i
SOs | 7.03 3.08 3.95 2.2 3.6 3.4 4.2 866 841 10.59 4.01 8.98 .733 .851 .566
60s 4.14 3.41 0.73 4.3 5.9 4.5 5.7 958 1029 6.48 3.43 4.77 .806 .886 .067
709 -0.05 0.36 -0.91 6.3 5.7 5.8 5.7 1001 1012 j 12.40 2.57 11.43 .105 .044 .062
Wheat I
S0s 4.00 3.01 0.93 1 8.7 11.5 19.2 23.9 450 480 8.93 3.11 6.47 .616 .884 .056-
60s f -1.31 -1.34 0.03 j 11.9 11.4 1 24.0 22.0 500 518 11.66 2.45 11.45 .021 .701 .125
70s I 1.49 0.97 0.52 10.9 11.9 21.9 23.3 500 507 8.96 3.81 6.92 1 .051 .226 .099
Sources and Methods; Outputs, areas, sod yields fro. F.H. Sanderson and S. Roy, Food Trends and Prospects in India, pp. 20,26,33,40-41, except
millets, where our data are for all millers (not just bjwra) and are from Agricultural Situation in India, Jan. 1980, p. 765;
FAO, Monthly Iull. Stats. Jan. 1980, p. 13; and FAO Production Yearbook, 1952, p. 3 8 ; 1953, p. 39; 1954, p. 3 3 ; 19SS,p.33;
1957, p4;959, .47; 1962, p4 7; 1972, p8 4 ; 1974, pS4 ; 1976, plO2; and 1977, p104. (Consistency was checked and most recent
data were used.) 1978-9 and 1979-80 data from Agricultural Situation in India, Ioc. cit and FAO, Monthly Bull. Stat., loc.
cit. 1950s are 1950-1 to 1959-60, 19 6 0s are 1960-1 to 1969-70, 1970as are 1970-1 to 1979-80, except: Foodgrains exclude
1979-80; wheat excludes 1950-1 and 1959-80; rice excludes 1950-1; pulses exclude 1979-80. Trend rates of growth are best-fit
exponential.
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the vulnerability of at-risk groups to food shortage -- by raising the
variability, not just of total output of food, but also of access by the
poorest to income with which to buy food. The present unreliability of many
major gravity-flow systems is a major barrier to food security, and it is not
clear that "command area development programs" have improved matters much.
In view of the increasing rarity of new, economic groundwater, plus the
rapidly rising real cost of new gravity-flow systems, 82/ improved technical
(agronomic, not just hydraulic) and managerial structures in existing systems
are in the 19 80s the most important potential source of better food security.
The shift from area expansion to yield expansion as a major source
of growth in foodgrain output is shown in columns 1-3 of Table 4.1. The last
three columns show that the fit of output to a time-trend, except for sorghum,
is normally much better for area than for yield. Therefore the shift from
area-based to yield-based expansion, a shift likely to intensify, normally
tends to increase the variability of output about the time-trend (propor-
tionate difference, in a year chosen at random, between actual output and
what would be expected from a fluctuation-free time-trend). Table 4.1 is
"incomplete" because it fails to disaggregate changes in foodgrain output due
to changes in cropping pattern (a weight, not a cash, measure of grain output
is used, as this is a better indicator of food-value) and in cropping intensity
(aggregated into gross area measures, to permit comparison between total
and specific foodgrains). Probably "completion" in this sense would stress
even more the increasing reliance of output growth on crop-specific and
season-specific yield increases. This too can be extrapolated, given the
rapidly rising marginal cost of irrigation, plus the fact that most of the
obviously attractive, HYV-technology-induced changes in cropping pattern
have probably occurred already. Appropriately adapted, economic and robust
HYVs will therefore become even more important in the 1980s, relative to
other innovations, in determining stability of foodgrain output.
Most noticeably, the dramatic increase in the instability of
output among coarse grains (with the partial exceptions of sorghum) and pulses
has contributed to the failure of the "new strategy" to stabilize total Indian
foodgrain output. This has been associated with poor growth performance.
Hybrid bajra gives far too favorable a picture of millets as a whole, which
-- due to the poor performance of ragi and minor millets -- showed very slow
output growth in the 1960s, decline in the 1970s, and no significant time-
trend for yield in either decade (or in the 1950s), as well as a clear rise in
variability of output in the 1970s, with (increased) yield variability rein-
forcing, not correcting, area variability (itself somewhat reduced). Maize
presents a similar picture. Both are clearly being pushed off the better,
more stable, irrigated areas, in favor of crops where HYVs have made more
progress. That, dramatically, was the fate of pulses in the 1960s. For
sorghum, the HYVs make the 1970s look rather better, but this is probably due
in part to absence of the 1979-80 data (probably well below trend); output and
yield, even here, show higher coefficients of variation in the 1970s than in
the 1960s and almost as high as in the 1950s.
Hence the factors responsible for the reduced stability of most
foodgrain outputs and yields have been: expansion of irrigation into less
certain areas; poor management and poor reliability of these exported
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gravity-flow areas for tail-enders; increasing dependence of growth on yield
expansion (inevitably less sure than area expansion); and relative neglect
-- and pushing out of safer areas -- of coarse grains. Unlike the external
factors we have largely absolved of blame for growing instability -- oil
markets, world grain prices, rainfall variability -- these are in principle
policy variables. Also the damage from output variability is mitigated by
higher mean output (and stocks) per person; but the mitigation is limited,
because the extra output is mostly not the right food, in the right place,
at the right time. The coarse grains afflicted by instability are,
especially in hard times, the staples of the poorest people, as well as
important sources for them of income (to buy food) from wage employment and
self-employment. The incidence of rural unemployment is highest, not just
among the poorest quintile of persons, but in times, and presumably places,
of relatively low agricultural output. 83/ Coarse grains have experienced
slow growth (or decline) as well as high and increasing instability. This
deprives the poorest, who are most at risk of undernutrition, at one and
the same time of local or self-produced food availability and of prospects
to obtain work to earn "exchange entitlements" for food; 84/ and it does so
at times and places of relatively costly purchased food.
Doubtless, were disaggregated crop and area data up to date
and reliable, it could also be shown that kharif rice, in unirrigated or
badly-drained districts, showed similarly low and worsening growth and
stability. If so, the above conclusions about the internally originating
food insecurity of India's Western poverty belt would apply also to the
Northeastern belt. Of course, even in a country of vast distances (and
with roads that are often unreliable during the monsoon), one must not argue
as if every state, district, and village should be self-sufficient in food-
grains. Markets do exist; so do comparative advantages. But very poor
people, without reserves, and who rely wholly on such abstractions, may die
in the short run. A clear implication of the very different patterns of
changing insecurity -- in which irrigated, surplus wheat areas, for example,
have raised output (and income) per person and stability, while coarse grain
(and perhaps unirrigated rice) areas have reduced both -- is the need to
provide the poorer, at-risk groups in the latter areas with priority in the
allocation of primary health care; of micro-irrigation (where economic); of
improved on-farm facilities for storage (and perhaps other post-harvest
processing) on a scale sufficiently small to enable marginal and deficient
farmers to retain their crop; of right-to-work programs; of non-farm,
labor-intensive activities producing outputs reliably saleable, when crops
are bad, for cash "exchange entitlements" for food from other areas; and of
research into improved crop robustness and water control. The "Drought-
prone Areas Programme" could focus some of these strategies on some of
the areas where large proportions of people are at risk.
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V. INTERACTIONS AND POLICY RESPONSES
At the level of micro inputs and outputs, Indian food security,
even for the poorest, looks much less vulnerable to external shocks than
might be expected a priori. This paper has made only a very modest start
at statistical proof of this. However, I have little doubt that it is
more or less statistically provable that internal downward fluctuations
in access to food by poverty groups are a much more serious threat to the
survival and health of poor Indians than are external downward fluctuati-ons
in aggregate food availability.
Against this (more or less) hard fact must be set a soft hunch.
It is that the aggregate responses of Indian policy-makers to world
recession and to energy shortages and risks do involve major threats to
the food security of at-risk groups, in a way that input-output and other
micro relationships, more or less demonstrably, do not. The importance
of an effect is in no way related logically to the "hardness" (for example,
the quantifiability) of the proof of that effect. It is greatly to be
hoped that statistically oriented organizations will accept that the soft
wood may matter more than the hard trees. There are three ways in which'
the government's aggregate adjustments to external recession, fluctuation,
and uncertainty might threaten the food security of at-risk groups.
The first is the government's response to sudden resource scarcity,
or the threat of it. What do Indian policy-makers do if access to foreign
exchange is, or seems likely to be, sharply curtailed, most plausibly by
inflation of prices of imports (especially oil or food); by protection against,
or recession in markets for, exports; or by declining aid? The historical
evidence, both in the retreats to a core Second Plan in the late 1950s and from
the abandonment of the minimum income program in the early 1970s, is that it is
agricultural and anti-poverty programs -- and especially the intersection of
these two sets -- that suffer most when resources are scarce. Moreover, the
inflationary experiences of the 1970s, although modest and well-controlled'by
most standards, have led India to contractionist gut-reactions -- involving;
drastic cuts in public expenditures rather than attempts to raise more resources
or develop incomes policies -- more similar to those recently familiar in several
OECD countries than to most other Third World situations. In a sense, the
Government of India is its own IMF.
The second danger, especially if usable food stocks shrink rapidly,
is that the government will concentrate its energies within agriculture even
more upon secure sources of food surplus production. Even from the stand-
point of those at greatest food risk, there would be a strong case for such
a response, if
- income distribution were fairly equal;
- food movements were rapid, efficient, and cheap
per ton-mile;
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- markets or policies effectively induced workers
to move from, and/or nonfarm capital to move to,
areas unfavorable for secure food production.
These conditions are on the whole absent in India. They are unlikely to be
created in the wake of external shocks -- recessionary or cost-inflationary --
because such shocks will reduce available resources and intensify conflicts
over their use: conflicts in which those with much income and power have
natural advantages. More mundanely, more expensive energy means more
costly food transport to points of need.
The third danger concerns the balance between export promotion and
import substitution as a policy goal. The government has in the past 5-10
years done much to rectify the tilt, typical of its earlier economic policies,
towards import-substitution that was often randomly structured and that almost
always turned the terms of trade and the incentives to allocate resources
against agriculture. Modest measures of trade-freeing in OECD -- notably the
EEC's list for the generalized scheme of preferences, which compensated in
part for the protectionist impact vis-a-vis India, of the Community's Common
External Tariff and of its special trading arrangements with its African and
Caribbean Associates, with the European Free Trade Area, and with the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) -- have helped India to expand
important manufacturing-export sectors, often non-traditional. So have joint
engineering ventures with OECD firms in West Asia, the softer terms of capital
inflows, and good harvests. All these -- but above all reasonable export
growth -- have given the government confidence in moves, however gradual, away
from restrictionist and anti-agricultural trade policies. If India's export
prospects are retarded due to recession and protection in the OECD, then the
forces calling for reversion to the older, import-substituting postures will be
greatly strengthened. In practice, this reversion would almost certainly
damage the relative short-run prospects for food production and for the
poorest groups, whatever its virtues as a long-run development strategy may
be. India's tentative entry into the Eurodollar markets in late 1980 marks a
further attempt to secure the cash base for renewed expansion without renewed
protectionism; if a world debt crisis were to curtail such options, or even
worse, lead to cumulative contraction of credit, then India could swiftly be
driven back to the defensive postures of 1956-65.
It has (I think) been shown that external shocks do not represent
a major threat to the food security of India's at-risk groups and that
internally induced, local disturbances around a precarious mean normally
do. It has been suggested -- not shown -- that government adjustments to
international setbacks may also involve such a threat. What of the reverse
effect: the effect of the government's adjustments to internal threats to
food security upon its vulnerability to external shocks?
Four possible government policies might be pursued to reduce
food insecurity. The first is the safety net, making available relief
(with public-works programs, via health insurance, by remission of land
revenue, etc.) to an at-risk group, either after or as a prior guarantee
against a decline in either its food availability or its earning power. The
second is "betting on the safe" -- concentrating efforts to improve output
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(varietal research, price-incentives, fertilizers) of crops and areas of
small variability and in particular of assured water supply. The third is
"strengthening the unsafe": raising their average intake of food, so as to
reduce the suffering implicit in an X percent (or in a Y kcal.) decline in
their daily food intake per consumer-unit. The fourth is "making the
unsafe safe": reducing the variability of their access to food.
The government's "New Strategy" for agriculture since 1965 has
explicitly centered on betting on the safe, especially growers of irrigated
wheat. That strategy has succeeded in keeping food output growth ahead of
population growth and in building up a substantial safety margin of grain
stocks. However, as we have seen, instability of food output has not
decreased. Moreover, further attempts to raise the share of output in
"safe" areas -- apart from their reliance on uncertain transfer mechanisms
when the poorest people in the "unsafe" areas go short of food -- are bound
to run into diminishing marginal returns. A final factor is the high and
rising energy intensity of further output in the Punjab and Haryana. Our
arguments above, that food production is not comparatively energy-intensive
and especially not oil-intensive, apply rather less forcibly to marginal
wheat and rice production in safe areas -- often tractorized (and diesel-
fueled), and increasingly watered by tubewells with diesel or non-hydro-
electric pumps. With oil and its derivatives costing India 70 percent of
export earnings as of late 1980, such factors must militate against
further emphasis on "betting on the safe." So must interregional food
transport costs. The strategy has yielded substantial results, but it is
vulnerable to external "oil shocks" as well as being, as a route to food
security in an unequal society, itself worryingly insecure.
If more "betting on the safe" increases external vulnerability,
more "strengthening the unsafe" appears very attractive and tends to reduce
vulnerability. This is because marginal coarse grain output in the West,
and much marginal monsoon rice in the Northeast, is both input-extensive
and unlikely to be diverted from poor beneficiaries in response to world
movements in oil or grain prices, or in demand for Indian exports. The
poor eat the outputs themselves, and/or work to produce them. The trouble
with strengthening the unsafe is that, in the existing state of knowledge,
it may well not be at all cost-effective. Research outputs, permitting
dramatic yield gains that significantly increase net farm income, are just
not yet available in most monsoon rice or rainfed bajra, ragi and jowar
areas. Much of the ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-arid Tropics) and AICMIP (All-India Co-ordinated Millet Improvement
Program) work, and some IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) and
AICRIP (All-India Co-ordinated Rice Improvement Program) work, is extremely
promising of such outputs, however. At least since the mid-1970s, such work
has been explicitly directed toward robustness, especially under moisture
stress, even at the expense of very high yields. The agro-economic work on
farm systems, involving watershed management in sloping but rainfed areas, is
exciting. So is the work to retain high-yielding qualities and pest-resistance
for several years in millets, via composites. But strengthing the unsafe, for
all its moral appeal and economic promise, requires a major rise in outputs
from -- and probably in input to -- research for the affected crops and areas
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(above all, perhaps, for rainfed rice in the Northeast and for minor millets),
if it is to work. When it does, it will improve the immunity of food security
from external shocks.
Making the unsafe safer, however - reducing the downward fluctuations
about low means, above all in yearly food output in the Northeast and West,
but also in yearly and in seasonal access to earnings (command over food) by
the urban and rural poorest in many parts of India - may have all the appeal
and security against international fluctuation of strengthening the safe, and
a lot more policy practicability even without major new research. All over
India, tail-enders could gain security in bad years (and slack seasons) from
improved system management by irrigation maintenance officials -- now,
without waiting for new research. And these are among the poorest and
most-at-risk groups, second only to farmers in semi-arid unirrigated areas in
exposure to water uncertainty. For farmers in semi-arid areas, much could be
done toward a similar goal. Work to discover where small-scale irrigation is
effective, by establishing the precise location, depth, recovery costs and
benefits, and amount of groundwater, followed by credit for private or
co-operative well-building, could give very large numbers of micro-farmers
the confidence to invest. In Northeast India improvements in drainage and in
water-weed control could similarly reduce insecurity. These are not exciting
or new proposals. However, they could, by a timely reversion to traditional
"security" functions of irrigation (away from the much more recent concern
with growth), give many small farmers the confidence to invest, to employ
more of the landless, and, paradoxically, by shifting to security -- to lay
the basis for renewed growth.
- 109 -
NOTES TO PART 4
1. Being prepared by the Agriculture and Rural Development Depart-
ment of the World Bank under the direction of Dr. G. Donaldson.
2. Net foodgrain output, per head of Indian population, rose from
161.4 kg in 1967-68 to 172.1 kg in 1970-71; fell in three of
the next four years to 145.4 kg in 1974-75 (over halfway back
to the 1965-66 disaster level of 128.3 kg); but then rose to a
peak of 206.7 kg in 1978-79. F. Sanderson and S. Roy, Food
Trends and Prospects in India, Brookings, 1979, p.7 8; Agriculture
Situation in India, Jan. 1980, p. 765.
3. D. Antiporta and R. Barker, "Food production and demand,"
Supplementary Papers: vol. 1, p.5, to Rural Asia: Challenge
and Opportunity, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1978; C.H.
Hanumantha Rao, Technological Change and Distribution of Gains
in Indian Agriculture, Macmillan (Delhi), 1975, p. 8.
4. For evidence that any improvement was indeed slight, see D.
Tyagi, "Farm prices and class bias in India," Economic and
Political Weekly, XIV, 39, 29 Sept. 1979, esp. pp. A-121-A-122.
5. FAO, State of Food and Agriculture 1978, Five Year Plan 1978-83:
Final Report (Rome); Planning Commission, Delhi, 1980;
P. Streeten and M. Lipton (eds.), The Crisis of Indian Planning,
Oxford, 1968, p.8 6. Figures are for agriculture, irrigation,
forestry, and fisheries.
6. In 1979 the SFDA (catering to farmers with 1-2 ha) and the
Marginal Farmers' and Landless Laborers' Association or MFAL
(catering to farmers with below 1 ha) were merged.
7. N. Reynolds and P. Sundear, "Maharashtra's employment guarantee
scheme - a programme to emulate?," Economic and Political Weekly,
XII, 29, 16 July 1977; K. Dandekar and M. Sathe, "Employment
guarantee scheme and food for work programme," Economic and
Political Weekly, XV, 5, 12 April 1980.
8 V.S. Vyas, "Some aspects of structural change in Indian agricul-
ture," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXIV, 1, Jan-
Mar. 1979, esp. p.4.
9. P. Visaria, Living Standards, Employment and Education in Western
India, 1972-3, Working Paper no.1, joint ESCAP-IBRD project or
evaluation of Asian data income distribution, Washington, Rev. 1977,
tables 17-20. For example, 11.1% of person-days were "unemployed"
in rural Guyarat in 1972-73 among the bottom decile of households
marked by income-per-person -- but only 3.8% among the top two
deciles, (table 17)
- 110 -
10. Some evidence suggests that in Latin America as many as 57
percent of infant and child deaths are "associated with
malnutrition" (R.H. Cassen, India: Population, Economy,
Society, Macmillan, 1978, p.107). See, however, 0. Koksal,
"Effects of nutrition on infant and maternal mortality in
specific developing areas," Turkish Journal of Paediatrics,
18, 3/4, 1976, pp.7 2-9.
11. P.V. Sukhatma, Malnutrition and Poverty, Ninth L.B. Shastri
Memorial Lecture, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics,
Delhi, 1977.
12. A useful discussion is S.S. Bhalla, Measurement of Poverty -
Issues and Methods, World Bank, 29 Jan. 1980, pp.6 9-9 6.
Internal circulation only.
13. G.S. Bhalla and Y.K. Alagh, Performance of Indian Agriculture:
A Districtwise Study, Sterling (New Delhi), 1979, p.67.
14. Bhalla and Alagh, pp. 84, 108, 139. Rice yield fell in Orissa
(by 1.4% yearly), Maharashtra (by 1.1%), Rajasthan (0.6%), and
Bihar (0.1%) viz. in states containing 35 of India's 189 rice
districts; and jowar yield fell in most districts (pp. 76-7,
81,101).
15. Sanderson and Roy, p.38, estimate that in 1970-71 coarse grains
(planted on 34% of foodgrain area in 1978, and accounting for 25%
of foodgrain output) received 14% of fertilizers used on food-
grains.
16. Bhalla, loc. cit.; and M.S. Ahlwahlia, "Rural poverty and
agriculture performance in India," Journal of Development Studies,
1-4,3 April 1978.
17. See, for example, Cassen, p. 95.
18. P.V. Sukhatme, "Assessment of adequacy of diets at different
income levels," Economic and Political Weekly, XIII, 31-32, Aug.
1978, esp. pp. 1375-82.
19. P.V. Sukhatme, "Nutrition policy: need for reorientation,"
Economic and Political Weekly, XV, 26,28 June 1980, p. 1103; cf.
Cassen, p.92.
20. C.H. Shah, "Food preferences and nutrition: a perspective on
poverty," 39th Conference, Indian Society of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Bangalore, 18 Dec. 1979; M.R. Rao, "Nutrition situation
in India during 1971-72," Sarvekshana, Jan. 1979. On the sale of
ration books by the poor to meet non-food needs, see L. Gulati,
"Rationing in a Peri-urban Community: Case Study of a Squatter
Habitat," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XII, 12, March 1977
p. 506.
21. Since the poor and the poorest, in rural areas, derive most
income respectively from own-farm employment and farm-labor
self-employment, sharp cuts in food production lead mainly to
"failures of exchange entitlements" for the poorest, but to
"food availability deficiency" for the poor. A. K. Sen, "Famines,"
World Development, 8, 9, Sept. 1980.
22. N.S. Jodha, "Effectiveness of farmers' adjustments to risk,"
Economic and Political Weekly, XII, 25, 25 June, 1978.
23. Forced sale of assets, entry into debt bondage, etc.; cf. Jodha.
24. Bhalla, p.42, summarizes the substantial Indian evidence.
25. Cassen, pp. 58-63.
26. Relative cost, feasibility, and incidence of benefit must of
course be known before the suggestions can be turned into a set
of policies. For evidence that the cost of preventing each death
involving undernutrition is lowest if prenatal care is stressed
-- and rises with the child's age at intervention -- see A.
Kielmann et al., "The Narangwal nutrition study: a summary
review," American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 31, 11, 1978
27. For evidence that over 80% of alleged anthropometric evidence of
inadequate dietary energy concerns low height/age ratios and/or
weight/age ratios -- and that these are probably often harmless
- see D. Steckler, "Small but healthy," mimeo, Ford Foundation,
New Delhi (n.d. but probably 1980).
28. The effect is not in reducing work capacity per unit of body
weight (except in extreme cases), but in raising the heat-rate at
similar (sub-maximal) work loads. K. Satyanarayanana et al.,
"Nutritional deprivation in childhood and the body size, activity,
and physical work capacity of young boys [aged 14-17 in rural
Hyderabad]," American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 32, 9, 1979;
G.B. Spurr et al., "Functional assessment of nutritional status:
heartrate response to submaximal work," ibid., 32, 4, 1979.
29. C. Martinez and A. Chavez, "Nutrition and development of children from
poor rural areas: 7," Nutrition Reports International, 19,3, 1979.
30. Leading ultimately via marasmus to starvation; but a ratio of 20%
or over in women, or 12% or over in men, would presumably be
considered safe by most experts.
31. Leading ultimately either via kwashiorkor to starvation, where
classic protein-calorie malnutrition (PCM) presents as protein
deprivation a rare phenomenon in India except as a by-product of
caloric deprivation (Sukhatme (1977)); or via impaired immune
response to repeated and/or prolonged infections and death (R.K.
Chandra, "Malnutrition and infection", in M. Wallerstein (ed.),
Proceedings of 1979 MIT Nutrition Conference, MIT Press, forthcoming).
- 112 -
32. For the relation of these to intra-village inequality, see
B. Dasgupta, Village Society and Labour Use, Oxford University
Press. (Delhi), 1977, pp. 180-87; cf. S. Epstein, South India:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, MacMillan 1973, pp. 46-49, 213, 217.
33. In the late 1960s, urban prices exceeded rural prices by about
15 percent (G.S. Chatterjee and N. Bhattacharya, "Rural-urban
differences in consumer prices," Economic and Political Weekly,
IV, 20, 17th May 1969, p.850). I would expect an even narrower
gap now.
34. M.R. Rao, pp. 111-12.
35. Choice of expensive calories by the urban poorest caused the NSS
urban poverty line to set at over twice the rural level (Shah,
p.9) despite a price differential of only about 15% (fn. 33
above). See also Rao, p. 113-4.
36. S. Schofield; "Seasonal factors affecting nutrition with special
reference to pre-school children," Journal of Development Studies,
Oct. 1974.
37. Cassen, p. 243.
38. See Cassen, p.95 for evidence of substantial understatement of
caloric intakes in Kerala.
39. Ahluwahlia (1978), p.3 06.
40. Ibid., p.317.
41. H. Binswanger, The Economics of Tractors in South Asia, Agricul-
tural Development Council, 1978.
42. Ahluwahlia (1978), p.3 13.
43. A.K.M.A. Chowdhury, S. Huffman, and L.C. Chen "Interaction of
Agriculture, dietary practices and infection on seasonal dimen-
sions of energy malnutrition," in A. Pacey, R. Chander, and
R. Longhurst (eds.) Seasonal Dimensions to Rural Poverty.
44. R. Chambers, R. Longhurst, D. Bradley, and R. Feachem, Seasonal
Dimensions to Rural Poverty: Analysis and'Policy Implications,
IDS Discussion Paper No. 142, Feb. 1979.
45. R. Boxal, M. Greeley, D.S. Tyagi, M. Lipton, and J. Neelakanta,
The Prevention of Farm-level Food Grain Storage Losses in India:
A Social Cost-benefit Analysis, IDS Research Report, Brighton,
Oct. 1978.
- 113 -
46. R. Longhurst and P. Payne, Seasonal Aspects of Nutrition:
Review of Evidence and Policy Implications, IDS Discussion
Paper no. 145, Brighton, Nov. 1979; Chambers and Longhurst;
R. Chambers, Health, Agriculture and Rural Poverty: Why Seasons
Matter, IDS Discussion Paper No. 148, Brighton, Dec. 1979.
47. The World Bank's project in Indonesia and The International
Fund for Agricultural Development's (IFAD's) 1979 proposals to
the Government of Sri Lanka indicate great potential for home
garden development. Any program to purchase urban land for
allotments or garden plots, however, would require finance for
purchase or compensation.
48. P. Visaria, op. cit.; and his Working Paper no. 3 on the same
project, "Size of Land Holding, Living Standards and Employment
in Rural Western India 1972-73, Washington, Oct. 1978; also P.
Visaria and S. Pal, Poverty and Living Standards in Asia;
World Bank, Feb. 1980. (internal circulation only).
49. Work in progress for PPRD by M. Lipton.
50. Cassen, pp. 94-106.
51. P.V. Sukhatme, "Nutrition policy: need for reorientation,"
Economic and Political Weekly, XV, 26, June 28 1980, p. 1103.
52. Gopalan (1969) found only 32% of his sample of children, but
62% of cases of nutritional deficiency, with birth-rates 4 or
higher -- a risk 3.5 times as great (Cassen, p.9 2). This actually
understates the disparity, because a larger proportion of
children with higher birth-orders die before reaching any given
age of entry to an (age-stratified or random) sample.
53. R. J. Saunders and J.J. Warford, Village Water Supply, World
Bank, 1976.
54. Sukhatme (1980), p.1103.
55. W.E. Tyler, Energy Resources and Economic Development in India,
Nijhoff, 1978.
56. A.V. Desai, India's Energy Economy: Facts and Their Inter-
pretation, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Bombay, Feb.
1980, pp.35, 80.
57. Desai, p. 78.
58. Desai, p. 42.
59. J. Adams and W.E. Tyner, "Energy in rural India: national policy
from the village perspective," Indian Journal of Agricultural
Economics, XXXII, 4, Oct.-Dec. 1977, pp. 79-81. See also World
Bank, World Development Report 1981, pp. 40-42.
- 114 -
60. FA0, The State of Food and Agriculture 1976, Rome, 1978, p.97.
61. G.K. Sohbti, "Fertilizer prices: historical perspective,"
Fertiliser News, 24, 4, April 1979, pp.6-7 and cover.
62. Sanderson and Roy, pp.24-5; Fertiliser News, 24, 7, July 1979,
p.54, and 25, 6, June 1980, p.5 1. The assumption that a steady
70% of all fertilizers go onto foodgrains is somewhat arbitrary,
but was known to be about right in 1970/71.
63. Sanderson and Roy, p.22. The following illustrative calcula-
tions - the exact initial proportions assumed for mid-1973 have
no significance - assume cost-plus pricing and no impact of
fossil-fuel prices on the non-feedstock components of urea cost.
To remove the latter simplification strengthens the argument;
to remove the former complicates but does not in essence change
it.
64. K.V. Ramanathan, "Fertilizer demand and supply situation in
India," Fertiliser News, 25, 1, Jan. 1980, p.2 6.
65. Partly due to financing problems, partly because of a policy
decision to protect domestic fertilizer producers. It is not
clear that, even at present levels, subsidies compensate ferti-
lizer buyers for the price increases caused by protection.
66. Ramanathan, p. 26; "Statistical notes," Fertiliser News, 25, 6,
June 1980, p. 51. (Ramanathan shows that the share of P is
projected to grow somewhat further and of K substantially further,
at the cost of the share of N, until at least 1987-88.) Energy
requirements of fertilizers from FAO, State of Food and Agricul-
ture 1976, pp. 97-8.
67. Ramanathan, pp. 26, 28; "Statistical notes," p. 51.
68. Bhalla and Alagh, p. 67.
69. Ramanathan, p. 26.
70. Sanderso-. and Roy, p. 64. For convincing evidence on size-
productivity, see fn. 73.
71. Ibid. p. 38; in 1970-71 coarse grains, planted on 34% of food-
grain area, received only 14% of fertilizer, and - partly for
this reason? - contributed only 25% of output.
72. Fertiliser News, 24, 7, July 1979 (special number on fertilizer
marketing).
- 115 -
73. R.A. Berry and W.R. Cline, Agrarian Structure and Productivity
in Developing Countries, John Hopkins, 1979, esp. the appendix
by S.S. Bhalla.
74. R. Righter, Sunday Times, 9 November 1980.
75. "At least" because the greater incidence of undernutrition
among the under-fives renders the proportion of affected Indian
persons greater than of consumer units.
76. Sanderson and Roy, pp. 157-58.
77. Ibid., p. 156; if an index covering 1976, with its serious
drought, and 1980 were available, the variability for the 1970s
would probably be close to the 1950s level.
78. M. Lipton, "The technology, the system and the poor: the case of
the new cereal varieties," in Institute of Social Studies,
Developing Societies: the Next Twenty-five Years, Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1979.
79. Bhalla and Alagh, pp. 84, 86, 98-99.
80. Sanderson and Roy, p. 158.
81. R. Wade, "Mobilization of local resources for irrigation:
support of changes in water management," paper presented at ADC
Seminar Mobilizing Local Resources for Irrigation, 11-15 August
1980, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The alleged "faults" of farmers (top-
enders' greed, tail-enders' non-maintenance of field channels)
are in fact rational responses to the irrigation managers'
failure to provide reliable water. This, in turn, is a rational
response to the very unsatisfactory training, information,
career structure, incentives, and politicization to which the
Irrigation Department is exposed.
82. Sanderson and Roy, pp. 127-28, estimate investment costs per gross
hectare (in 1975 prices) of major and medium-size surface-water
projects at $450 in 1968-9/1973-4; $900 in 1977-9; and $1,350 by
2000. On groundwater, see pp. 140-41.
83. Raj Krishna, Rural Unemployment - A Survey of Concepts and Esti-
mates for India, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 234, April
1976, p. 37.
84. A.K. Sen, "Famines as failures of exchange entitlement," Economic
and Political Weekly, XI, 31-33, Special Number, August 1976.

COMPANION PAPERS IN THIS SERIES
No. TITLE OF PAPER AUTHOR
449 Policy Experience in Twelve Less Developed Countries B. Balassa
470 Industrial Country Policy and Adjustment to Imports J.M. Finger
from Developing Countries
471 The Political Structure of the New Protectionism D. Nelson (consultant)
472 Adjustment to External Shocks in Developing Countries B. Balassa
473 Food Policy Issues in Low-Income Countries E. Clay (consultant)
474 Energy, International Trade, and Economic Growth A. Manne (consultant)
475 Capital-Importing Oil Exporters: Adjustment Issues A.H. Gelb
and Policy Choices
476 Notes on the Analysis of Capital Flows to Developing R.C. Bryant (consultant)
Nations and the 'Recycling' Problem
477 Adjustment Experience and Growth Prospects of the F. Jaspersen
Semi-Industrial Countries
478 Trade Policy Issues for the Developing Countries I. Frank (consultant)
in the 1980s
479 Trade anong Developing Countries: Theory, Policy 0. Havrylyshyn
Issues, and Principal Trends (consultant)
M. Wolf
480 Trade in Services: Economic Determinants and A. Sapir (consultant)
Development-Related Issues E. Lutz
481 International Migrant Workers' Remittances: Issues C. Swamy
and Prospects
482 Private Bank Lending to Developing Countries R. O'Brien (consultant)
483 Development Prospects of the Capital Surplus R. Hablutzel
Oil-Exporting Countries
484 Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries and A. Fleming
Their Determination
485 International Adjustment in the 1980s V. Joshi (consultant)
No. TITLE OF PAPER AUTHOR
486 Adjustment in Low-Income Africa R. Liebenthal
487 A Comparative Analysis of Developing Country C. Wallich
Adjustment Experiences in the 1970s: Low-Income
South Asia
488 Developments in and Prospects for the External N. Hope
Debt of the Developing Countries: 1970-80 and
Beyond
489 Global Energy Prospects B.J. Choe
A. Lambertini
P. Pollak
